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ARTICLES
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR AGENTS,
AGENTS AND THEIR PROSECUTORS
Daniel Richman *
This Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal
prosecutors and federal enforcement agents, and to suggest how these dynamics affect the exercise of enforcement discretion. After considering the virtues
and pitfalls of both hierarchicaland coordinate organizational modes, the
Article offers a normative model that views prosecutors and agents as members of a "working group," with each side monitoring the other. It concludes
by exploring how this model can be furthered orfrustrated with various procedural and structural changes.
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INTRODUCTION

Although the concern is hardly a new one, I recent years have seen
intense interest in prosecutorial discretion and motivation. 2 One reason
for this renewed focus may be the advent of the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, which according to most analyses have increased the power of
prosecutors vis-A-vis other actors in the criminal justice system." Another
may be the growing recognition that the road to criminal justice reform
lies not through the battleground of defendant rights-where trench
warfare has replaced the swift advances of the Warren years 4 and even the
1. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, DiscretionaryJustice: A Preliminary Inquiry 188
(1969) [hereinafter Davis, Discretionary Justice] ("[T]he American legal system seems to
be shot through with many excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers but the one
that stands out above all others is the power to prosecute or not to prosecute."); Norman
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L.
Rev. 1, 25-33 (1971) (calling for publication of prosecution guidelines);,John laplan, The
Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 174 (1965) (offering personal
recollections about exercise of prosecutorial discretion in one U.S. Attorney's Office);
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am.J. Comp. L. 532
(1970) (discussing the need for structured controls on prosecutorial discretion).
2. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power,
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393 (2001) [hereinafter Davis, American
Prosecutor] ("[P]rosecutors daily exercise practically unlimited discretion and engage in
...controversial investigative practices."); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordhamn
L. Rev. 851 (1995) (proposing system of financial incentives to curtail prosecutorial
misconduct); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 'J.Crim. L. &

Criminology 717 (1996) ("The current flaw in the evolving power of the prosecutor is the
failure to force her to face the full cost of prosecutorial decisions."); Robert Weisberg, A
New Agenda for Criminal Procedure, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 367 (1999) (detecting "sense
that the challenge of a new criminal procedure will be to find ways of evaluating and, if
necessary, newly regulating, that vast area of the system that often gets relegated to the
default category of executive branch 'discretion'").
3. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 926 (1991) ("The sentencing reform movement
has not restricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion from
judges to prosecutors."); Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained,
and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L.
Rev. 679, 748 (1996) ("[T] he limitation of unaccountable judicial discretion is, on balance,
a beneficial result of the Guidelines. The fact that other participants in the criminal system
...exercise far more influence over sentencing than they did before the Guidelines is no
cause for alarm."); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81
Cal. L. Rev. 1471, 1475 (1993) ("By determining sentencing outcomes as a function of
charging decisions, the sentencing guidelines have had the unintended effect of giving
more control over the sentencing outcome to the person who controls charging, the
prosecutor.").
4. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (establishing procedures for
the interrogation of suspects in the custody of law enforcement agents); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to states). Trench
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advances have generally proved to be just chits to be traded for lower
sentences5-but through attention to whatJerry Lynch has called the "indigenous administrative-inquisitorial structures that in fact process most
6
American criminal cases."
The renewed focus on prosecutorial discretion is salutary, as we
move beyond simplistic assumptions of "conviction maximization," in
search of richer descriptive models. 7 But efforts to celebrate or bemoan
prosecutorial power go too far when they deny due attention to the law
enforcement agencies that are primarily responsible for case selection
and choice of investigative tactics. 8 No one, of course, really dismisses the
role of the police. 9 But the model is static: The police or (in the federal
system) "agents" decide whom to arrest or investigate, and prosecutors
decide whom to charge. Each enforcement actor is treated as making an
independent discretionary decision, supreme within his realm. If anyone
has the upper hand, it is the prosecutor, because she has the last word.
The first goal of this Article, pursued in Part I, is to replace this picture with one showing how the iterated interactions between agents and
warfare means no swift retreats either. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432
(2000) (reaffirming Miranda); see also Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466,
2471-2503 (1996) (showing relative stability under Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts
of constitutional norms regarding police practices).
5. Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1181,
1237 (1996) ("[l]n a criminal justice system in which plea bargaining is the dominant
mode of adjudication, the chief significance of a much-vaunted constitutional right may lie
in its value as a bargaining chip.").
6. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 2117, 2151 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Our Administrative System].
7. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 981-89 (1997) [hereinafter Richman, Old Chief]
(recognizing that motivations other than mere conviction maximization lie behind
prosecutorial decisions about which gun cases to bring); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12J. Legal Stud. 289, 295-96 (1983) (explaining
that a prosecutor "attempts to obtain the maximum deterrence fr-om his available
resources ... by bringing new prosecutions until the marginal deterrence available from
investing extra resources in a given prosecution is the same as the return available from
investing in some other prosecution"); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 63 (1971) (arguing that prosecutors seek maximization of
convictions weighted by sentence).
8. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of
the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 259, 259-61 (2000) (modeling
selection of drug cases for federal prosecution based on assumption that decision is made
primarily by prosecutors).
9. See Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime
338-40 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969) [hereinafter Miller, Prosecution]; Sarah J. Cox,
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 383, 412 (1976) ("Because
the prosecutor occupies a central position in this [system that includes other agencies and
officials, and] which requires cooperation, coordination, and compromise of all its
participants, his own need to cooperate, coordinate, and compromise restricts his exercise
of discretion.").

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:749

prosecutors will affect investigative and adjudicative' decisionmaking
and the allocation of enforcement resources. Although the resulting
equilibria elude specification, the factors that affect the allocation of
power at least can be identified. Because general discussions about the
police-prosecutor dynamic that ignore institutional structures and procedural rules miss some of the most important of these factors, the focus
here is on a single system-the federal.
A second goal of this Article is methodological. In the late 1960s,
Kenneth Davis and others put criminal procedure on the road to an encounter with administrative law.' I But the encounter has proved somewhat sterile. Davis's normative agenda has long become a standard part
of the criminal procedure literature, with a long line of distinguished
scholars echoing his call for formal guidelines to channel enforcement
discretion.12 By contrast, the positive contributions that an administrative law perspective offers to understanding the enforcement bureaucracy
have been left largely unexplored, an oversight that has become particularly regrettable now that administrative law scholarship has been enriched through the introduction of insights from positive political theory
and institutional economics.'
The insights of the administrative law literature are not the only ones
left untapped, to the detriment of criminal justice analyses. So too has
been work, mostly in corporate law literature, relating to the institutional
role of lawyers. 14 While the relationship between prosecutors and agents
10. "Adjudicative" here refers not to judicial decisions btIL to decisions as to how the
government will proceed in the post-arrest phase of a case.
II. See Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 1; see also Charles D. Breitel, Controls
in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 427, 432-35 (1960).
12. Davis, Discretionay Justice, supra note 1, at 188-214; Abrams, supra note I, at
4-7; Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
StUdy of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1036 (1972);,James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of ProsecUtorial Power, 94 Har-v. L. Rev. 1521, 1560-72 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 432
(1989) (analyzing how strtucture and process inlfluence behavior of administrative
agencies); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of StrIctural Choice: Toward a Theoiy of Public
Bureaulcracy, in Organization Theo-y 116 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., expanded ed. 1995)
(argtiing that political scientists studying political buireaucracy should constr'uct new
organization theories rather than borrowing those theories from economics and other
disciplines); Edward L. Robin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discoulrse, and the
Microanalysis of Institttions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1413 (1996) (observing that cturrent
trends in the law and economics movement converge on institutional analysis issues);
Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics
Perspective, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 306, 308 (1999) (examining bureaucracy through the
lens of transaction cost economics).
14. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand
Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869 (1990) (using the analytical tools of law and
economics to investigate lawyers' professional standards); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies] (discussing "the circumstances under which
liability rules shotlcd directly target the incentives of leading corporate participants,"
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is at heart very different from that between lawyers and clients, the obstacles to coordination that this literature labels "agency problems" may still
enter into that bureaucratic interplay, and the agent-prosecutor dynamic
can be illuminated from this perspective. Similarly, one can also profitably draw on insights from the behavioral law and economics and cognitive psychology literatures, which counsel that we temper rational choice
analysis with a recognition of 5systemic biases that may have behavioral, as
1
well as institutional, origins.
Drawing on these analytical perspectives, the methodological project
here is to reduce the insularity of the criminal enforcement literature,
and engage in the kind of "microanalysis" envisioned by Edward Rubin:
"an institutionally grounded analysis of the classic question concerning
the role of pluralistic and rational decisionmaking in a democratic system."'16 The goal is to make sense of interactions at a middle level of
theory, particularized enough that actors would recognize the world they
live in, but streamlined enough that theoreticians and empiricists who
look askance at my uncomfortable straddle might find profitable avenues
for more rigorous study. The risk of facing charges that my model simply
generalizes the experiences of one former prosecutor in an atypical district under superseded conditions17 is just one I'll have to take.',
In Part II, the article moves from the descriptive to the normative
and asks what the prosecutor-agent dynamic should look like in the federal system. Hitching a normative project to an all-too-tentative descriptive endeavor may seem foolhardy, but there is a good necessity defense.
including lawyers, "to control corporate wrongdoing"); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2J.L. Econ. & Org. 53,
53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers] (investigating when liability should be
imposed on gatekeepers, such as lawyers, who can "disrupt misconduct by withholding
their cooperation from wrongdoers"); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc.
L.J. 375, 376 (1997) (exploring "whether lawyers systematically tend to overstate legal
risks").
15. This is not to suggest that the administrative law literature is not also exploring
these insights. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking
to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 616 (2002) (using cognitive
psychology in combination with other theories to investigate the manner in which public
policy decisions are made);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549 (2002) (drawing on cognitive
psychology to explore the poor choices and errors in human judgment the authors
contend are the root of failing public policy). But see Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral
Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 671, 673 (2002) (noting
limitations of literature).
16. Rubin, supra note 13, at 1426.
17. See James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the
Political and Legal Systems 108-11 (1978) (describing exceptional degree of autonomy
that Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office has traditionally enjoyed). I was
an Assistant in the Southern District of New York from 1987 to 1992.
18. Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14-19
(2002) (presenting a devastating critique of "empirical" research in legal scholarship).
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The way power is allocated between agents and prosecutors is a function
of their organic relationship, political preferences, and exogenous contingencies like the attacks of September 11, 2001. It is also, however, a
function of conscious or unreflective choices about particular rules of interaction or organizational arrangements-choices that are not constitutionally or even politically required, and could easily be different1 t) So
long as these choices are being made anyway, they might as well be made
on the basis of some vision of how prosecutor-agent relationships should
be structured. After considering the attractions of hierarchical and coordinate models, Part II suggests that the distinctive incentives of prosecutors and agents can most productively be harmonized if the two enforcement elements are seen as mutually monitoring members of a working
group.
The working group paradigm may seem to some like a fancy way of
describing the status quo. Perhaps it is, and we live in the best of all
possible worlds. Given the range of agent-prosecutor dynamics across the
federal system, however, it is far more likely that there is room for improvement (to put it mildly). Part III explores some mechanisms for
such improvement. Casting its net broadly, it shows how a focus on institutional dynamics reveals opportunities in some surprising places for
criminal procedure law to promote healthier relationships among law enforcers and, by doing so, to advance some of the same values we strive to
protect through the judicial process.
A note on the quiet comparativism of this Article. Thinking broadly
about separation of power dynamics within criminal enforcement systems
obviously could have payoffs outside the federal system. One might even
gain insights into how to structure an enforcement system from scratch,
as is being done in the European Community2 ' and in the area of international criminal law, where the tensions between Hague prosecutors
and their NATO enforcers, highlighted during the Kosovo crisis, were
(depending on one's perspective) a source of embarrassing inaction or of
increased moderation and accountability. 2 ' But the main effort here is
19. See infra Part III (exploring how legal and institutional changes could affect
allocation of power between prosecutors and agents).
20. SeeJohan Goethals et al., Preface: The Future of the Public Prosecutor's Office in
the European Union, 8 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. just. 149, 151 (2000) ("[O]ver the
past few years there has been a growing body of opinion in 'Brussels' to set tip a European
prosecution service to improve the protection afforded under criminal law of the financial
interests of the European Community."); see also Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in
Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1501, 1536
(2002) (identifying possibility of "a separate Eturopean Prosecutor's Office for the
investigation and prosecution of firaud against the European Community").
21. See Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Svrp. 37, 40
(1999) (discussing a prosecutor for International Criminal Tribunals for Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda who "find[s] it personally appalling to stIggest that the
participation of SFOR [Stabilization Force] troops in arrests would jeopardize the
fundamental operational principal [sic] of evenhandedness and that arrests should,
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not to devise some unified field theory of enforcement discretion, or suggest the need for transplantation (or exportation). Indeed, one of this
Article's aims is to highlight how attention to institutional and procedural
context must dominate any inquiry into such discretion. The references
to analogous or divergent practices in other systems are primarily intended to encourage consideration of alternative possibilities, choices,
and historical paths. Yet they also might point the way to a richer comparative literature on how institutional structure can promote the striking
of an appropriate balance between criminal enforcement and the rule of
law.
I.

CONSTITUENT ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION

What Mirjan Damagka characterized as the American embrace of the
"coordinate mode of organization" 2 2-where organizational alignment is
horizontal rather than vertical, and divisions enjoy equal as opposed to
superior or subordinate status-is nowhere more evident than in the federal criminal enforcement system. In state and local systems, the separation of authority that leaves elected executive officials and their appointees bringing criminal cases to prosecutors or county attorneys with their
own electoral source of authority23 is attributable to some combination of
historical tradition and popular preference. In the federal system, the
comparatively late development of criminal enforcement agencies2 4 and
therefore, yield to the higher imperative of the maintenance of the peacekeeping
operation"); Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 855, 880-85 (1999)
(criticizing U.S. government's objections to discretionary power of proposed International
Criminal Court prosecutor); Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Search
for and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 411, 450-52 (1997) (finding that states underrate "the deterrent value of
enforcing the rule of law" and stating that without greater emphasis on arresting war
criminals, "the future of the International Tribunal looks grim").
22. Mirjan R. Damas4ka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 44 (1986); see also
John Hagan, Why Is There So Little Criminal Justice Theory? Neglected Macro- and
Micro-Level Links Between Organization and Power, 26J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 116, 118
(1989) (noting "the loose coupling that is characteristic of American systems of criminal
justice"). See generally Mirjan Damalka, Structures of Authority and Comparative
Criminal Procedure, 84 Yale L.J. 480 (1975) (explaining the "hierarchical" and
"coordinate" models to illustrate features of continental and Anglo-American criminal
processes respectively).
23. See CarolJ. DeFrances, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, at
2 (2002) (stating that in 200 1, all chief prosecutors in state jurisdictions were elected,
except in Alaska, Connecticut, NewJersey, and the District of Columbia);Joan E.Jacoby,
The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity 19-28 (1980) (documenting increase in
power of District Attorneys as they changed from appointed to elected status); James N.
Johnson, The Influence of Politics upon the Office of the American Prosecutor, 2 Am. J.
Crim. L. 187, 190-91 (1973) (discussing benefits of electing, rather than appointing, chief
prosecutors).
24. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law Enforcement, in 2 Encyclopedia of
Crime and Justice 698, 700 (2d ed. 2002).
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the "unitary" nature of federal executive authority25 make the adherence
to coordinate authority, and parallel rejection of hierarchical control,
even more remarkable.
Although all federal prosecutors are housed within the Justice Department (either in the litigating divisions of "Main Justice" or in United
States Attorneys' Offices), not all federal investigative agencies are. The
Secret Service (which handles financial and computer crimes in addition
to its protective duties) and the Customs Service, previously in the Treasury Department, are now both in the Department of Homeland Security,
as is the enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
hitherto in the Justice Department.2" The criminal agents in the Internal
Revenue Service report to the Secretary of the Treasury. Postal Inspectors-whose jurisdiction over mail fraud sweeps in a broad array of criminal activity, and who gained a new visibility in the anthrax investigationare part of the U.S. Postal Service. And criminal investigations are also
conducted by personnel within various regulatory agencies, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection
Agency, and such executive departments as Agriculture, Labor, and Interior. Even within the Justice Department, special agents in the FBI, DEA,
and (since the 2002 Homeland Security legislation) the renamed "Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" 2 7 report not to prosecutors, but to other agency officials, with only the Attorney General and
Deputy Attorney General exercising (or at least possessing) hierarchical
authority over them.28 One often hears rookie prosecutors refer to "my
agents." Most soon learn to drop the possessive.
If neither a line prosecutor nor her chief can dictate how an agency
should deploy its resources or run an investigation, and agency officials
cannot control the adjudicative process, how are the terms of this coordinate relationship set? Part of the answer lies in the macro policymaking
that comprises an administration's criminal justice agenda. Congressional agendas may have similar effects as well. 29 Policy formation and
25. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L1J. 541, 663 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
Harv. L,.
Rev. 2245, 2246-47 (2001).
26. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 821, 116 Stat. 2135
(transferring Secret Service to Department of Homeland Security); id. §§ 411-419
(transferring Customs Service); id. §§ 441-446 (transferring immigration enforcement
functions).
27. Id. §§ 1111-1113.
28. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, DQ Organization Chart, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dojorg.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) *(on file with the Columbia Law Review). For
discussions of how control over the FBI by top Justice Department officials has markedly
increased since the end of the Clinton Administration and the arrival of FBI Director
Robert Mueller, see Philip Shenon & David Johnston, A Partnership Forged to Thwart
Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 2001, at BI.
29. For an example of how administration and congressional agendas can affect
prosectitor-agency relations, see Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of
Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (2001) [hereinafter Richman,
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decisions about implementation (assuming for the moment that the two
are analytically distinct)-" will also occur at the subcabinet level, within
the Justice Department or at the upper reaches of enforcement agency
hierarchies. Even specific cases, because of their importance and national ramifications, may be coordinated and controlled at the highest
levels of the executive branch.3 1
As John Hagan has noted, "there is a need to link the study of microand macro-level organizational and political forces to account more fully
for criminal justice operations and to understand the important kinds of
variations that can occur in these operations across contexts. ''32 My focus
here, however, is on micro policymaking-the interaction between prosecutors and agents in the run-of-the-mill cases that have not been selected
out for special attention by Washington. 33 These cases are generally handled by prosecutors in the ninety-four U.S. Attorney's Offices, and by
field agents scattered across the country (but concentrated in the bigger
cities). In the absence of a clear bureaucratic command, how are they
able to achieve a modus vivendi? What are the structures that drive agenProject Exile]. For an exploration of how legislative influence does not necessarily reflect
the preferences of a legislative majority, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The
Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power (UCLA School of Law, Research
Paper No. 02-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=324482 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
30. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory
Bureaucracies, in Keith Hawkins &John M. Thomas, Enforcing Regulation 3, 10 (1984)
[hereinafter Hawkins & Thomas, Enforcing Regulation] (drawing rough but necessary
distinction between "policy formation"-a "process whereby the agency interprets and
translates legislative goals into rules, standards, and plans of action"-and
"implementation"-"enforcement of these agency directives," including the "operating
routines used by field-level personnel and applied to targets of regulation, decisions about
the application of regulations, and means for obtaining compliance with rules").
31. See, e.g., John R. Wilke, Top Prosecutor in Anderson, Enron Cases Plays for
Keeps, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at Al 2 (discussing role of Assistant Attorney General
Michael Chertoff in Enron investigation); Beverley Lumpkin, Tested Under Fire, Sept. 21,
2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/HallsOqustice/hallsojustice94.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that FBI Director Robert Mueller "in a very real
sense is running" the investigation into the September 11, 2001 attacks); Beverley
Lumpkin, Don't Let the Door Hit You ..., Nov. 16, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/us/HallsOfJustice/hallsofjusticel02.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing Chertoff's central role in September 11 investigation).
32. Hagan, supra note 22, at 122.
33. For an exploration of some of the influences that the political branches have on
federal criminal enforcement policy, see Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757 (1999)
[hereinafter Richman, Federal Criminal Law]; Richman, Project Exile, supra note 29; see
also Alfred Blumstein, Coherence, Coordination and Integration in the Administration of
Criminal Justice, in Criminal Law in Action: An Overview of Current Issues in Western
Societies 247, 257 (lan van Dijk et al. eds., 1986) (noting that design of criminal justice
system at the "micro level," with "independent and highly fragmented institutions,"
"usually results in great difficulty in coordinating efforts at the macro level in order to
maintain an appropriate balance of workload and resources").
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cies and prosecutors to negotiate the terms of their interaction and that
set those terms?
To capture these dynamics, the strategy here is to make three passes
over the system, increasing complexity with each pass. We start with the
basic institutional structures for investigating and prosecuting cases and
explore the extent to which agency control over investigations and prosecutorial control over the adjudicative process create a bilateral monopoly.
Then, we add an overlay of procedural rules that tend to inject prosecutors into investigative decisionmaking. Finally, we consider the diverse
cultural forces that both separate and bind the two groups.
Before we look at how the game is played, logic would seem to demand starting with an adequate description of the motivations that drive
individual enforcers and their organizations. But here is where I can only
throw ip my hands and beg the reader's indulgence for my failure to
figure out precisely what prosecutors or agents seek to maximize.- 4 Convictions? Sentence-years? Deterrence? Agency prestige? Lifetime earnings? Leisure? My provisional assumption is that every prosecutor or
agent is impelled by a broad variety of motives, personal and institutional,
and that the salience of each motivation to each actor varies greatly. The
effort here, to the extent it focuses on materialist explanations (as opposed to cultural ones),3 5 will be to explore how, given specified incentives on the part of the actors involved, institutional structures will influence the exercise of enforcement discretion.
A. Prosecuitorial Gatekeeping Monopoly
At its heart, the relationship between federal prosecutors and federal
enforcement agents is a bilateral monopoly. Prosecutors are the exclusive gatekeepers over federal court, but they need agents to gather evidence. Agencies control investigative resources, but they are not free to
retain separate counsel. If agents want criminal charges to be pursued
against the target of an investigation, they will have to convince a prosecutor to take the case."" To focus on these truisms, however, is to ignore
34. For a recent review of the literature on bureaucratic behavior, see David B.
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 404-13 (2002)
(presenting historical overview of theories related to delegation of authority to agencies);
see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 488-89 (2002) (challenging assumption that
participants in agency systems engage in rational decisionmaking).
35. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of
Organizations, 23 Ann. Rev. Soc. 479, 481-82 (1997) (dividing literature on legal
environments of organizations into "two metatheoretical perspectives": "a rational
materialist" perspective that "sees organizations as rational wealth maximizers" and "a
normative cultural alternative" that "sees organizations as cultural rule-followers").
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000); United States v. Providence Journal, 485 U.S. 693,
693-94 (1988); Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 156; Philip B. Heymann, The Politics of Public
Management 96 (1987) ("To see a case carried through to conviction, those investigative
agencies that are not within the Department of ILstice must win the support of prosecutors
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the interactions that determine how enforcement discretion is exercised
on the ground.
Let us refine the prosecutorial side of the equation. Federal prosecutors would have monopoly power only if they were able to act through
some central "purchasing" agent. And they aren't. Traditions of local
independence, advantages of local knowledge,3 7 and the limited resources they have because of Congress's affinity for decentralized power 38
are all barriers to the entry of litigating units from Main Justice into a
district without cooperation from the U.S. Attorney. Those units remain
at least potential entrants, however, offering a limited counterweight to
39
the U.S. Attorney's Office's control over its district's criminal docket.
Grand jury investigations into alleged communist infiltration in the late
1940s were, for example, spearheaded by a team of "Special Assistants,"
dispatched to the districts from Washington. 4°1 Although the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division explained to a congressional committee that the goal was merely to ensure uniformity and
gushed over the "wonderful" spirit of cooperation between his office and
the districts, 4 1 such flying squads would have been (and still are) potent
reminders of what the Department can do when it fears that districts do
not share its priorities.
One U.S. Attorney's Office can also face competition from another.
Where a metropolitan area is divided among two or more federal districts
(as when a large city lies near a district's border), flexible federal venue
rules 42 will allow an aggressive investigative agency to play one U.S. Attorwho are under the attorney general."). Certain agencies, including independent agencies
like the SEC and executive agencies like the INS, can pursue violations administratively.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000) (authorizing immigration inspectors); 15 U.S.C. § 78u
(2000) (authorizing SEC to pursue Title 15 violations). The analysis here assumes a
universe of cases in which agencies would like to seek criminal sanctions.
37. See Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 114-18.
38. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 806-07.
39. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1063 ("The very existence of the Tax Division, which
sends a completely packaged case to the U.S. Attorney and will, on occasion, send a special
prosecutor if the U.S. Attorney is reluctant to proceed, creates pressure from within the
enforcement branch to proceed.").
40. John G. Heinberg, Centralization in Federal Prosecutions, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 244, 255
(1950).
41. Id. at 255-56.
42. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) ("[W]here a crime
consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any
part can be proved to have been done." (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73,
77 (1916))); see also United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 314 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Venue
[for a criminal prosecution] will lie wherever ... essential conduct elements [of the
charged offense] have occurred. Venue will also lie where the effects of the defendant's
conduct are felt, but only when Congress has defined the essential conduct elements in
terms of those effects."); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In a
conspiracy prosecution, 'venue is proper in any district in which an overt act . . . was
committed by any of the coconspirators.'" (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145,
147 (2d Cir. 1994))).
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ney's Office off against another, steering its "best" cases to the district that
has given the agency the best service by taking less alluring cases or offering the "best" (i.e., the most accommodating) legal support for investigations. 43 Indeed, the malleability of venue doctrine-and the broad geographical reach of all too many criminal enterprises-allows rivalries
between non-contiguous districts to develop as well, even as Washington
44
strives to develop means of resolving such differences.
The possibility that another federal prosecutorial office can take
cases from its jurisdiction may not be of great concern to a U.S. Attorney's Office. Disputes may occur when two offices simultaneously reach
for a high-profile case holding the promise of institutional and personal
glory, but ordinarily the universe of potential federal cases is large
enough (and low profile enough) to allow any number of offices to pursue territorially overlapping matters with little friction. The important
point for our purposes, however, is that the overlap of prosecutorial authority inevitably reduces the ability of each office to control investigative
agencies' access to federal court, and consequentially reduces the extent
to which an office can leverage its gatekeeping power into control of
those agencies' agendas.
The overlap between state and federal criminal law also offers agencies some choice, at least in theory. Although the federal system is generally thought to offer significant procedural and resource advantages over
43. See Howard Kurtz, Prosecutors Vie in N.Y. Crime Wars: U.S. Attorneys in
Brooklyn and Manhattan Keep Eyes on Bad Guys-and Each Other, Wash. Post, Aug. 12,
1988, at A25; Selwyn Raab, Prosecutors' Feuds Hinder Inquiries, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991,
at B4 ("Federal agents say that jurisdictions are so fuzzy that they sometimes shop between
Federal prosecutors in Manhattan and Brooklyn to see which office is more receptive to
their cases.").
44. See Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement (CAFLE)
Hearings, Dec. 2, 1998, pt. I, at 147-48 [hereinafter CAFLE Hearings] (statement of Mark
Calloway, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina) ("[M]any crimes cross
many jurisdictions and districts now so if' the relationship's not good with one U.S.
Attorney's office the agencies usually find another place to get a prosecutor."); U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-00-187, Department ofJustice: Information on the Office
of Professional Responsibility's Operations 27 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/gg00187.pdf (noting that, in September 1996, OPR investigated "three
complaints of alleged misconduct arising out of friction between U.S. Attorneys' offices
over the joint use of witnesses" and advised the Attorney General that such problems
"could be expected to increase 'as multi-jurisdictional prosecutions arising out of related
schemes become more common' and that the Department "'may want to implement
procedures to address the resulting frictions between jurisdictions'").
Author's note: The citations to the hearings of the Commission for Advancement of
Federal law Enforcement and quotations from those hearings are based on verbatim notes
the author of this article took of the hearing transcripts while they were posted on the
Internet, on the website of the Criminal Justice Institute of the University ofArkansas. The
transcripts have since been removed from that site and, despite the best efforts of the
author and the Columbia Law Rteviv, have as yet been unattainable. (A request remains
pending at the National Archives.) The unavailability of these transcripts is particularly
regrettable, as they provide a valuable window into the works of the federal enforcement
bureaucracy.
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state criminal processes, 45 the difference will not always be significant, or,

if significant, may still be outweighed by the desire to circumvent federal
prosecutorial gatekeeping. A U.S. Attorney will not mourn whenever federal agencies take cases to the local D.A.'s office and will often want cases
falling below some threshold level to go there. 46 Yet an agency's interaction with local authorities will limit the U.S. Attorney's control, and even

knowledge, of agency activity.
Finally, the size and organization of a single U.S. Attorney's Office
can limit its power if agents can play one assistant or unit off against another. If agents can "shop" cases around until they find a sympathetic
assistant, gatekeeping standards can fall victim to a "race to the bottom,"
in which those individual prosecutors with the lowest standards (or, from
another perspective, the greatest zeal 4 7) will be the ones to whom agents
most prefer to take cases. 48 Since there are limits to how many cases even
the most acquiescent assistant can take, office standards are unlikely to

fall all the way to his level. But the risk is that agents will reserve for him
the cases over which they want to exercise the most control-which may
be precisely those cases most in need of prosecutorial oversight. If, be45. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1103-25 (1995) (noting
prosecutorial advantages in federal system, including freer use of accomplice testimony
and harsher sentences); see also Steven D. Clymer, UnequalJustice: The Federalization of
Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 668-75 (1997) (stating ways in which defendants
receive less tavorable treatment in federal than in state court).
46. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3, at 739 n.219 (describing five-kilogram cocaine
powder guidelines for United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida
in the early 19 9 0s); Clymer, supra note 45, at 706 n.276 ("In the Central District of
California, where I practiced as a federal prosecutor from 1987 until 1994, screening
decisions for many cases involving duplicative federal statutes were made according to
predetermined guidelines based largely, but not wholly, on drug weights and dollar
amounts.").
47. See Vanessa Blum, Who Is Thomas DiBiagio, Anyway?, Legal Times, Nov. 4, 2002,
at 12 (The new Maryland U.S. Attorney instituted a "resurrection of an old policy allowing
law enforcement agents to bring cases directly to individual prosecutors. By encouraging
lawyers to build relationships with investigators, DiBiagio hopes to foster an
entrepreneurial climate that rewards feisty, hard-working prosecutors.").
48. See RobertJackall, Wild Cowboys: Urban Marauders & the Forces of Order 102
(1997) (telling how one New York City detective "like many [others], was shopping his
cases, looking for [a prosecutor] with the stomach to 'break the fingers' necessary to get
robbers off the streets"); Miller, Prosecution, supra note 9, at 16 (describing measures
taken in one prosecutor's office once it was recognized that police officers, "familiar-at
least as they saw it-with the individual characteristics and reaction patterns of various
assistants . . . , 'shopped around' for the particular assistant who, they believed, would
regard their requests for [arrest] warrants most sympathetically"); see also Kraakman,
Gatekeepers, supra note 14, at 72-73 (noting how wrongdoers can evade interdiction by
seeking out multiple gatekeepers); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel,
and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34
Law & Soc'y Rev. 457, 470 (2000) (documenting inside counsel's belief that if he behaves
"too much like a cop[, t] he business people will simply go without legal advice, or they will
engage in an intra-organizational version of 'forum shopping,' bringing their problems to
the lawyer in the company who is least likely to challenge the business-person's project").
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cause of their significance, these cases are among the most personally
rewarding for prosecutors to work on, other assistants will be tempted to
lower their standards as well. Offices can, and do, counter this problem
by establishing some centralized screening mechanism. 49 But circumvention may still be possible, as sometimes occurs when an assistant pursues a
"related" matter.
These qualifications aside, a U.S. Attorney's Office still has considerable market power when it comes to "purchasing" the fruits of an
agency's criminal investigation. Even in these days of interstate and transnational criminal activity, much of what any particular agency field office
wants to pursue will, as a practical matter, fall within the bailiwick of only
one such office,5t 1 and the refusal of that office to prosecute will end the
matter.
How deeply does gatekeeping by U.S. Attorney's Offices cut into the
agendas of the various agencies that present cases for prosecution to
them? As in any team production context, an assessment of each component's contribution to the joint output evades outside inquiry. 5' Studies
can and have been made of declination rates, and the reasons offered for
declination. 52 But given that every case file is an artifact, what is one to
make of the many cases declined for insufficient evidence? 53" As Nicola
Lacey has noted:
Cases do not simply come into the world 'weak' or 'strong'; to a
significant extent, they are made so by the commitment or noncommitment of investigatory resources.... Thus, the whole conduct of police investigations-distribution of resources and operational priorities, proportion and patterns of cases taken up,
styles and thoroughness of questioning-is central to how the
49. See Miller, Prosecution, supra note 9, at 16-19 (showing examples of how the
"shopping around" problem can be addressed through some system of centralized
supervision by more senior assistants and random assignment).
50. Even the most aggressive U.S. Attorney's Office will, for example, not pursue the
fraud whose perpetrators, victims, and means lie wholly within another office's territory, or
the street gang whose members rarely venture beyond turf wholly within another office's
borders.
51. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779 (1972) ("With tean
production it is difficult solely by observing total output, to either define or determine each
individual's contribution to this output of the cooperating inputs.").
52. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of justice, Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics 1999, at 30, 35 tbl.2.4 (2001), available at http://
www.ojp.usdo.gov/js/pub/pdf/cfjs99.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Compendium] (reporting the various bases for the declination of prosecution
by U.S. Attorneys); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A
Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 246 (1980) [hereinafter
Frase, Decision] (reporting on a study of prosecutorial discretion).
53. Compendium, supra note 52, at 35 (citing "weak evidence" as reason for 21.3% of
31,004 declinations by U.S. Attorneys' Offices between October 1, 1998 and September 30,
1999).
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cases which
get further into the system are selected and
54
presented.
The extent to which case strength is a function of agency interest will
be particularly great in the federal system, where the offenses targeted
usually have a universe of potential witnesses far less circumscribed than
one is likely to find in, say, a street corner robbery. 55 The declination of a
weak case may thus reflect only a slight disjunction between agency and
prosecutorial judgment.
Under other circumstances, a prosecutorial declination may not reflect any disjunction at all. As long as agency executives, congressional
funders, and others use presentation figures as a measure of agency activity,56 agents will view a reasonable number of declinations with equanimity, even alacrity. 57 An agency might even be keen to get a case declined,
54. Nicola Lacey, Introduction: Making Sense of Criminal Justice, in Criminal justice
1, 13 (Nicola Lacey ed., 1994); see also Mike McConville et al., The Case for the
Prosecution 56 (1991) ("The police have, at a most fundamental level, the ability to select
facts, to reject facts, to not seek facts, to evaluate facts and to generate facts. Facts, in this
sense, are not objective entities which exist independently of the social actors but are
created by them.").
55. See Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 156 ("The ability to decline prosecution provides
assistants with their most potent discretionary power, but many of the cases presented leave
little room for the exercise of discretion. Some are so trivial or so weak that prosecution
would be ridiculous."). For a fascinating exploration of the interaction of agency priorities
and tactics in a very different context, see Eric A.Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews,
and Ordinary Germans 362-75 (1999) (finding, in analysis of Gestapo investigations, that
targeting was proactive and generally flowed from strategic agenda, not denunciations).
56. Exactly what part arrest or presentation statistics play, or are perceived to play, in
agency funding decisions is hard to determine. See Letter from Laurie Ekstrand, Director,
Justice Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Senator Jeff Sessions, The Drug
Enforcement Administration's Reporting of Arrests 5 (Feb. 13, 2002), at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d02276r.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (responding
to Senator's request for an investigation into whether DEA arrest figures had been inflated
in order to obtain more resources, GAO's "review of DEA's budget justifications showed
that prior years' arrest data have been used as output information within performance
indicator tables but not as performance goals or outcome measures"); The FBI's Handling
of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior
to September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 5
(2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director,Joint Intelligence Inquiry Staff), available
at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021017/hilhluclass.pdf
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Statement of Eleanor Hill] (reporting comments by FBI
field office agent that "counterterrorism and counterintelligence have always been
considered the 'bastard stepchild' of the FBI because these programs do not generate the
statistics that other programs do, such as Violent Crimes/Major Offenders or drugs").
57. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1056 ("[An] agency's self-evaluation criteria might
make it insensitive to the regular declination of its complaints on de mininms grounds, so
long as the agency received credit for an appropriate number of complaints tendered.");
see also James Q. Wilson, The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents 129-31
(1978) [hereinafter Wilson, Investigators] (recounting how, after an earl), 1970s FBI survey
found that U.S. Attorneys "were tired of having to go through the motions of declining
prosecution on cases that the FBI knew could not be prosecuted but that Bureau rules
required be presented to the USA," the new Director, Clarence Kelly, instituted a "Quality
over Quantity" program).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:749

when that allows it to "pass the responsibility" for a failure to prosecute. 5s
It is a responsibility that U.S. Attorneys, with their blended claims of technical expertise and political independence, their ties to the local community, and their large portfolio of unquestionably worthy cases, are particularly well-suited to bear. One would expect such consensual declinations
to occur most frequently in cases where an agency is under some sort of
political pressure to proceed, or wants to avoid claims of favoritism. And
it is thus not surprising that the highest declination rate in 1999 occurred
for civil rights offenses: 92.8%, or 1583 out of 1705 suspects. 5- Not surprising because a large percentage of these suspects appear to have been
law enforcement officers.""
Agency desire to at least share responsibility (and not, say, insufficient prosecutorial vigilance) may also explain the relatively high proportion of declinations in "domestic or international terrorism" cases in the
fiscal year ending September 30, 2001.iI With heavy pressure from Congress to spend funds allocated for antiterrorism efforts," 2 the FBI may
well have found it helpful to send marginal cases to U.S. Attorneys' Of58. Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 152; Jerry Seper, Senators Question Whether FBI Is
Sufficiently Pursuing Terrorists, Wash. Times, June 17, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Seper,
Senators] (responding to inquiries about the high number of declinations in terrorism
cases in the six m1onths after September 11, FBI officials note that the referral of a case to a
U.S. Attorney is not a recommendation to prosecute); see also Robert A. Kagan, On
Regulatory Inspectorates and Police, in Hawkins & Thomas, Enforcing Regulation, strpra
note 30, at 37, 42 ("[T]he policeman or inspector who grants 'curbside probation' risks
being accused of legal impropriety, favoritism, or corruption.").
59. Compenditrm, LIsupranote 52, at 28 tbl.2.2; see also Daniel C. Richman, The
Changing BotUdaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, iv 2 Boundary
Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations 81, 104 (Nat'l Inst. of'Justice ed., 2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/criminaljstice2OOO/vol_2/02d2.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Revit)
[hereinafter Richman, Changing Botrundaries] (noting frequency
"since the Rodney King beating trial, with which abtrse-offiorce allegations against local
police officers have been accompanied by calls for Federal intervention"). The next
highest declination rates were for obscene material offenses (84.0%), and threats against
the president (82.3%). Compendium, supra note 52, at 28.
60. See Human Rights Watch, Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and
Accountability in the United States, New Data on Federal Prosecutions and Sentencing
(1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/,-eports98/police/uspo35.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting diffictrlty in calculating number of criminal civil rights
investigations involving law enforcement officers, and reporting that, in 1996,
approximately 70% of the FBI's civil rights investigations related to law enforcement
officers); see also FBI, Civil Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.ibi.gov/
aboutus/flqs/faqsone.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the "'most
common" civil rights complaint "involves allegations of excessive use of force by law
enforcement personnel which causes injuries or death").
61. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Criminal Enforcement Against
Terrorists (2001), at http://trac.sy-.e(Iu/tracreports/terorism/,-epottO11203.html
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
62. See generally U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAOT-NSIADGGD-99-107,
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ni299107t.pclf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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fices and let the culling happen there. And a similar story of sharing
responsibility may (but need not) explain the 61% declination rate for
6
terrorism cases in the six months after September 11, 2001. 3
Such stories give a taste of the declination dynamic. Yet only a taste.
High declination rates can reflect a disjunction between an agency's
agenda and those of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. But they are equally
consistent with a managerial strategy of seeking political insulation, using
prosecutors to monitor insufficiently supervised field offices, or impressing funders, or with an agency strategy of regretfully bowing to prosecutorial gatekeeping authority,64 or with some combination of these,
with variation over districts or regions. Put differently, the fact that the
FBI had a declination rate of 43% in 1998-1999, compared to a DEA rate
6
of 18.3%, says something. 65 But we cannot be sure what. 1
Conversely, one might expect a low declination rate where there is
intense and indefeasible political pressure on federal enforcers to take a
particular kind of case, 6 7 and especially where state and local authorities
lack or systematically decline to exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
In 1994, responding to sustained calls by border states for increased federal immigration enforcement, 8 the Justice Department launched "Op63. See Seper, Senators, supra note 58 (reporting on letter from Senators to Attorney
General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller which notes that 61% declination rate "raises
troubling questions about whether the FBI and the Department of Justice are devoting
sufficient resources to counterterrorism [and] how well the FBI conducts terrorism
investigations" (quoting letter from Senators Patrick J. Leahy and Charles E. Grassley)).
There is no reason to believe that the number of declinations indicates a lack of interest in
counterterrorism cases at any agency. Indeed, the extent of departmental interest may
have led to the overstatement in the number of cases classified as "terrorism-related." See
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-03-266, Justice Department: Better Management
Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics
(Jan. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03266.pdf (reporting that
USAOs mischaracterized 132 of 288 reported "terrorism-related" convictions in fiscal year
2002).
64. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1055 (discussing "feedback effect" in which an agency
"react[ed] to a consistent pattern of declinations . . . by shaping its referral policy
accordingly").
65. Compendium, supra note 52, at 29 tbl.2.3.
66. See William Landes, Comments, in The Economics of Crime and Punishment 227
(Simon Rottenberg ed., 1973) [hereinafter Landes, Comments] (noting that "[t]o the
extent that prosecutors and investigators collude so that each internalizes the interests of
the other," a system that formally separated prosecution from investigation would be
"operationally equivalent to one that combined the functions).
67. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1051 (noting, in context of Selective Service violation
prosecutions in 1970, that "[s]ometimes a type of violation is regarded as so serious that
selective enforcement will not be tolerated, despite the strain on prosecutorial resources").
68. See Editorial, Immigration Costs: State Should Not Back Away from Lawsuit,
Dallas Morning News, Aug. 17, 1994, at 24A (supporting Texas's suit against federal
government seeking reimbursement for immigration-related costs now borne by the state,
and noting that "even when [suspected criminals] are apprehended [at the border], they
are let off with a slap on the wrist by U.S. attorneys who are responsible for their
prosecution"); Michael Paulson, States Seek Compensation for Incarcerating Criminal
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eration Gatekeeper. '6 '- As a result of this and other efforts comprising
the "Southwest Border Initiative," immigration prosecutions in five border federal districts increased "more than seven-fold" between 1994 and
2000, 7 1' and convictions in INS cases rose from comprising 12.0% of all
federal convictions in 1992 to 20.5% in 2001.7' The INS's declination
rate, always comparatively low, was the lowest in 1998-1999 (3.4%) for
72
any of the high-volume federal investigative agencies.
Regrettably, one regains one's moorings only by moving from the
quantitative to the qualitative or just plain impressionist. By these measures, no one doubts that federal prosecutors exercise a considerable degree of discretionary power in their case selection decisions, and that they
regularly diverge from agency preferences in this regard. 73 At its core,
prosecutorial power is primarily negative, and hardly absolute-not the
Immigrants, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 23, 1994, at A9 (reporting that governors of "at
least seven states" had sued the United States government, "demanding that they be
reimbursed for the cost of incarcerating illegal immigrants" and argued that "if the federal
government had done its job securing the nation's borders, the states would not have as
large a problem with criminal immigrants"); Maggie Rivas, Gaps in the Fence:
Immigration Reform Seems Far Cry from Reality at Mexican Border, Dallas Morning News,
Jan. 3, 1994, at IA (noting complaints by local officials of inadequate federal efforts against
illegal immigration).
69. Reno Initiative Aims to Control Immigration, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1994, at A40;
see Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 Geo. lmmigr. L.J. 285, 299
(1998) (discussing formation of operation as part of federal government's new
commitment to border control).
70. Crisis in the Border Courts: Impact of Massive Illegal Immigration, Related Drug
and Other Criminal Prosecutions Along the U.S. Southwest Border upon Federal Courts,
at http://www.uscourts.gov,/judnow/crisis.ltm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also John Scalia & Marika F.X. Litras, U.S. Dep't of justice, NCJ
191745, Bureau ofJustice Statistics Special Report: Immigration Offenders in the Federal
Criminal Justice System, 2000 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub.pdf/iofcjs00.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 42% increase between
1996 and 2000 in INS law enforcement personnel, with 82% of that increase occurring in
Texas, Arizona, California, N.Y., and Florida).
71. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, INS at Work: Recent Trends in
INS Enforcement (2002), at http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracins/findings/aboutlNS/
insTrends.html (on file with the Columbia Law leview) [hereinafter TRAC, Recent Trends].
72. Compendium, supra note 52, at 29 tbl.2.3. The percentage of INS referrals
prosecuted went from 83% in 1992 to 92% in 2001. TRAC, Recent Trends, supra note 71
(percentages calculated from figures presented on website). Why the INS declination rate
was low even before "Gatekeeper" is best explained by a former U.S. Attorney from the
Southern District of California: "Given the local DA's unwillingness to prosecute border
cases, we do not have the traditional federal prosecutor's tool of declination to state
authorities to bring the number of cases into line with the resources." William Braniff,
Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 Fed. Sentencing
Rep. 309, 312 (1993).
73. See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 156-69 (describing U.S. Attorneys'
relationships with federal investigative agencies); Wilson, Investigators, supra note 57, at
139; CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Dec. 1, 1998, pt.1, at 113 (author's notes) (testimony
of FBI Director Louis Freeh) (explaining that cases are chosen based on priorities and
personalities of U.S. Attorneys).
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power to make an agency pursue a kind of case that the agency does not
want to pursue, or even the power to say "no" to every single case of the
sort that an agency very much wants to pursue. But the leverage that
flows from prosecutorial gatekeeping authority ought not be
underestimated.
B. Agency Control over Investigative Resources, Tactics, and Agenda
On the investigative side of the equation, tactical choices and enforcement agendas are inextricably intertwined, sometimes dramatically.
The decision to arrest and handcuff a Wall Street executive on his trading
74
floor,
the decision to conduct a "surprise interview of Monica Lewinsky
incommunicado for as long as she would allow" 75 -each of these raises a
question of "proportionality" that cannot be answered without taking a
position on the nature and seriousness of the conduct being investigated. 7" To what degree do investigative agencies decide whether and
with what intensity any matter or set of matters is pursued? To what extent are they monopolists when it comes to providing the investigative
support that prosecutors need to bring and pursue criminal charges?
Here, again, truisms have a substantial basis in reality. Maybe some
federal prosecutors leave the comfort of their offices to pound the pavement investigating cases. But this generally happens only in the movieswhich don't have to worry about niceties like the rule precluding a lawyer
77
from acting as both advocate and sworn or unsworn witness -if

at all. 78

Enforcement agencies have the expertise, the manpower, the technical
74. See Miriam Rozen, G.E.'s Sacrificial Lamb, Am. Law., July/Aug. 1987, at 31, 32
(describing arrest of Richard Wigton on trading floor of Wall Street firm); see also Connie
Bruck, Ten Years of Upheaval: Rudolph Giuliani, Am. Law., Mar. 1989, at 98, 100
(discussing controversy surrounding the arrests); Jonathan D. Glater, Five Questions for
Mary Jo White: Those Very Public Arrests of Executives, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2002, at C4
(documenting former U.S. Attorney's discussion of recent public arrest of John J. Rigas,
founder of Adelphia Communications); Richard B. Stolley, The Ordeal of Bob Freeman,
Fortune, May 25, 1987, at 66, 67 (describing arrest of Wall Street arbitrageur in his firm's
offices).
75. Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 729 (1999)
[hereinafter Little,
Proportionality].
76. See id. at 733 ("The issue ... regarding the investigative decisions made in the
Starr investigation, is not whether the tactics were either legal or novel" but whether "they
were proportionate to the crime(s) under investigation."); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at
Home: Sense of Proportion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1998, at A19 (suggesting that Starr had
"lost his sense of proportion").
77. See United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097, 1106 (7th Cir. 1996).
78. See The Client (Warner Bros. 1994), a movie based on a John Grisham novel,
starring Tommy Lee Jones as a U.S. Attorney jetting about with his staff in his own plane,
in pursuit of the bad guys. And who knows what hijinks will fill the new television comedy
series A.U.S.A, which debuted in February 2003? A.U.S.A. (NBC television broadcast, Feb.
4, 2003); see also A.U.S.A., at http://ww.nbc.com/A.U.S.A (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Benjamin Weiser, Federal Prosecutors as Fodder for a
Sitcom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2003, at BI (previewing sitcom based on S.D.N.Y. U.S.
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resources, and, perhaps most importantly, the informational networks
that no U.S. Attorney's Office possesses, and without which few cases
could be brought. Indeed, save in the exceptional cases-where the news
media or a victim brings a case directly to its attention-a U.S. Attorney's
Office generally will not even know that a crime has been committed until an agency informs it.
In recent years, state and local enforcement agencies have found it
politically and financially expedient to develop robust alliances with their
federal counterparts, sharing information and manpower in exchange for
such benefits as technical assistance, overtime pay and "buy money," and
access to favorable federal fora (for criminal cases and forfeiture proceedings). 79 1 The balance of power in this area may recently have shifted, as
state and local enforcers have moved from being principally supplicants,
seeking federal aid in combating violent crime, to being sometimes eager
and sometimes grudging providers of the manpower needed for finegrained nationwide terrorism investigations." ° But the primary point of
contact between federal and local enforcers has, at least so far, been at
the agency level.'
Why haven't federal prosecutors reduced their reliance on federal
agencies by dealing directly with state and local agencies, trading the advantages of federal jurisdiction for investigative support? This has occurred,8 ' and may occur more, as the federal government reaches out for
Attorney's Office and noting short-lived program about "a crusading United States
attorney in Manhattan who did not hesitate to take to the streets with his gUn").
79. See CAFLE Hearings, snpra note 44, Aug. 25, 1998, at 18 (author's notes)
(Oklahoma Public Safety Commissioner notes that he accepts federal entry into the area of
traditionally local crimes "because it gets mie money. It gets overtime pay for ny people.");
Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 59, at 95; Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
supra note 33, at 784.
80. See Fox Butterfield, A Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7 (reporting a Portland, Oregon police chief's decision that his
department would "not cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its efforts to
interview 5,000 young Middle Eastern men nationwide" because he considered the activity
a violation of state law); Paul Duggan, FBI Chief Promises to Give State and Local Police a
Role in Probe, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 2001, at AI5 (president of International Association of
Chiefs of Police reports FBI Director Mueller as acknowledging "that the bureau has made
insufficient use of its state and local counterparts in the biggest criminal investigation in
U.S. history").
81. See, e.g., Mary Beth Sheridan, INS Seeks Law Enforcement Aid in Crackdown:
Move Targets 300,000 Foreign Nationals Living in U.S. Despite Deportation Orders, Wash.
Post, Dec. 6, 2001, at A25 (describing INS efforts to enlist local police, as well as other
agencies, in apprehension of aliens subject to deportation orders).
82. See, e.g., Richman, Project Exile, supra note 29, at 406-07 (describing how
Maryland U.S. Attorney bypassed ATF and reached out directly to local police for gun
cases); Gail Gibson, Ehrlich Reloads Debate on Screening Gun Cases, Bait. Sun, June 30,
2000, at 1B (describing Maryland U.S. Attorney's appeal to local police rather than ATL' for
gun cases); see also Dick Lehr & Gerard O'Neill, Black Mass: The True Story of an Unholy
Alliance Between the FBI and the Irish Mob 257 (2000) (recounting federal prosecutors'
requests for support from state authorities when targeting a mobster who was then under
the protection of the FBI agents he worked with as a sometime informant); Office of
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more local assistance in terrorism investigations.83 But there are obstacles. Although agents and police have their rivalries, they have similar
professional perspectives. After Attorney General Ashcroft placed U.S.
Attorneys in charge ofjoint terrorism task forces around the country, 84 a
former FBI executive expressed his concern that the move would "'undermine[ ] the effectiveness of the FBI's relationship with state and local
authorities,'" and noted that "several police chiefs" had advised that they
were "'not comfortable in such a relationship led by U.S. Attorneys.' "8s5
In any event, federal prosecutors are bound to federal agencies by
asset specialization. 8 6 Federal agents have a special familiarity with federal law, and because they cater primarily to federal prosecutors, they are
likely to have developed informational networks with prosecutorial demands in mind. As in any long-term contractual relation, each side is
87
likely to have developed structures that make exit difficult.
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Promising Strategies to
Reduce Gun Violence (1999), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun-violence/
contents.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on federal-local efforts to
reduce gun violence); Roger L. Conner, The Office of the United States Attorney and
Public Safety: A Brief History, U.S. Attorneys' Bull. 7 (2001), available at http://
www.tisdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading_room/usab4901.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing efforts of U.S. Attorneys' Offices to work directly with local police
forces).
83. See Steven Brill, The FBI Gets Religion, Newsweek, Jan. 28, 2002, at 32, 33; Allan
Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to Be Asked to See U.S. Attorney, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2001,
at A5 (discussing role of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in working with local police forces as part
of nationwide effort to "interview" Middle Eastern men); Susan Sachs, Long Resistant,
Police Start Embracing Immigration Duties, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al I. One new
player in the relationship between Washington and local enforcers has been the White
House Office of Homeland Security, whose "outreach to state and local officials" has
involved enforcement coordination that before September 11 would likely have been
handled within the Justice Department. Steven Brill, Ridge Against the Machine,
Newsweek, Mar. 18, 2002, at 32, 33; see Elizabeth Becker, One Year Later, Ridge Sees a
Country Better Prepared, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al. The Department of Homeland
Security will inherit the Office's responsibilities in this area. Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
84. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys,
All Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://
ww.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/terrorisml.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
85. Homeland Defense: Sharing Information with Local Law Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary (2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-judiciary/pjll21101sc.htmn (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting former FBI
Associate Deputy Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revell). As part of its effort to cement relations
with local enforcers since September 11, the FBI has created a new Office of Law
Enforcement Coordination, with a former police chief at Assistant Director rank. See Press
Release, FBI National Press Office (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrel/ pressrel02/ mueller041102.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
86. See Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting 52-56 (1985).
87. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 14, at 63 n.24.
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Yet prosecutors, too, can take advantage of overlapping jurisdictions
to play their federal counterparts against one another. The FBI dominates traditional organized crime cases, but when a group engages in
drug dealing or gun running, the DEA or ATF may have an interest as
well. 88 In the white collar area, the Postal Inspection Service's jurisdicq
tion over mail fraud makes that low profile agency
a fit instrument for
prosecutors seeking to go where the FBI would prefer not to venture (or
to control an investigation to a degree that the FBI would not tolerate).
Thus, when Rudolph Giuliani's U.S. Attorney's Office pursued Wall
Street cases in the late 1980s, it initially would create ad hoc investigative
teams from the Postal Inspection Service, the IRS, and the SEC. 90 Only
after these cases garnered considerable positive media coverage"' did the
FBI enter the area. 92 In another district, a U.S. Attorney recently explained why he liked the overlap between FBI and Secret Service jurisdiction in white collar cases: The U.S. Attorney's Office, he noted, "doesn't
want to put all their investigative eggs in one basket" because "at different
times [the two agencies] have different resources and different commitments to different types of white collar cases. ' ' 9 '

88. See Ed Magnuson, The FBI Is a Lot of "Bull," The Magnuson Report, at http://
memnbers.aol.com/deawatch/clea4I-5.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) (on file with the
Colmnbia Law Review) (suggesting, on unofficial DEA website apparently used by agents,
http://menbers.aol.com/deawatc/daily.htin, that FBI helped sabotage first federal
prosecution of John Gotti because it was a DEA case and "the FBI wanted John Gotti all to
themselves").
89. Stephen Beaven, Delivering Justice: Postal Inspection Set-vice Fights Crime with a
Low Profile, Indianapolis Star, May. 8, 2000, at 3B; Brooke A. Masters, Role of Postal
Inspectors Key in Corporate Cases, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2003, at E3 (calling Postal
Inspection Service "one of the federal government's most overlooked weapons against
corporate crime"); John Waggoner, Long Arm of Post Office: Inspectors Get Bad Guys,
Little Attention, USA Today, Apr. 16, 1993, at 1B. When it comes to media coverage, the
Service's glory years were back in the mid-nineteenth century. See Daniel P. Carpenter,
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in
Executive Agencies, 1862-1928, at 70 (2001) ("Hailed as the eyes and ears of the postal
system, inspectors rivaled the Pony Express in their capacity for inspiring mythic tales of
valor and peril.").
90. See Rifka Rosenwein, Giuliani's Securities Unit Struggles with Caseload,
Manhattan Law., Aug. 30-Sept. 12, 1988, at 1, 17.
91. See, e.g., Jane Applegate, Postal Inspectors: The Unsung Heroes of U.S. Sleuths,
L.A. Times, June 17, 1987, at H1; Steve Coll & David A. Vise, Foot Soldiers in Trading
Crackdown: Postal Agents Aid in Building Insider Case, Wash. Post, July 19, 1987, at H.
92. See Rifka Rosenwein & Edward Frost, FBI Lands First Securities Case, Manhattan
Law., July 12-18, 1988, at 8.
93. CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Dec. 2, 1998, pt. 1, at 167 (author's notes)
(testimony of Mark Calloway, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina).
Although the Secret Service is best known for its protective activities, it has striven to
highlight its "cybercop" role. See, e.g., Robert Vamosi, How the Secret Service Became
Our Nation's Cybercops, ZDNet, June 26, 2002, at http://zdnet.com/anchordesk/stories/
stoiy/0,10738,2872250,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing recent
Secret Service involvement in computer crime investigations by local law enforcement).
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Over time, the costs of competition 94 have led agencies, or their political sponsors, to clarify these jurisdictional boundaries. 9 5 Yet such clarifications have their own costs, and the current degree of blurriness may
reflect some recognition of its advantages, which include the benefits of
97
competition 9 6 and the deterrence of corruption.
Interagency competition is not the only source of prosecutorial bargaining power at this structural level. Where an agency is particularly
weak and poorly organized, prosecutors may be able to gain substantial
control over its agenda. This appears to be what happened to the IRS's
Criminal Investigation Division (CID), at least until recently. Housed in
an agency under constant political attack for aggressiveness, 98 reporting
to district managers for whom criminal prosecutions were a secondary
concern, and authorized to "pursue a broad range of investigations with
94. See John A.C. Conybeare, Bureaucracy, Monopoly, and Competition: A Critical
Analysis of the Budget-Maximizing Model of Bureaucracy, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 479, 495
(1984) (noting that competition among bureaus, while leading to efficiencies, "may also
bring some negative side effects" including "higher monitoring costs for the sponsor,
wasteful 'political advertising' by bureaus, loss of economies of scale if decreasing costs are
possible").
95. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-03-272, Combating Child Pornography:
Federal Agencies Coordinate Law Enforcement Efforts, but an Opportunity Exists for
Further Enhancement (2002). Competition may be more of an issue in the larger districts
than in the smaller. One U.S. Attorney recently noted that, in smaller districts like his, "a
lot of times ... You're lucky to get one agency to look at a problem, let alone have two
fighting over it." CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Dec. 2, 1998, pt. I, at 169-70 (author's
notes) (testimony of Paul Warner, U.S. Attorney for Utah).
96. See Albert Breton & Ronald Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct 128
(1982) (noting that because "optimum market structure for maximizing entrepreneurial
competition or innovative activity is not perfect competition but some degree of
monopoly," assignment of "quasi-property rights within organizations" will stimulate
entrepreneurial activity by ensuring that "bureaucrats will obtain the benefits from an
increased allocation of resources to their bureau"); Richard S. Higgins et al., Dual
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, in Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside
the Federal Trade Commission 154, 177 (RobertJ. Mackay et al. eds., 1987) (concluding,
after studying FTC-Justice Department liaison agreement governing antitrust cases, that
"far from resulting in wasteful duplication, bureaucratic competition leads to more
efficient resource use"); see also Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 354 (1998) (discussing benefits of
mild interagency competition).
97. See Lehr & O'Neill, supra note 82, at 245 (describing how control by corrupt FBI
agents of information about their drug-dealing informants was threatened when DEA
agents launched their own investigation of the informants' trafficking).
98. See, e.g., Albert B. Crenshaw, Senate Panel Told of IRS Abuses: Witnesses Allege
Harassment, Mistakes, Fabricated Evidence, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1997, at E3 (reporting
portrayal of IRS as "an uncaring arrogant agency with workers who will go as far as to
fabricate cases to collect taxes that aren't due"); David CayJohnston, Senate Committee Is
Told of a Vast Range of Abuses by I.R.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1998, at A16 (reporting
testimony that the IRS tolerated car thefts, anonymous bullying, and armed raids on
nonviolent taxpayers by its agents). But see Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-99-82,
Tax Administration: Allegations of IRS Employee Misconduct (1999), available at http://
www.unclefed.com/GAORepo.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (inquiry unable
to substantiate allegations of IRS abuses).
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little regard to the impact these investigations ha[d] on overall tax compliance,"' 0' CID agents responded by offering their financial expertise to
U.S. Attorneys' Offices, which in turn "determine[d the Division's] investigative agenda."'0'° It remains to be seen whether the recent reorganization of the Division will succeed in shifting agents' attention more specifically to tax compliance goals. I0 1
What makes an agency strong or weak, if one measures strength by
the extent to which an agency can impose its enforcement priorities
downstream on prosecutors (while avoiding upstream interference from
the agency's political masters)? A full answer is beyond the scope of this
Article. 102 One school of thought, led by Terry Moe and others, counsels
us to look to the politics of institutional design, and recognizes the many
ways in which legislators and interest groups can embed their preferences
in an agency's organic structure-its turf, its capacities, and its procedures." 3 In response, Daniel Carpenter, while conceding that "[a]gency
structure undoubtedly shapes the potential for bureaucratic autonomy,"
tells powerful tales of agencies "forging bureaucratic autonomy" in ways
4
unforeseen by their designers and not predetermined by their design."1
Autonomy, for Carpenter, is something an agency can win by "establish[ing] political legitimacy-a reputation for expertise, efficiency, or
moral protection and a uniquely diverse complex of ties to organized interests and the media-and induc[ing] politicians to defer to the wishes
of the agency even when they prefer otherwise."' 1 5 Among his accounts
99. William H. Webster, Review of the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal
Investigation Division 9 (I.R.S., Pub. No. 3388 (4-1999) 1999) [hereinafter Webster
Report].
100. Id.; see also David Burnham, The F.B.I.: A Special Report, Nation, Aug. 11,
1997, at 22 (describing a "prosecutor in the New York area" who noted that when the FBI
refused to pursue "a serious official corruption matter in the district, and [his] boss-the
U.S. Attorney-was not prepared to make an issue out of it," he "g[o]t around the
problem'" by "shop[ping] around for help, finally recruiting some I.R.S. agents").
The Webster Report found no evidence to support allegations that U.S. Attorneys
were requiring IRS CID agents "to assist prosecutors on non-tax, financial grand jtry
investigations as a quid pro quo for prosecuting [the Division's] tax cases." Webster Report,
supra note 99, at 16 n.27.
101. Since September 11, 2001, substantial CID resources have been committed to
block the money flow to terrorist organizations. See Criminal Investigation Div., Dep't of
Treasury, IRS Criminal Investigation's Role on Terrorism Task Forces (2002), available at
http://wVw.tlstreas.gov/irs/ci/factsheets/docterroristtaskforces.htni
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review); U.S. Treasury Dep't, Contributions by the Department of the
Treasury to the Financial War on Terrorism: Fact Sheet (2002), available at http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/2002910184556291211.pdf
(on file with the
Columbia Law R'view); Judith Miller, The Money Trail: Raids Seek Evidence of MoneyLaundering, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2002, at A19.
102. For a tentative exploration of such matters, see Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
supra note 33, at 793-99.
103. For sources exploring political and economic theories on institutional design,
see supra note 13.
104. Carpenter, supra note 89, at 358.
105. Id. at 4.
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from the Progressive Era is one of the postal inspectors leveraging their
department's "reputation for moral vigor"-developed during the 1890s
through the enforcement of morals legislation-into a new focus on
fraud in the 1910s and 1920s that "made the fraud order one of the most
powerful forms of economic regulation in the new, advertising-driven

economy."

10 6

There is no reason why we have to choose between these theories.
Indeed, we find evidence of both at work in the federal criminal enforcement bureaucracy and can see how they can reinforce one
another. Is the FBI "story" one of the inevitable power that flows from
control of the national security "beat,"'' 17 or of the Bureau's ability
to manage its relationships with Congress,10 8 the rest of the executive branch, and the media?(19 It is surely both. And however beleaguered the Bureau may seem today," 0 no prosecutor will discount its
106. Id. at 148-49.
107. As Richard Gid Powers writes:
The search for spies, the hunt for disloyal government officials, the extirpation of
the Communist party in the courts of law during the early years of the cold war
were all part of a struggle to redefine the limits of political respectability. AndJ.
Edgar Hoover's official position naturally placed him at the center of the loyalty,
spy, and Communist cases.
Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover 311 (1987).
108. See Wilson, Investigators, supra note 57, at 166 (arguing that the FBI manages to
maintain autonomy in part because it cultivates support from Congressmen).
109. See Claire Bond Potter, War on Crime: Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics of Mass
Culture 125-26 (1998) (describing efforts of J. Edgar Hoover and his public relations
staff).
110. The Bureau may have seemed particularly autonomous during the Clinton years.
See David S. Cloud, Polite Prosecutor: The Attorney General Gets Little Respect, Wall St.
J.,Jan. 27, 2000, at Al (suggesting that FBI has "wide latitude");John F. Harris & David A.
Vise, With Freeh, Mistrust Was Mutual, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 2001, at AI (describing how
"dysfunctional relationship" between Clinton Administration and FBI prevented effective
oversight); David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Revelations Inflame Rift Between Justice Dep.
and FBI, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1999, at A3 (depicting "unusually hostile relations between
Justice and the FBI"). Its insulation from oversight appears to have ended, however, with
the arrival of an administration not targeted by special prosecutors and the disclosures
about the agency's errors in the Oklahoma City bombing case and the swirling allegations
concerning the Bureau's mishandling of its counterterrorism investigations before
September 11. See Cheryl W. Thompson & Claudia Deane, FBI's Ratings Suffer in Light of
Blunders: Handling of McVeigh Case Worries Majority, Poll Finds, Wash. Post, May 22,
2001, at A3 (discussing the Oklahoma City bombing); Michael Isikoff, The Culture of "Yes
Men": Freeh Explains How FBI Let Documents Fall Through Cracks, Newsweek Online,
May 16, 2001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); Romesh Ratnesar & Michael
Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case, Time,June 3, 2002, at 24 (discussing FBI employee
who accused her superiors of ignoring warning signs of the events of September 11, 2001);
Richard C. Shelby, September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence
Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence 7, at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("The story of September 11 is... replete with the FBI's problems of
internal counterterrorism and counterintelligence ... coordination, information-sharing,
and basic institutional competence."). For a discussion of how the FBI's autonomy
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clout.1 1 The limited bargaining power of ATF, which exists in large part
because opponents of gun control wanted a weak agency responsible for
gun enforcement,' 12 may be more a matter of institutional design, but
one still finds the agency striving to establish "political legitimacy" by touting its violent-crime fighting capabilities and working to forge strategic
alliances with local law enforcement authorities. I I" The important point
here is not to get a fix, or even place a rough estimate, on the absolute or
relative power of any agency, but rather to recognize that such power will
greatly affect the extent to which prosecutors can impose their priorities
on agencies.
Where there is a disjunction between agency and prosecutorial priorities, can agencies leave prosecutors in the lurch by presenting "investigated" cases that (from a prosecutorial perspective) have not been sufficiently developed? Certainly post-indictment prosecutorial investigative
work occurs, and the bright line that the civil immunity cases draw between investigating a case and preparing one for trial' "4 is quite artificial.
Part of the problem may be that "cost savings from guilty pleas instead of
suffered in the wake of mid-1970s revelations, see Wilson, Investigators, supra note 57, at
179-82.
111. See CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Nov. 13, 1998, at 44-45 (author's notes)
(comment of former U.S. Attorney and FBI Director William Webster) (arguing that
although the "U.S. Attorney is, as many of them like to say, the senior federal law
enforcement officer in the area," "[t] he truth of the matter is that the lines of investigation
generally are based on instructions fr'om doctrine, policy and so forth fr-om [FBI]
headquarters"); WalterJ. Kendall, Ill, A Brief Argument for Greater Control of Litigation
Discretion-The Public Interest and Public Choice Contexts, 23J. Marshall L. Rev. 215,
225 (1990) ("The influence of the FBI on the priorities of the U.S. Attorney's office was
acknowledged to be significant."); Burnham, supra note 100 (" 'The theory is that the U.S.
attorney ... is the top dog in the area when it comes to federal enforcement,' said one
senior investigator. 'But in many districts the SACs [special agents in charge] have more
experience and political connections in Washington than the U.S. attorney.'").
112. See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 796 (finding that ATF "has
never been a particularly powerfful agency on Capitol Hill, to put it. mildly"); see also
WilliamJ. Vizzard, In the Cross Fire: A Political History of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms 155 (1997) (describing how political pressure fiom opponents of gun laws
contributed to extensive congressional hearings on ATF raid on Branch Davidian
compound).
113. Richman, Project Exile, supra note 29, at 399. How the ATF will fare now that it
has been transferred from the Treasuiry Department to justice remains to be seen. See
Dan Eggen, Move tojustice Dept. Brings ATF New Focus, Wash. Post, Jai. 23, 2003, at A19
(noting concerns about interaction between ATF and FBI).
114. For example, in Bucky v. Fitzsimmons, the Court stated:
There is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and
interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the
detective's role in searching for the cities
and corroboration that might give him
probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand.
When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a
detective or police officer, it is "neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the
same act, immtnity should protect the one and not the other."
509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir.
1973)).
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long trials cannot be transferred" from prosecution to agency budgets,' 15
leaving little room for agencies to negotiate efficient deals directly. Even
so, prosecutors generally may not have a pressing need to address the
evidentiary gap created by agents' inattention to adjudicative needs.1
Under the present system of easily obtained indictments and negotiated
dispositions," 7 prosecutors can let agencies freely arrest suspects, frequently without even giving prior notice, knowing that an indictment will
be easy to obtain even on a quick clock and that a combination of minimal disclosure obligations and big sentencing differentials will generally
induce guilty pleas.' I Giving free rein to agencies allows U.S. Attorneys'
Offices to operate at maximum capacity, and keep their own statistics up
(which they need to do to compete with other districts for funding and
other resources).' j9 And because prosecutors are hard pressed to identify ex ante which cases will go to trial, even if they had in-house investigators, 1 20 such personnel would be of limited use in closing the evidentiary
gaps.
115. Michael Levi, Covert Policing and the Investigation of "Organized Fraud": The
English Experience in International Context, in Undercover Police Surveillance in
Comparative Perspective 195, 210 (Cyrille Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995).
116. As Wilson noted:
"Making a case" is the most common expression agents use to describe what they
are doing .... Once a case is "made"-which usually means, once it has been
accepted for prosecution-the agent thinks of himself as having fulfilled his task.
His work is by no means done-he must still fill out reports and appear in courtbut "work" is simply energy expended and is not at all the same thing as "the job."
Wilson, Investigators, supra note 57, at 160; see also Jacoby, supra note 23, at 112 (noting
police officer's role changes from authority figure, with discretionary power during
.investigation and arrest, tojustifier during the intake stage, to coordinator of witnesses and
evidence-and maybe witness-at trial).
117. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 414 tbl.5.17 (Ann L.
Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2002), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing that over 87% of felony terminations in
federal district court in 2000 were based on guilty pleas); id. at 445 tbl.5.44 (reporting that
94% of state felony convictions are based on guilty pleas).
118. For an insightful normative challenge to this way of doing business and an
exploration of the relationship between the prosecutorial screening and plea bargaining,
see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29
(2002).
119. The collective action problem facing U.S. Attorneys' Offices is worth noting. As
a group, they might prefer to demand a higher level of case preparation from agencies, but
in the absence of enforceable agreement or some sort of "effort convention," see Harvey
Leibenstein, The Prisoners' Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm
Productivity, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 92, 94-95 (1982), there is pressure to compete for money
from Washington. For a sense of this competition, see Plaintiffs' Statement of Proposed
Findings of Uncontroverted Fact in Support of Their Motion for Suimmary Judgment 1
127-153, Doe v. United States, 44 Fed. Appx. 499 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (No. 98-896C), available
at http://www.dojclass.com/115.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
competition among U.S. Attorneys' Offices for ranking on department's "work week"
chart).
120. See infra notes 343-351 and accompanying text.
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Besides, prosecutors may do better in a system in which agencies are
responsible for gathering evidence for trial. If there were a clear line
between investigative information gathering and adjudicative information gathering, agencies would have a greater incentive to shift costs to
U.S. Attorneys' Offices by presenting weaker cases for prosecution. In
any given case, prosecutors could respond by declining to bring charges.
And if this happened over a category of cases of middling importance,
large-scale declination would be the answer.12 If the pursuit of cases in a
category were politically non-negotiable, however, the consequences of
investigative inaction would be unfavorable dispositions. The U.S. Attorney could try to blame the agency for these, but it would be hard to make
the charge stick. To be sure, agencies are not fully accountable under
the present system either, since allocating responsibility for an acquittal
or unfavorable plea bargain will always be difficult. Was it because insufficient evidence was collected? The indictment poorly drafted? The case
poorly tried? 12 2 But, at the very least, agencies' distasteful obligation to
assist at trials gives them an incentive to gather sufficient evidence to
make guilty pleas more likely, and to weed out poor cases early. 123
Robert Rabin noted the benefits of the "additional interdependency
[that post-referral agency involvement] creates between agency and
prosecutor":
At a minimum, the involvement sensitizes the U.S. Attorney to
the pre-referral resource investment of the agency, and leads
most U.S. Attorneys to be open about the reasons for declination when the agency feels aggrieved. In turn, the post-referral
work probably sensitizes the agency to some of the concerns of
the prosecutor which it otherwise would not share. Specifically,
the involvement gives the agency some feel for the trial considerations that exercise a continuing influence on prosecutorial
24
decisions at every stage of the development of a case.1
Contributing to the adjudicative effort reinforces agency interest in
obtaining convictions-an interest that, in some general sense, is shared
with prosecutors, and that likely has many of the same sources: congressional oversight, political accountability within the executive branch, ego
121. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1063 (relating that U.S. Attorneys declined "out of
hand" cases referred by the Department of Agriculture because of the poor quality of that
agency's preparatory work).
122. For a discussion of how team-prodtiction theory points to a solution to the
problem created by outsiders' ability to meastre federal enforcement "output," see infra
notes 278-284 and accompanying text.
123. See Raaj Ktumar Sah &Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 716, 725 (1986) ("[A] higher quality
screening at the lower bureau improves the portfolio to be evaluated by the higher bureau,
but it also costs more because a larger number of projects are evaltiated at the lower
level.").
124. Rabin, supra note 12, at 1068.
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satisfaction, internal promotion, and so forth. 25 Indeed, the difficulty
that the relevant audiences (funders, citizens, or targets) have in apportioning responsibility for unfavorable dispositions makes the term "feds"
a reputational commodity all enforcers need to protect. If when agents
show up for an interrogation, or prosecutors for plea negotiations, they
are greeted with, "Oh, you're the guys who can't put anyone in jail," the
conversation is likely to go downhill from there.
Our first pass at the underlying structure of agency-prosecutor relations thus finds U.S. Attorneys' Offices maintaining substantial control
over federal adjudicatory resources but with few investigative resources of
their own. For their part, federal enforcement agencies, to one degree or
another, control federal (and to some extent, state and local) investigative resources but cannot achieve their missions without access to the adjudicatory process, for which the U.S. Attorneys' Offices are gatekeepers.' 26 A rich dynamic of interaction could arise out of this mutual
dependency, 2 7 with interagency competition ebbing and flowing in the
face of "[c] hanging task environments." 128 Yet the constituting backdrop
125. For an exploration of prosecutorial motivation, see Richman, Old Chief, supra
note 7, at 966-69 (citing other sources of prosecutorial motivation).
126. See Rabin, supra note 12, at 1056 ("[A]gency-prosecutor friction is diminished,
but not eliminated, by the necessity of living with each other.").
127. See generally Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005 (1987) (arguing that parties in an ongoing relationship can
work to create patterns of mutual cooperation).
128. Jonathan B. Bendor, Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government 43-44
(1985) ("If one organization's program demonstrates its superiority, other organizations
may leave the field, transforming competition into monopoly.... But the short-run gain is
likely to become a long-run problem. Changing task environments may render old success
ineffective .... ").
The FBI's specialized expertise and jurisdictional domination in the area of
"traditional" organized crime, for example, gave it leverage over prosecutors, but may, at
least in part, have been responsible for the slowness with which the agency responded to
the threat posed by "non-traditional" organizations (e.g., Russian, Asian, etc.) in the 1980s.
See Margot Hornblower, Asian Mafia Seen Spreading: Experts Say Far-East Crime Cartels
Are Operating in America, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1984, at A3 (reporting that chief of FBI
organized-crime section had indicated that Bureau "was deciding whether to target Asian
organized crime as one of its nationwide enforcement priorities"); James Rosenthal,
Russia's New Export: The Mob, Wash. Post, June 24, 1990, at CI (reporting complaints of
state and federal prosecutors that the FBI was giving insufficient attention to Russian
mobsters in Brooklyn). Other agencies, federal and local, began to enter these emerging
"markets." See, e.g., Mark Arax & Jack Jones, LAPD Blamed for Killing Anti-Gang Unit:
Coolness to Plan for Multiagency Force Doomed Proposal, 2 Chiefs Say, L.A. Times, Jan.
12, 1985, at 29 (reporting that Los Angeles police department apparently scuttled plans for
federal-local task force targeting Asian organized crime because department felt own
efforts in area were successful); Barbara Lyne, The Women of One Hogan Place: Three
Who Play Key Roles in Morgenthau's Inner Circle, Manhattan Law., Mar. 1990, at 5, 24
(describing how Assistant District Attorney brought Asian organized crime case that had
been developed by police gang squad to U.S. Attorney's Office). This left the Bureau to
play catch-tip once the new threats became bright enough on the political radar screen to
demand its attention. By 1998, "international organized crime" was an FBI priority, indeed
one of several recognized "threats to U.S. national security." Threats to U.S. National
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to the agent-prosecutor relationship goes beyond these structural arrangements to include some basic features of federal criminal procedure.
C. ProsecutorialControls over Investigatory Tactics
Even if prosecutors lacked any formal say in the tactical decisions of
investigative agencies, their control over the charging process and relative
expertise in predicting how the use of particular tactics would play out in
the adjudicative process (as a matter of law or of jury response) would
give them a significant voice in agency decisionmaking. But we now
should add another element: the control that the law has given or encouraged prosecutors to exercise over the use of critical investigative
tools.
If they are willing to devote resources and abide by constitutional or
subconstitutional restrictions, criminal enforcement agencies can freely
resort to a panoply of investigative techniques. 29 They can develop informants, go undercover,I3 °1 interview willing witnesses, conduct fullblown searches upon consent or where warrants are not required, make
"investigative stops," or conduct sustained physical surveillance.' 3 1

Security: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 28, 1998)
(statement for the record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) ,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress98/threas.htm
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
129. Constitutional provisions like the Fourth and Fifth Amendments restrict
information gathering but still give law enforcement officers considerable freedom where
they do not conduct formal interrogations or invade areas in which an individual has a
legitimate expectation of privacy. Additional restrictions have been imposed by statute.
See, e.g., Peter H.W. Van Der Goes, Jr., Opportunity Lost: Why and How to Improve the
HHS-Proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement Access to Medical Records, 147 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1009, 1041 (1999) (analyzing "federal legislation that impacts individuals'
health information privacy and law enforcement's access to such records").
130. In certain sensitive cases, or where undercover tactics are particularly risky,
administrative regulations require agents to obtain approval from prosecutors. See infra at
Part III.A.2.
131. See Little, Proportionality, supra note 75, at 737 ("Not all criminal investigative
techniques require, or even involve, prosecutors. Law enforcement agents may and often
do, for example, interview witnesses, obtain public records, and conduct covert
surveillance, without ever consulting a prosecutor.");John Schwartz, Some Companies Will
Release Customer Records on Request, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2002, at A16 (reporting that
nearly 25% of corporate security officers surveyed said they would give customer
information to law enforcement officials and government agencies without a court order
and that 41% would do so "[i] f an investigation concerned national security"); cf. Ethan A.
Nadelmann, The DEA in Europe, in Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective 269,
285 (Cyrille Fijnaut & Gary Marx eds., 1995) (describing how "prosecutors in almost every
European country" gained "at least some role in authorizing, supervising or informally
shielding controlled deliveries"-operations in which the police allow drugs to proceed to
their destination so as to see who will pick them Lip).
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Where cases can be made based on these tactics, agents will have consid132
erable sway.
What agents generally cannot do, however, is invoke coercive
processes and require unwilling witnesses to provide evidence under pain
34
of contempt.' 3 Strictly speaking, only grand juries have this power,'
but prosecutors can freely invoke it in the grand jury's name,13 5 and thus
have a means of curing agency investigative inadequacies.1"" Even where
132. Hagan, supra note 22, at 123 (noting that "prosecutors must often rely on
narcotics officers for the information they need in developing cases, and they therefore are
often willing to give these officers extra consideration").
133. Recent counterterrorism legislation may (but need not) free enforcement agents
from prosecutorial supervision when invoking coercive processes. Under the USA
PATRIOT Act,
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director
(whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make
an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things ...
for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a
United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities ....
50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2000) (Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign
Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations). And the Bush Administration
may be going further in this direction. A leaked Justice Department draft of legislation
would create a new regime for "administrative subpoenas in ...investigations of terrorism"
that would allow the Attorney General to subpoena witnesses, compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, and require the production of any records that he finds relevant or
material to the investigation. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Jan. 9, 2003
draft), sec. 128, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/
Story 01-020703 Docl.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). See also Adam
Clymer, Justice Dept. Draft on Wider Powers Draws Quick Criticism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
2003, at A10 (noting insistence of Justice Department spokeswoman that the draft
represented nothing more than staff discussions). The draft is unclear on the degree to
which the Attorney General can delegate this authority. In the health-care fraud areas
where the Attorney General has been given similar administrative subpoena power, see 18
U.S.C. § 3486(a) (1) (A)-(B) (2000), authority appears to have been delegated only to U.S.
Attorneys and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. U.S. Attorneys'
Manual 9-44.201 (Overview of Authorized Investigative Demands-Delegation), available
at http://wwv.usdoj.gov/tisao/eousa/foiareading-room (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also In re Administrative Subpoena, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding
administrative subpoena in health care fraud investigation).
134. By contrast, prosecutors in the United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office can
require "attendance of persons to answer questions" and seek criminal sanctions if they fail
to answer questions "without a reasonable excuse." Janet Dine, Criminal Law in the
Company Context 176 (1995).
135. Daniel C. Richman, GrandJury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket,
36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 339, 344 (1999) [hereinafter Richman, Grand Jury]; see also United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (noting that "the grandjury cannot compel the
appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and must appeal to the court
when such compulsion is required").
136. Commenting on the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's Office's nowabandoned practice of requiring subpoenaed witnesses to appear for prosecutorial
questioning prior to going before the grandjury, one prosecutor recalled that in homicide
cases "he would routinely subpoena witnesses to his office in an effort to build a casewhich, in the District, is almost always compromised by shoddy police work and
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an agency appears to be zealously pursuing an investigation, control over
coercive processes allows prosecutors considerable sway in decisions
about what directions the inquiry will take. This dynamic is particularly
likely to occur in the white-collar context, where grand jury subpoenas
are fruitful tools for obtaining useful137information that would not otherwise have been voluntarily provided.
Where information cannot be obtained by grand jury subpoena,
prosecutors control other coercive tools: the ability to threaten prosecution, to enter into arrangements that promise leniency or better in exchange for information, and to seek compulsion orders requiring witnesses to testify under grant of immunity. Of these powers, only the last
has formally been granted to prosecutors (and not law enforcement agencies) by statute." 8 The others have been treated as arising out of prosecutorial charging discretion. Even where an agent actually promises a
suspect that he will not be prosecuted if, say, he aids in an investigation,
the promise will not be binding in the absence of specific (and generally
unavailable 31 ) evidence that the agent had authority to bind the U.S.
Attorney's Office. 140
uncooperative witnesses." Tom Schoenberg, Prosecutors Nix Witness Strategy, Legal
Times, Dec. Il, 2000, at 1; see also Davis, American Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 427
(discussing "office visit" practice of the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's Office).
137. See Richman, Grand Jury, supra note 135, at 345 (noting that in white collar
area, "potential witnesses frequently operate within an institutional context that both
requires the threat of legal sanction as a means of obtaining testimony, and takes that
threat seriously").
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (governing applications for compulsion orders for court
and grand jury proceedings).
139. Recent.lustice Department regulations reaffirm the absence of agent authority in
this regard:
A [Justice Department law enforcement] agent does not have any authority to
make any promise or commitment that would prevent the government from
prosecuting an individual for criminal activity that is not authorized pursuant to
[specific guidelines], or that would limit the use of any evidence by the
government, without the prior written approval of the [Federal Prosecuting
Office] that has primary jurisdiction to prosecute the [informant] for such
criminal activity. A[n] agent must take the utmost care to avoid giving any person
the erroneous impression that he or she has any such authority.
The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants 5
(2002), available at http://www.tlsdoj.gov/olp/dojguitlelines.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
140. See United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 84-90 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that FBI
agent lacked authority to promise informant immunity); United States v. Cordova-Perez,
65 F.3d 1552, 1554 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that INS agent who made a "no prosecution"
promise could not bind the United States); United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 520-21
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that ATF agents lacked authority to promise that defendant would
not be prosecuted); United States v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding
that FBI agent "lacked any actual or apparent authority to make the alleged promise not to
prosecute"); United States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675, 676 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that
DEA agent lacked authority to guarantee immunity); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding "no authority for ruling that oral
promises of immunity by an investigator [FBI agent], not in accord with statutory
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Compare this legal regime to that in England and Wales. There,
where the Crown Prosecution Service has had gatekeeping authority over
almost all prosecutions since 1986, a 1993 High Court decision held that
it would be an "abuse of process" for prosecution to proceed where police
had represented to the defendant that no such prosecution would be
brought. 14 1 Although the Crown Prosecution Service protested that it
had the exclusive right to decide whether to proceed, the High Court,
giving little thought to "how a Crown Prosecutor, without any powers to
supervise the investigation stage, could prevent the police making such
undertakings,"14 2 responded: "If the Crown Prosecution Service find that
their powers are being usurped by the police, the remedy must surely be
' 143
a greater degree of liaison at an early stage.
By statute, prosecutors have a gatekeeping role over the use of certain other investigative techniques, such as electronic surveillance under
Title 111.144 And although agents theoretically can apply for search warrants on their own, 1 4 5 familiarity with legal standards and with drafting
make prosecutors sought-after partners in this process as well. Prosecutors also play a bonding role vis-;t-vis the judicial officers to whom search
warrant applications must be presented. A judicial officer, aware that
"good faith" doctrine makes her decision to issue a warrant effectively
unreviewable (at least in a criminal case), 146 may be more likely to sign
off if the application has been written, or at least sponsored, by an AUSA

requirements, bind all federal ... prosecutors"); United States v. Hudson, 609 F.2d 1326,
1329 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Secret Service agent's promise to drop charges did not
bind the United States). A defendant who made incriminating statements in reliance on
unauthorized agent promises may be able to suppress them as improperly obtained.
Compare Welsh S. WhIite, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 Duke
L.J. 947,986-88 (1994) (arguing for doctrine to that effect), with Flemmi, 225 F.3d at 91-92
(rejecting one such claim).
141. R. v. Croydon Justices ex rel Dean [1993] 3 All E.R. 129, 129.
142. Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study 35 (1995)
[hereinafter Fionda, Discretion].
143. Croydon Justices [1993] 3 All E.R. at 135 (Staughton, L.J.); see also Julia Fionda,
The Crown Prosecution Service and the Police: A Loveless Marriage?, 110 Law Q. Rev.
376, 376-79 (1994) (describing tensions between Crown Prosecution Service and police
over prosecutorial discretion).
144. Application by "[a]n attorney for the Government" is also needed for pen
registers and "trap and trace" devices. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000). For a trenchant
depiction of the FBI's autonomy in the wiretap area before passage of Title 111, see
generally Athan Theoharis, FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 107
Pol. Sci. Q. 101 (1992).
145. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a) ("Upon the request of a federal law enforcement
officer or an attorney for the government, a search warrant authorized by this rule may be
issued .... ").
146. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding exclusionary
remedy not available where evidence was "obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant").
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known to the court" 4 7 or whose status as a legal professional makes him
more apt to get judicial deference.141
The more technically demanding a warrant process is, the more a
prosecutor can use her statutory role to scrutinize an agency's investigation. As one prosecutor counseled in a departmental publication:
All prosecutors should be from Missouri [the "Show Me" state].
With electronic surveillance, and all other aspects of our work
for that matter, we should personally verify all facts in a wiretap
affidavit that can be verified. An investigative agent will not be
offended when we ask to see copies of the pen register or trap
and trace data, or toll records which constitute part of the probable cause for an application. This personal review not only affords the prosecutor an opportunity to verify the accuracy of
such information in the affidavit, it also gives him or her an opportunity to identify other information that might be pertinent
immediately or at some future point in an investigation. Likewise, the prosecutor should review any and all surveillance and
interview reports that are connected to events described in an
affidavit. 149
Even when an agency does not need formal ex ante judicial or prosecutorial authorization for some investigative tactic, consultation with
prosecutors will often be salutary because of the extent to which agency
actions will later be subject to judicial scrutiny.' 5" Prosecutors' legal expertise and professional ties to judges can provide agencies with the
promise of greater success or some insulation (should their work be con147. See Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship Between
the Judge and the Prosecutor, 79 Neb. L. Rev. 251, 269 (2000) (discussing how personal
relationships between judges and prosecutors are fostered); see also Miller, Prosecution,
supra note 9, at 53 n.18 (survey of arrest warrant practices of Michigan state judges in late
1960s) ("One judge responsible for the signing of warrants stated that he, being a former
prosecutor himself, placed mnuch faith in the ability of the present prosecutor to screen
cases. Consequently, he did little more than scan the information contained in the
warrant before signing it.").
148. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper:
Reputational
Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting I (Colum. L. &
Econ. Working Paper No. 191, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstractid=270944 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing how
reputational penalties can bond gatekeeper performance).
149. Jeffrey W.,johnson, Defending Wiretaps: "Think in the Beginning What the End
Will Bring," U.S. Attorneys' Bull., Sept. 1997, at 27, 28 (footnotes omitted); see also
Wiretaps: A DEA Agent's Perspective: Interview with Special Agent Mark Styron, U.S.
Attorneys' Bull., Sept. 1997, at 29, 31 (statement of supervisory DEA agent who instructs
other agents on use of wiretaps) ("When a case merits a wiretap, the agent usually spends a
great deal of time advising the AUSA of the investigative history.").
150. See Scott Turow, Policing the Police: The D.A.'s Job, in Postmortem: The O.J.
Simpson Case 189, 191 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996) (blaming Los Angeles DA's Office for
sponsoring periurious testimony by police officers in O.J. Simpson case and recalling that
when he was an AUSA, AUSAs "were available to answer federal investigators' legal
questions twenty-four hours a clay," and "agents were forbidden to make an arrest or enter
a residence without our approval").
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demned on review). And agencies may also want to give prosecutors
some foreknowledge of (and complicity in) tactics (including warrantless
searches and interrogations) that will later be the subject of suppression
hearings. 15 1 Even when agencies have in-house legal personnel, these
considerations (and perhaps perceptions of relative competence in such
matters) can lead agents to seek legal counsel from prosecutors.15 2
Agents surely see themselves as paying a price for this insulation and
insurance. Dramatic evidence of this impression can be found in the account of the now-famous counsel at the FBI's Minneapolis field office,
Coleen Rowley, about her office's vain efforts to gain access in August
2001 to the computer of Zacarias Moussaoui, who is now charged with
conspiring with the September 11 hijackers. Explaining why she had
sought a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, rather
than going to the U.S. Attorney's Office for a criminal search warrant,
Rowley noted:
[A]lthough I thought probable cause existed ("probable cause"
meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or
if quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's Office, (for a lot of reasons including just to play it safe)
in regularly requiring much more than probable cause before
approving affidavits, (maybe, if quantified, 75%-80%
probability and sometimes even higher), and depending on the
53
actual AUSA who would be assigned, might turn us down. 1
The insulation that prosecutors provide may be based not simply on
professional courtesy but on a judicial recognition of prosecutors' risk
aversion. The dynamic in this regard has much in common with that in
the corporate arena, where lawyers also are frequently perceived as
151. See The Activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Part 1I: Hearing Before
the Subconm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 46-49 (1998)
(testimony of FBI Dir. Louis Freeh), available at http://commdocs.hoise.gov/
committees/judiciary/hju5030.000/hju5030_0F.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Hearing on FBI Activities] (noting that although FBI consulted with
local U.S. Attorney prior to interrogation of Richard Jewell, in connection with the 1996
Olympics bombing, he was not told that agents would misleadJewell into thinking that the
interrogation was for a training video).
152. See Webster Report, supra note 99, at 103 ("Field interviews established that CI
Special Agents generally have little confidence in the legal advice of their IRS Counsel due
to the Counsels' lack of criminal litigation expertise. Consequently Special Agents rely
heavily on Assistant United States Attorneys for advice during investigations."); cf. Robert
Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational
Representation, 64 Ind. L.J. 479, 503-04 (1989) (noting that, historically, corporations did
not vertically integrate for legal services because "elite firms ... were the only source for
quality legal services").
153. Memorandum friom Coleen Rowley to Robert Mueller, FBI Director (May 21,
2002), available at http://wvw.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (edited version of Rowley's letter to Director Mueller); see
also Ratnesar & Weisskopf, supra note 110, at 24 (profiling Rowley and discussing the
circumstances and content of her letter).
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"naysayers."' 154 The analogy has its limits: Prosecutors lack their private
counterparts' need to bill more hours and justify high legal fees, 155 and
their immunity 156 makes malpractice liability of little concern. But like
private attorneys, prosecutors have an interest in building a professional
reputation for legal acuity that will often be best served by blocking an
action.'15 7 They may also fear that those they advise, having laid off some
of the accountability by bringing in lawyers, may be even more aggressive
than they otherwise would have been. Moreover, there is a power dimension, as the overstatement of legal risk-i.e., going beyond simple prudence in the face of legal uncertainty' 5 8 -can be rewarded with control
over agency decisionmaking. 59 Where professionals seek "to increase
their power and prestige within organizations . . . by constructing the
legal environment as a major threat and then claiming the unique expertise to craft an effective response," the advice they give "may be substan16
tially more constraining than the law itself." 1
The nature of the procedural and substantive rules that prosecutors
interpret is itself a source of their professional power. Enforcement
agents would still need some legal assistance in a world of well-developed
codes of police conduct and of criminal liability. Yet the world in which
federal agents operate seems to have been intentionally constructed to
render them dependent on lawyers. Common law constitutional constraints dominate the rules governing police conduct, and, though "the
Supreme Court has studiously denied that federal common-law crimes
exist," 6 ' the lack of legislative specificity on the substantive side is re154. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 399.
155. Id. at 393 (noting that overstatement of legal risk creates more work for lawyers).
156. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-96 (1991) (holding that prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity in his adversarial role but only qualified immunity in his role as an
investigator).
157. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 397 ("By overstating legal risks,
the lawyer can decrease the reputational penalty that she pays when transactions go
awry.").
158. Id. at 379-80.
159. Id. at 430 ("[A] lawyer's status in a client interaction is elevated by the
assumption of dominance and control in that relationship, and the leverage a lawyer has to
achieve that status is the threat of legal risk. By using it, the lawyer can take charge and
displace the client's apparent autonomy." (citations omitted)); see also Lauren B. Edelman
et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26
Law & Soc'y Rev. 47, 77 (1992) ("[T]he professional power perspective suggests that
personnel professionals and practicing lawyers have a shared interest in constructing the
threat of wrongful discharge in such a way that employers perceive the law as a threat and
rely upon those professions to curb the threat."); Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14,
at 416 ("The overstatement of legal messages within an organization approaches the blurry
line between those intended in good faith to prompt action by the client and those
strategically designed to maximize the status and resources of legal players within the
enterprise.").
160. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 35, at 500.
161. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 761 (citing cases).
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markable. 16 2 Whether prosecutors actively embrace this legal uncertainly
is a matter of speculation.' 63 But they certainly profit from it in their
relations with agents.
Prosecutors' institutional aversion to adjudicative loss-whether in a
pre-trial suppression hearing or a post-trial reversal-can also lead them
to underestimate the investigative or enforcement value of a proposed
investigative tactic. To be sure, the tactic's success could bring in valuable
evidence that would increase the likelihood of an adjudicative victory (by
plea or trial). But the prosecutor, having the ability to decline cases she
deems "weak" (and probably having less invested in an investigation114)
can usually be more cavalier about the risk that a particular investigation
will come up dry.
These are all reasons why the rational prosecutor may be quicker to
veto an agency's investigative plans than a close reading of the relevant
case law might require. But as Langevoort and Rasmussen have noted in
the corporate context, the lawyer's bias against risk may have a cognitive
basis as well. It is true that, unlike their corporate cousins, prosecutors
will often be consulting a body of case law skewed toward the approval of
a proposed action.16 5 That is a natural consequence of a system in which
criminal defendants are free to bring, and lose, meritless legal claims of
improper agency action. 1 66 But, as in the corporate context, the prosecutor will still encounter "asymmetric accountability"'1 7 and be more likely
to face review and condemnation for authorizing action than for vetoing
162. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 469, 470-72 (1996); Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 761.
163. See Kahan, supra note 162, at 479-81 (suggesting that prosecutors use power of
initiation to guide development of federal criminal law); cf. Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as
Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2058 (1990) (book
review) ("The differing social prominence of the bar in the civil and common law worlds is
due to contrasting views within these systems over the degree of precision and certainty
necessary to the exercise of professional authority.").
164. To the extent that a prosecutor does have a considerable investment in the
success of a particular investigation, because, say, she has devoted much of her time to it,
or because she perceives a need to pursue this particular case, her decisionmaking bias
may be quite different. See infra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 433 (noting that in the civil
context, there is selection bias toward the "hard" cases, "leading some to predict a roughly
50/50 split between dispositions for plaintiffs and defendants on the merits, regardless of
the prevailing standard of law"); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4-5 (1984) (developing a model which
"demonstrates that, where the gains or losses from litigation are equal to the parties, the
individual maximizing decisions of the parties will create a strong bias toward a rate of
success for plaintiffs at trial or appellants at appeal of 50 percent, regardless of the
substantive standard of law").
166. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences
of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1990) (noting that
"defense counsel risk little by disputing all available legal issues at trial and on appeal, even
where the claim appears to have little merit").
167. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 427.
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it.""' And with the costs of foregone action so often elusive, the tempta-

tions to err on the side of caution are great.
There are limits to the costs to agencies of involving prosecutors in
investigative decisionmaking. The prosecutor who has helped (or at least
thinks he has helped) call investigative shots is more likely to be aligned
with the agency's interests when it comes to making charging decisions. ' !' But it would not be surprising if many agents saw prosecutors
more as a necessary evil or ambassadors to a foreign realm than as devoted champions.' 71 And the "costs" to agencies (measured as power lost
to prosecutors) are presumably greatest in those areas in which judicial
intervention is most likely, or in which the information acquisition tools
controlled by prosecutors are most needed.
D. Culture Clash and Merger
To this point, we have seen the effects of structural arrangements
and procedural rules on the prosecutor-agent relationship. The next element to add is cultural. At first blush, it would seem that, whatever their
legal and institutional obligations to work together, prosecutors and
agents would be pushed apart by their membership in distinct, even antagonistic, professional cultures. Yet here too, particularly in the federal
system, there is a degree of convergence that often goes unrecognized.
The basics are well known. Although the FBI has a long tradition of
lawyer-agents, most agencies do not.17 ' And even the FBI has changed a
168. There are exceptions to this rule. See Beverly Ltumpkin, Anti-Terrorisl
Proposals, Sept. 28, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/HallsOttiustice/
hallsoljustice95.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting dispute between
unnamed FBI and Justice Department officials, in wake of September 11 attacks, as to
whether Department officials had prevented the Bureau friom obtaining FISA warrants
prior to attacks). A recent congressional inquiry has held the FBI's National Security Law
Unit responsible for the decision not to seek such warrants. See Statement of Eleanor Hill,
supra note 56, at 16.
169. See Heiner Busch & Albrecht Funk, Undercover Tactics as an Element of
Preventive Crime Fighting in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Undercover: Police
Surveillance in Comparative Perspective 55, 66 (Cyrille Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995)
(noting how in "many large cities [in Germany], the organized-crime units of the police
. . . set up special offices for maintaining liaison with the state attorney's office" and
observing that "(t] he danger of such a liaison is that the state attorney's office may find
itself being gradually drawn away from judicial criteria, becoming increasingly committed
to the criteria of police efficiency").
170. Although in the federal system agents cannot directly seek electoral revenge on
prosecutors for overly aggressive gatekeeping, police have that option elsewhere. See Roy
B. Flemming et al., The Craft ofJustice: Politics and Work in Criminal Court Communities
46 (1992) (quoting DA who had "turned down an awful lot of warrants" and had thereby
"pissed off the cops" and subsequently dropped out of race for reelection when he 'Tound
he had no support from the Fraternal Order of the Police").
171. See CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Oct. 5, 1998, at 87-88 (author's notes)
(testimony of Richard Cafias, Director of the National Drug Intelligence Center)
("[W]here the DEA took great pride in [the fact] that 70-80 percent of its people had
prior [state and local] law enforcement experience, the FBI took great pride that 80-90
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lot since the Hoover years. 1 72 As a general rule, then, most agents have
not been exposed to the acculturation process at law school, which not
only tends to be process oriented when it addresses criminal enforcement
issues, but also exalts a norm of moral neutrality173 that can (but need
not) lead prosecutors to distance themselves from the enforcement
projects of the agents they deal with, who may see the world in more
Manichean terms.'

74

Law school is only the beginning of the story, though. Far more influential are the differences in the career paths of agents and prosecutors
and the aftermarkets they face. There are many career, or at least longserving, prosecutors. 175 But a great many view the job as a way station, a
percent of their people did not."); see also Harry Thie et al., Future Career Management
Systems for U.S. Military Officers 323 (1994) ("Most new [ATF] agents come directly from
colleges and universities, often from one of the many schools with a strong program in
criminal justice."); id. at 328 ("Most candidate agents join the Secret Service with some
prior law enforcement experience, often in a police department or the military. Others
come directly from college, often schools with programs in criminal justice."); U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook 346 (2002-2003 ed. 2002), available at http://
ww.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocosl60.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that to
be considered, FBI applicant "either must be a graduate of an accredited law school or a
college graduate with a major in accounting, fluency in a foreign language, or 3 years of
related full-time work experience"; DEA applicant "must have a college degree and either
1 year of experience conducting criminal investigations, 1 year of graduate school, or have
achieved at least a 2.95 grade point average while in college"; Secret Ser-vice and ATF
applicant "must have a bachelor's degree or a minimum of 3 years' related work
experience").
172. Actually, it was in the 1960s, when Hoover was still very much inl power, that "the
Bureau began to look to nonlawyers as agents." Powers, supra note 107, at 362. But see
Thie et al., supra note 171, at 317 ("While candidates [for the FBI] have a wide range of
backgrounds, requirements demand many lawyers and accountants ....").
173. See Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76
Minn. L. Rev. 193, 237-38 (1991). But see Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 414
("[T]he image of lawyers more beholden to the law than to their clients is of questionable
descriptive accuracy.").
174. See Robert E. Worden, Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police
Behavior: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Empirical Assessment, 23 L. & Soc'y Rev. 667,
688 (1989) ("The stereotypical police officer chafes under due process provisions in the
single-minded pursuit of criminal offenders ....Relevant psychometric data are scarce, so
that it is difficult to assess rigorously the extent to which police officers fit this stereotypic
mold ....");see also David Weisburd et al., Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority:
Findings from a National Study 11 (Juine 2000), available at http://wwv.ncjis.or-g/
pdffilesl/nij/181312.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (survey of 925 randomly
selected American police officers from 121 departments) ("Even though most police
officers disapprove of the use of excessive force, a substantial minority consider it
acceptable to sometimes use more force than permitted by the laws that govern them.").
175. See Law Enforcement Retirement Coverage: Hearing on H.R. 583 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 23 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Ed Bryant) ("Data fiom the Department ofJustice reveals that length of
service for AUSAs was seven years for 1990 through 1992, and eight years for 1993 through
1996 ....By comparison, the length of service for other justice employees was 19 years in
1996."); id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis) ("Right now, the current average length of
service for an AUSA is 10 years.").
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means of acquiring human capital (litigation experience, familiarity with
local legal practices and personalities) that will facilitate their representation of private clients thereafter.176 Even those prosecutors who plan to
stay with the government will often orient themselves toward their professional counterparts through participation in local bar activities and the
like.' 77 In contrast, agents stay a long time. A 1994 RAND report found
that "[o]verall attrition in the [FBI] is low," and that, while some agents
resign in their first five years, "[m]ost agents either retire at the earliest
opportunity [age 50] or remain in the bureau until mandatory retire-

ment [age 57].1117
Agents and prosecutors also have different geographical orientations. AUSAs wishing to move may try to transfer to another U.S. Attorney's Office. They may even be asked by Washington to take on jobs in
another city.' 79 But the typical AUSA stays in one city and builds her
professional reputation there. Life is very different for agents. According
to the RAND report, upon graduation from the FBI Academy, an FBI
agent starts with a three- to five-year assignment to a field office that cannot be near her home."' o After that, she typically will be sent to another
176. See Glaeser et al., supra note 8, at 260-61; Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long,
Size, Monitoring, and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys 14-17 (July
10, 2000), available at http://fiiiwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0089.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that young prosecutors are prone to take cases to trial to
acquire human capital Unless they are closely monitored); see also Richard W. Painter,
Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between
Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 149, 168 (1996) (noting how
interest of agency lawyers in "building a reputation for thoroughness, integrity, and zealous
representation of their clients" is "reinforced by values of the legal profession that accord
the most respect to the toughest government lawyers, and not to the weakest or most
accommodating").
Familiarity with informal discretionary policies, particularly as to charging, may also be
valuable. That at least appears to be the feeling of the many defense lawyers who start plea
negotiations with prosecutors by telling them how the case would have been treated "when
I was in the Office." See Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of
Attorneys at Work 78 (1985) (observing that defense lawyers tell of rapport with AUSAs
because they too were once prosecutors).
177. Cf. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why
They Do It 60 (1989) ("in a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who receive
some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners
located outside the agency.").
178. Thie et al., supra note 171, at 321.
179. See, e.g., Seth Rosenfeld, Big Job Ahead for New U.S. Attorney: "Straight
Shooter" Takes over Office in Apparent Disarray, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 23, 1998, at DI
(noting appointment of Robert Mueller, then an AUSA in D.C., as interim U.S. Attorney in
San Francisco); Benjamin Weiser, Bush Picks Virginia Prosectutor for U.S. Attorney, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 1, 2001, at D3 (noting appointment ofJames Comey, then AUSA in Virginia,
to be U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York); see also Nathaniel Hernandez,
Senator Cuts to the Core in Taking a Bite of the Big Apple, Chi. Law., June 2001, at 18
(reporting that Illinois senator selects-i.e., asks the President to nominate-Patrick
Fitzgerald, then an AUSA in New York, to be U.S. Attorney in Chicago).
180. Thie et al., supra note 171, at 317.
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field office-"often one of the 'top 12' offices that are larger, have
broader operational requirements, and are sometimes difficult to staffor to headquarters in Washington D.C."t 81 Reassignments are "based on
the needs of the FBI and whether agents choose to compete for management positions in other locations."' 8 2 As all agents sign mobility agreements when hired, they can be, and are, "reassigned or relocated at regular intervals."'18 3 Similar policies-including mobility agreements,
regular reassignment, and control of the entire process from headquar184
ters-can be found at other agencies.
These cultural differences can drive a powerful wedge between
agents and prosecutors. 185 Agents or even agencies seeking to justify
their refusal to share information about sources and methods with prosecutors will assert a fear that such data will be misused once the prosecutors enter private practice. 8 " This tendency toward non-disclosure is bolstered by concerns that prosecutors have far less "on the line" when it
comes to investigative security. An agent's promise to an informant is
bonded by his and his agency's professional reputation. The prosecutor
who will soon move into another world is not so bound. Agents may
worry that prosecutors looking for lucrative private practice berths will be
too quick to compromise cases with, or extend professional courtesies to,
prospective professional allies, or, alternatively, too quick to tax agency
resources by taking cases to trial unnecessarily in order to gain marketable litigation experience. 8 7 Agents may also see prosecutors as all too
ready to credit defense allegations of agent misconduct.' 88 Part of the
problem may be sheer resentment on the part of agents at the rewards
that private practice will bring prosecutors, and perhaps some disdain for
the unworldliness of young prosecutors' law school experience. Prosecutors, for their part, may tend to identify with professional adversaries' 8 9
181. Id.
182. Id. at 319.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 323-24 (ATF); id. at 329-31 (Secret Service).
185. See W.E. Douglas Creed & Raymond E. Miles, Trust in Organizations: A
Conceptual Framework Linking Organizational Forms, Managerial Philosophies, and the
Opportunity Costs of Controls, in Trust in Organizations 16, 18-19 (Roderick M. Kramer
& Tom R. Tyler. eds., 1996) (discussing trust as in part a function of "characteristic
similarity").
186. Cf. Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies Be Cops?, Foreign Pol'y, Winter 1994-1995, at
36, 46 (former general counsel of National Security Agency) ("It is bad security to describe
highly sensitive sources and methods to a steady stream of prosecutors-many of them
young lawyers who will soon be making a career out of representing criminal
defendants.").
187. See Boylan & Long, supra note 176, at 14-17.
188. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Informant 361-62 (2000) (recounting how defense
allegations of informant and FBI misconduct drove a wedge-at least temporarilybetween agents and prosecutors).
189. See James Eisenstein et al., The Contours of Justice: Communities and Their
Courts 34 (1988) ("The higher-status members of the criminal court community share
more than a common workplace and linked occupations. All are lawyers, sharing the
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and see theirjob as reining in "cowboy" line agents who pay little heed to
the niceties of due process. 9 1'
Yet other forces reduce the culture gap. A small (but interesting)
part of the story is the growing high-end private market for federal investigative expertise. When some of the best retirementjobs an agent could
seek were in the security area, they had good reason to pursue bank robbery cases'91 but no particular cause to get close with prosecutors. But
particularly since the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which
put a high premium on internal corporate investigations, 192 ex-federal
agents have begun to find a new array of lucrative employment opportutnities in the private sector.I 1' And the hiring will likely be done, or presided over, by lawyers, often ex-prosecutors who once worked with or
94
around them. 1
relatively high status that this profession accords its members and the common experience
of attending law school and practicing law.").
190. Christine Biederman, Busted, Dallas ObserverJuly 10, 1997, at 21, 31 (claiming
that "a good number [of DEA agents] display a devil-may-care attitude toward rules and
regulations borne of running snitches, serving as buckshot-fodder, and hunting down drug
dealers on unfamiliar, often hostile, foreign soil").
191. See Burnham, supra note 100, at 15 (quoting retired FBI executive) ("[A]t the
local level, bank robberies are 'often' exciting, and rarely do they require serious work.
And don't forget what may be the most important factor: A lot of agents want to please the
bankers because one of their favorite retirement jobs is being the chief of security for a
bank.").
192. See Note, Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1783, 1784-88 (1996) (discussing how Federal Sentencing Guidelines
have placed corporations under considerable pressure to develop programs for policing
employee conduct).
193. See Susan Antilla, When Things Go Wrong on Wall St., N.Y. Times, May 15,
1994, at C15; Kim Clark, The Detectives, Fortune, Apr. 14, 1997, at 122; Hilary Rosenberg,
The Deal Detectives, Institutional Investor, May 1996, at 74; Joseph B. Treaster, Gumshoes
with White Collars: Deal Spotlights New Shrewdness in Detective Business, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1997, at Dl. For a sense of the agency backgrounds of the investigative
consultants allied with one white-collar law firm, see Holland & Knight Consulting, at
http://www.hkconsulting.com/consultantsresults.asp?searchArea (last visited Mar. 9,
2003) (on file with the Columnbia Law Review).
194. See Clark, supra note 193, at 125 ("It turns out ... that many [investigative]
agencies claiming to have operatives around the world are really just a couple of exprosecutors in an office with the directory of retired FBI agents."); David M. Halbfinger,
Corporate Cops: They're Private, They're Crime Busters and They're Proliferating,
Newsday, Mar. 26, 1995, Money & Careers, at 1 (discussing role of ex-prosecutors in
investigative industry); Anthony Lin, Lawyers Play Detective in Corporate Scandals, N.Y.
LJ., July 26, 2002, at 1 ("Corporations typically hire law firms to spearhead internal
investigations .... Law firms then decide whether or not to hire an investigative agency,
and what role that agency will play."); id. ("[M]ost of the lawyers now leading major
corporate investigations possess significant law enforcement backgrounds, whether from
stints at U.S. attorney's offices, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S.
Department of Justice or elsewhere.").
For an unscientific sense of the range of employment options for ex-FBI agents, see
websites linked to homepage of The Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, at http://www.socxfbi.org/socxfbi-html/membersHPlist.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2003) (on file with the Colurnbia Law Review).
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Another factor is training-although who is training whom can vary.
The young prosecutor charged with supervising a wiretap, dealing with a
cooperator, or putting a corporate subordinate into the grand jury will
frequently find that the street-wise agents on the case are far more perspicacious instructors on human nature and criminal machinations than her
law school professors, her former law firm colleagues, or even the prosecutors down the hall. 195 For their part, an increasing number of agents,
many quite inexperienced,' 96 find themselves looking to prosecutors for
guidance and on-the-job training."'17 One U.S. Attorney recently noted
that the need for assistants to teach agents about white collar crime had
increased "as many young agents have been diverted into violent crime
investigations."' 98 It would be an overstatement to say that the training of
prosecutors by agents, or of agents by prosecutors, creates a common culture, 19) but these processes certainly tend to bridge cultural and profes195. Of course, a prosecutor's failure to recognize a training opportunity can increase
the cultural gap. See W. Boyd Littrell, Bureaucratic Justice: Police, Prosecutors, and Plea
Bargaining 42 (1979) (citing study ofjustice system in a New Jersey county that notes how
"delicate interpersonal problems" can arise when veteran police officers, much older and
with more criminal law knowledge than young prosecutors, must defer to prosecutorial
authority).
196. Even before September 11, turnover and aggressive agency expansion were
producing a relatively less experienced workforce. See Department ofJustice FY02 Budget:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Jtdiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congress01/freeh051701.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Agents
hired since September 1993 represent about 41 percent of the agents on board today.");
Chitra Ragavan, FBI Inc.: How the World's Premier Police Corporation Totally Hit the
Skids, U.S. News & World Rep., June 18, 2001, at 14, 16 (noting that Freeh's "ramping up
of staff was combined with a rapid retirement of senior agents in charge and deputies
(lured in part by lucrative pensions and large private sector paychecks), leading to a young
workforce"), The trend will become even more pronounced in the wake of September 11.
See Jerry Seper, FBI Sets "Aggressive Hiring" Goal at 900, Wash. Times, Jan. 30, 2002, at
A4; see also Stephen Barr, New Drill in Law Enforcement: Ready, Aim, Hire!, Wash. Post,
Feb. 13, 2002, at B2 ("Recruitment programs at Customs, the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies are being driven by the war on terrorism and by efforts to improve
homeland defense.").
197. CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Dec. 2, 1998, pt. 1, at 166-67 (author's notes)
(testimony of U.S. Attorney Calloway) ("It used to be that the agents trained the
prosecutor," but a hiring freeze followed by a burst of hiring created "a level of
inexperience," requiring "the more senior AUSAs" to train agents.).
198. Id. at 162-63 (testimony of U.S. Attorney Warner). In mid-1997, "about 25
percent" of the more than 1,100 FBI agents in the New York field office, which has a large
white-collar caseload, had "under one-year of experience." Hearing on FBI Activities,
supra note 151, at 8 (testimony of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh).
199. Cf. Dato W. Steenhuis, Coherence and Coordination in the Administration of
Criminal Justice, in Criminal Law in Action 229, 243-45 (Jan van Dijk et al. eds., 1986) (An
Advocate-General at the Court ofJustice, Leeuwarden, Netherlands notes that, in absence
of structural changes, "an important instrument to improve the coordination of
production in the criminal justice system would be the adoption of a common organisation
culture," which could be accomplished through a common training program and job
rotation for police, prosecutor, and judges.).
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Yet another factor, in many districts, is the presence in the U.S. Attorney's Office of one or more representatives of one or more agencies,
in the capacity of "task force representative"-the product of an increasing use of these interagency groups. 20 11 Over and above the coordinating
function they play in the cases to which they are assigned, these agents
can serve as general mediators between people from their agency and
2 1
assistants, able to vouch for assistants to agents and vice versa. 0
Finally, one ought not underestimate the unifying influence of a
shared commitment to "getting the bad guys," hardened by the adver2
sarial process, 211
nurtured by mutual respect and need, and on occasion
lubricated by alcohol.20 3 Organizational theory teaches that "effective coordination always depends, at least in part, on the development of informal norms and conventions through group interaction, socialization, and
experimentation." 2' 1 4 And, as in any other organizational setting, the social relationships that can arise out of constant and routine contacts will
2 5
provide a solid foundation for trust. 0

200. See Kathleen Sylvester, Stopping Smugglers: Can Task Forces Nab the
Kingpins?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 1 (discussing interaction of agencies and U.S.
Attorneys' Offices in task force context).
201. State prosecutors have recognized the value of this mediation. See Michael L.
Benson & Francis T. Cullen, Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work 224
(1998) (noting how one local prosecutor in Florida facilitated cooperation with federal
agencies by hiring two retired FBI agents as fraud investigators).
202. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917, 949-50 (1999) (noting
emergence of "'us and them' mentality" among Assistants).
203. See Gary]. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy
193 (1992) (noting how, in one study, "gambling, games, and social interaction constituted
a vital part of the means by which the men reinforced one another's expectations of
cooperative play in their team production dilemma"); Nina Burleigh, 'White Power:
Against Arab Terrorists or Wall Street Criminals, U.S. Attorney Maryjo White Always Plays
to Win, N.Y. Mag., July 9, 2001, at 26, 28 ("The U.S. attorney's office has always required a
high comfort level with the boys in law enforcement, but White has stood out as a
prosecutor's prosecutor, happiest socializing with FBI agents and cops.").
204. Donald Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in
Multiorganizational Systems 85 (1989) (using Bay Area public transit agencies as case
study); see also Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor 65 (1988) ("Boundaries between professional jurisdictions . . . tend to
disappear in worksites, particularly in overworked worksites. There results a form of
knowledge transfer that can be called workplace assimilation.").
205. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24J.
Corp. L. 869, 907-08 (1999); see also Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker,
Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships, in Trust in Organizations 114,
121-22 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (discussing "knowledge-based
trust").
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E. Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Prosecutor-agent relationships will vary
from office to office, and, even within the same office, from agency to
agency. 2°61 Sometimes, it is just a matter of local "culture." That culture,
however, may reflect the exigencies or luxuries of a particular case mix
(which may in turn be a function of enforcement priorities). The more
"proactive" 20 7 the enforcement agenda, the more deeply involved prose2 08
cutors are likely to be in pre-indictment decisionmaking.
There may be districts where agents simply propose and prosecutors
simply dispose. 21° 9 There may even be districts where, in doing so, each
actor is largely indifferent to how the other will exercise his discretion.
The goal of this Part, however, has been to show how institutional structures, legal rules, and professional interactions combine to bind the bureaucratic elements of the federal enforcement system far closer together
than has been generally understood, at least in the academic literature.
206. Julie O'Sullivan recently related how, as a former AUSA for the Southern District
of New York working in the Little Rock, Arkansas, Office of the Independent Counsel, she
was struck by how the regular Little Rock Assistants had
a completely different way of doing cases. The agents came to them with
completed cases ready to be indicted. They took the old model very seriously.
The agents investigated, the prosecutors prosecuted. There were some
exceptions, but overall that was definitely the model.
As a result, between local agents and a lot of Southern District-trained
Assistants . . . there was some tension in the beginning, because we not only
wanted to attend witness interviews, we actually wanted to conduct them, which
seemed very foreign to the agents.
Panel Discussion: The Expanding Prosecutorial Role from Trial Counsel to Investigator
and Administrator, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 679, 701-02 (1999). For a similar description of
the differences in the way prosecutors from two different offices conceived of their
investigative role, see Eichenwald, supra note 188, at 276 (relating that Springfield
prosecutors, who felt "[i]nvestigation was for the agents; prosecution was for lawyers,"
balked when lawyers from the Antitrust Division sought to participate in "drop-in
interviews with potential defendants" in the Archer Daniels Midland case).
207. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts Ill & IV, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 920, 964 (1987) (contrasting "proactive" and "reactive" models of
investigation).
208. See Hagan, supra note 22, at 123 (noting that "[p]roactive police work" by its
very nature "involves a tightening of the coupling among the police, prosecutorial, and
judicial subsystems"); see also Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal
Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 577 (1999) [hereinafter
Glazer, Thinking Strategically] (noting greater involvement of prosecutors in investigation
of more complex cases).
209. When a supervisory FBI agent wrote in the FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin about
how investigators could use "the enterprise theory of investigation" to help "dismantle
entire criminal enterprises," the role he envisioned for prosecutors was simply to advise
investigators as to the elements of the offenses involved and whether they had been
satisfied, and then to prosecute the completed case. Richard A. McFeely, Enterprise
Theory of Investigation, FBI Law Enforcement Bull., May 2001, at 19, available at http://
www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/mayOlleb.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
see also Little, Proportionality, supra note 75, at 734 (describing historical norm wherein
agencies investigated and referred cases and prosecutors took cases to trial).
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And the allocation of power that results from this dynamic will largely
determine how enforcement discretion is exercised-against which
targets and with what force.
II. NORMATIVE MODELS

As we have seen, the dynamics of prosecutor-agent interaction vary
greatly across the country, and certain constituting elements of that interaction are deeply embedded in the way the federal criminal enforcement
system has been structured. One is thus tempted to say either that the
system cannot be fairly modeled, or, if it can, that it cannot be tinkered
with. This Part nonetheless makes the normative move and asks what the
relationship between federal prosecutors and agents ought to look like.
For one thing, the answers we get can inform our assessment of the prevailing "prosecutorial-administrative system" that Jerry Lynch highlighted.2 ' But the project is prescriptive as well. Not every determinant
of how authority is allocated between prosecutors and agencies is set in
2
stone. Indeed, legislators and judges regularly change this allocation. ''
But this policymaking has been largely by default-with changes in institutional design often the unforeseen consequence of decisions about
what judicially enforced rights criminal defendants ought to have. The
irony is that if we paid more attention to how power is allocated between
agents and prosecutors, we might better protect criminal defendants' interests-and perhaps even their rights.
This Part starts by exploring the attractions of an organizational
model that exalts prosecutors over agents. It then turns around to show
why, at least in the context of a system with decentralized prosecutorial
authority, one might not want to foster prosecutorial hierarchy. Having
considered these two standard models, this Part suggests a third paradigm of agent-prosecutor interaction-a working group model that tries
to capture the professional contributions of each side, and to promote
mutual monitoring.
A. Toward a ProsecutorialHierarchy?
Before modeling the optimal relationship between prosecutors and
agencies, one first needs at least a rough sense of what one wants the
federal enforcement system to do. One hopefully rather uncontroversial
goal is that of prosecuting only guilty people, convicting them, and doing
so in accordance with law (defined broadly). A second, hopefully only
slightly less controversial, goal is that enforcement proceed with a degree
of moderation. American criminal law is famous (or infamous) for its

210. Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 6, at 2145.
211. See infra Part Il.
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breadth and the discretion it gives enforcers.2 12 And perhaps because
there is so little pressure on federal enforcers to act on legislative prohibitions, the federal criminal "code" may well be even broader than that of
the states in the range of conduct it ostensibly covers. 2 13 Reasonable
minds can differ "over what business practices should be deemed fraud,
even over whether perjury in a civil case should be pursued criminally, '2 14 but they are unlikely to differ over the need for institutionalized
restraint in this area.
Why can't we start by reducing the need for executive restraint by
demanding that Congress take more pains to specify what should really
be a federal crime? We can, but I will not spend too much time on the
point for three reasons: (1) It is too obviously right as a theoretical matter, the corollary of our allegiance "to the rule of law and democratic
accountability"; 2 15 (2) many, from the Chief Justice of the United States
on down, have already made the argument forcefully and well; 216 and (3)
2 17
it would be easier to get blood from a stone.
Restricting the focus to the executive branch, one can easily-although, as will be seen, not necessarily-push toward a normative model
of prosecutorial-agency interaction that strives, within the limits of a fragmented organizational chart, to subordinate agents to prosecutorialjudg212. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 505, 512 (2001) ("Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great deal of conduct is
criminalized, and of that conduct, a large proportion is criminalized many times over.").
213. See Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 6, at 2137 (contending that
many federal criminal statutes "are ill-defined, overbroad, or insufficiently concerned with
culpability"); Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 33, at 760-61 ("[A]nyone with
more than a passing familiarity with federal criminal law is struck by the extraordinary
extent to which Congress has eschewed legislative specificity in this highly sensitive area.").
The story of why there is no real "code" is well told in Charles R. Wise, The Dynamics of
Legislation: Leadership and Policy Change in the Congressional Process (1991). See
generally Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff. Crim.
L. Rev. 45 (1998) (reviewing historical efforts to revise the federal criminal code).
214. Richman, Project Exile, supra note 29, at 397.
215. See Kahan, supra note 162, at 484.
216. See William H. Rehnquist, Address to 75th Ann. ALl Meeting (May 1998);
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
Third Branch, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3; Comm. on Long Range Planning, judicial Conference of
the U.S., Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 21-28 (1995); A.B.A. Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law, The Federalization of Criminal Law 51 (1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and
Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 121,
122-23 (1988); Kahan, supra note 162, at 481-88; Jeffrey Standen, An Economic
Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 249, 284-95 (1998)
(calling for federal criminal code reform).
217. The extent to which the lack of legislative specificity reflects an unrestricted
congressional grant of power is open to dispute. Compare Kahan, supra note 162
(focusing on breadth of substantive federal criminal law), with Richman, Federal Criminal
Law, supra note 33 (exploring mechanisms other than substantive law through which
Congress guides the exercise of enforcement discretion).
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ment.2 18 In this model, prosecutors, just like their corporate cousins
(though perhaps for different reasons), are to be exalted in their
gatekeeping role,2 1 9 celebrated for their ability to prevent agency misconduct or excessive zeal, and given every tool possible to enhance their capabilities to this end.
An effort to bolster prosecutorial authority need not rest on any
claim of superior judgment. In their gatekeeping capacity, prosecutors
merely supplement agency judgments about appropriate targets and tactics; they do not replace them. Even if they were somewhat less skilled or
interested than agents, prosecutors could still promote legal and moderate enforcement by offering an additional level of review-as long as
prosecutors were not so unskilled that agents relaxed their own efforts
out of frustration. As has been noted in the separation of powers context, 220 what matters in this extremely thin analysis is the number of components and their serial arrangement. 22 ' And anything done to ensure
that prosecuting offices have access to information about targets and tactics, and the ability to act on that information, will help reduce type I
errors (of commission).
Claims of superior judgment can also be made. If the goal is to ensure that agents' investigative efforts do not violate constitutional or statutory strictures or the admonitions a court has made in its supervisory capacity,2 2 2 then who better to advise agencies prospectively and monitor
218. See Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality 357 (1987) ("The police
should . . . not take upon themselves the responsibility of resolving debatable and
troublesome moral questions that might affect prosecution; those should be left to the
prosecutors."). One can envision a hierarchical system in which prosecutors are
subordinated to police, as prevailed in England and Wales prior to the creation of the
Crown Prosecution Service. See Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial
Inaction: A Model DeclaratoryJudgment Statute, 97 Yale L.J. 488, 494 & n.38 (1988). But
I will restrict myself to hierarchical arrangements that are remotely plausible in the U.S.
federal context.
219. Cf. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 14, at 888-96
(exploring efficacy of gatekeeper liability for parties such as outside directors, accountants,
lawyers, and underwriters in preventing corporate malfeasance); Kraakman, Gatekeepers,
supra note 14, at 53 (examining economic costs of imposing liability on "private parties
who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers").
See generally Gilson, supra note 14 (examining devolution of legal counsel's traditional
function as gatekeeper in preventing strategic litigation).
220. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703, 769-70 (2002).
221. Cf. C.F. larry Heimann, Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational
Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 421, 427 (1993)
(contrasting serial systems, which by requiring the approval of several components before
agency action can be taken are less prone to type I errors, with parallel systems, which are
more prone to such errors "because it is only necessary for the incorrect action to pass
through one channel in order to be implemented by the system").
222. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1992) (noting limitations on
supervisory judicial power); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1433, 1434 (1984).
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agency compliance retrospectively than prosecutors, whose current and
future jobs place a premium on the knowledge (or prediction) and transmission of legal norms? And the more junctures at which prosecutorial
advice is sought, and the information needed to give it is provided properly, the better. Similarly, prosecutors' familiarity with de jure and de
facto standards of evidentiary sufficiency-what counts as "beyond a reasonable doubt" in court and what will actually persuade a jury in the district-make them valuable resources for the agents putting cases together, so long as the prosecutors know the true quality of the evidence.
Another, perhaps more tenuous, argument for maximal prosecutorial involvement in agency decisionmaking rests not on prosecutors' technical abilities, but on the sense of perspective and unique commitment to
procedural justice that they are thought to bring to the enforcement bureaucracy. The idea of prosecutors as "magisterial" figures, bound by a
special duty to "seek justice,"2 23 probably would sound rather self-aggrandizing to the dedicated federal agent. After all, he too thinks of himself
as pursuing justice, and if he is doing his job right, he too will keep a
professional distance from his cases, tempering zeal with judgment and
moderation. 2 24 Underneath all the aspirational talk in law reviews, judicial opinions, and professional literature about prosecutors as "ministers
of justice 225 lurk contestable assumptions about prosecutors' special fitness for that role, and the unsuitability of agents or police officers for it.
Having noted the occasionally grating triumphalism of the legal literature, 2 26 however, one can still find some truth in assumptions about
223. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983) ("A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); Stanley Z.
Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L.
197, 198 (1988) (discussing the dual role of a prosecutor: to seek conviction and to seek
justice); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
309, 337-53 (2001); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham
Urb. LJ. 607, 625-37 (1999) (arguing that prosecutor's duty to seek justice is rooted in
power and, even more, in role as representative of a sovereign committed to govern fairly);
Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution of
Criminal Cases, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1305, 1308-10 (1998).
224. See Robert Jackall, Investigating Criminal Violence, 97 Soc. Res. 849, 866 (2000)
("Even as [homicide investigators in New York] assess the stories of those who provide
them with information, criminal investigators are continually constructing and revising
their own narratives about what actually happened in any given crime."); Stephen J.
Vicchio, Ethics and Police Integrity, Address Before the National Symposium on Police
Integrity (uly 1997), in FBI Law Enforcement Bull., July 1997, at 8-12, available at http://
www.fi.gov/publications/leb/1997/july972.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
225. See Candace McCoy, Police, Prosecutors, and Discretion in Investigation, in
Handled with Discretion: Ethical Issues in Police Decisionmaking 159, 174 (John Kleinig
ed., 1996) ("It seems that prosecutors are more likely to mitigate their adversarialness than
police, because they do not have to cope with the daily suspiciousness and elements of
danger, nor necessarily with the 'us versus them' mentality, as do police.").
226. See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor 72 (1988) (discussing strategies whereby one profession tries to
"subordinate" another).
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prosecutorial tendencies to moderate agency judgments and tactics appropriately. In part, it is a matter of professional allegiances and associations. In his valuable study of a Canadian Crown Attorney's Office, Brian
Grosman found that while some prosecutors identify with the police and
associate defense lawyers with their clients, others "identify with the values of the defense lawyers" and see themselves as part of "the general
legal community"-a community that does not include cops and
agents. 2 2 7 Given that their raison d'etre and future livelihoods turn on
the exaltation of procedural due process values, prosecutors might be expected to be more sensitive to such niceties than agents, whose success is
more likely to be measured in terms of crime control. 2 28 That prosecutors are also subject to disciplinary rules formulated and enforced by
their professional peers may increase their sensitivity yet further (even
2
assuming the underenforcement of those rules). 29
Going further out on a limb, one might also see federal prosecutors
as better reflectors of community values than agents, and as better intermediaries between parochial agency interests and local needs. All enforcers work in the shadow of their jurisdictions' juries, and neither
agents nor prosecutors will gain much if they regularly pursue cases that
jurors do not think should be pursued, or tactics that repulse local jurors
and judges. Conviction-maximizing may not be their only goal, but it is a
necessary one.23 11 As the actors responsible for pitching cases to juries,
and for negotiating dispositions with an eye to jury responses, however,
prosecutors are more attuned to these matters and, indeed, as has been
seen, are valued by agents for this very expertise. 23 1 The U.S. Attorney
system, which places local lawyers in an office led by an official appointed
(usually) with considerable input from local political figures, accentuates
this comparative advantage, particularly with respect to strongly centralized agencies in which hierarchical controls are reinforced by geographi227. Brian A. Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion
68 (1969); see also Suzanne Weaver, Decision to Prosecute: Organization and Public
Policy in the antitrust division 160-61 (1977) (noting that "close connections" that
Antitrust Division lawyers "maintain with their colleagues in the private antitrust bar" are
regarded by division lawyers as "a powerful constraint on their actions"); supra notes
175-177 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors' professional orientation).
228. The crime control/dIe process dichotomy was, of course, first articulated by
Herbert Packer. Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57J. Crim.
L. Criminology & Police Sci. 238, 239 (1966).
229. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 72-76 (1995) (arguing that
"[c]riticism of formal disciplinary nechanisms overlooks the importance of informal
judiciary controls, if not informal professional controls"); Horwitz, supra note 223, at 1377
("The fact that a police prosecutor is not bound by an attorney's code of ethics or
answe,'able to the disciplinary process for attorneys is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of
the practice of police prosecution.").
230. See Richman, Old ChieI stupra note 7, at 967-68.
231. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
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cal transfers. 23 2 Moreover, at least in recent years, the natural tendency
of U.S. Attorneys to respond to local political forces has been reinforced
by the readiness of Main Justice to devolve power in this direction. 233
As one former U.S. attorney put it:
The U.S. Attorney, as a representative of the President, has the
unique responsibility of establishing prosecutorial policy. He or
she is the single person in the criminal justice system who must
look to the totality of criminal threats within the district, as well
as the available resources to meet those threats, and fashion a
prosecution response that maximizes the positive impact that
can be obtained from
the resources. No other person has this
23 4
broad responsibility.
All these premises argue for measures designed to increase the likelihood that the prosecutors can exercise independent judgment in their
charging decisions. With their negotiating power thus increased, prosecutors would inevitably gain a greater say in investigative agency decisions
about resource allocations and tactics. Measures could also be taken that
more explicitly involve prosecutors in investigative decisionmaking, or at
least confirm their existing control over particular investigative tactics.
B. Questioning Hierarchy?
Yet is it so clear that we want to move in the direction of a prosecutor-dominated hierarchy that strives (against all odds) to make law enforcement agents into prosecutorial agents?
To begin, one may not accept the assumption that prosecutors have
superior judgment when it comes to targeting and tactics. There are
three different, but related, elements to this challenge. The first, without
denying prosecutors' technical legal expertise, questions whether they really are forces of moderation. If one believes, like Dan Kahan, that ambitious U.S. Attorneys "consistently overreach in the hope of pleasing local
interests who are in a position to confer future political rewards, '2 35 any
move to increase prosecutorial control over agency decisionmaking is a
step in the wrong direction. Kahan's cure for this pathology is to shift
232. Cf. David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of
Order, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 247, 273-74 (1998) (noting how uniformity of prosecutorial
decisionmaking in Japan is promoted by frequent transfers, much to dismay of some
agency personnel).
233. See Kendall, supra note I 11, at 226 (recounting U.S. Attorney's efforts to speak
to community groups about their concerns); Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note
33, at 808-09. The "community prosecution" movement, see Anthony C. Thompson, It
Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 321, 338-54 (2002), has gained
some federal adherents, even outside the District of Columbia (which more resembles the
state jurisdictions in which the movement had its roots). Roger L. Conner, The Office of
the United States Attorney and Public Safety, U.S. Attorneys' Bull., Jan. 2001, at 7; Wilma
A. Lewis, Community Prosecution in the Office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, U.S. Attorneys' Bull., Jan. 2001, at 38.
234. Braniff, supra note 72, at 311.
235. Kahan, supra note 162, at 496.
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more control over prosecutorial legal theories to Main Justice. But his
diagnosis could also be addressed by measures that shore up agency control over investigations. It does not matter, in this analysis, whether agencies are seen as politically responsive to the president and the administration, or as semi-autonomous and relatively apolitical. And indeed one's
view on this score will vary with agency and with administration (and
probably with one's frame of reference). The important point is that,
either way, so long as their agendas differ, relatively centralized enforcement agencies can be counterweights to prosecutorial overreaching of
236
the type Kahan fears.
The second element of this challenge to prosecutorial incursions
into agency decisionmaking rests on a weaker form of Kahan's diagnosis.
U.S. Attorneys' Offices do not necessarily "overreach," this argument
goes, but they are prone to reflect local enforcement preferences at the
cost of national priorities. 237 The point is only relative, since agency field
offices also respond to local groups and authorities.23 8 But U.S. Attorneys-frequently members of the local elite, selected by local politicians-and their assistants-local lawyers whose chosen livelihood requires them to think constantly about local jury responses and local legal
culture-are unlikely to have the same continuing interest in adhering to
a national bureaucratic agenda as their agency counterparts. 23 9 The dis236. See H. Geoffrey Moulton & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special
Prosecutors: An Organizational Perspective, 5 Widener L. Symup. J. 79, 90 (2000) (noting
how FBI acts as a "relatively apolitical watchdog over line prosecutors"); see also Heymann,
supra note 36, at 100 (noting that "involvement of professional, career agents makes less
credible charges of political bias in [the] Justice [Department]").
237. Cf. Richman, Project Exile, supra note 29, at 405 ("Against sometimes parochial
local needs, a U.S. Attorney must consider broader national priorities, usually conveyed by
Main Justice or expressed by the referrals of highly centralized enforcement agencies
. . . .

.).

238. See Wilson, Investigators, supra note 57, at 202 ("[F]ield administrators are likely
to have strong ties to local authorities including, possibly, governors, congressmen, and
police chieLs, and these alliances are disrupted only at the [central agency] executive's
peril."); see also Statement of Eleanor Hill, supra note 56, at 13 (former FBI headquarters
official notes that the Bureau's "culture often prevented headquarters from forcing field
offices to take investigative action that they were unwilling to take");John T. Scholz et al.,
Street-Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 829, 831
(1991) (studying effects of local politics on enforcement activities of Occupational Safety
and Health Administration field offices); Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Senator
Feinstein Asks Attorney General Ashcroft to Officially Approve DEA Office in Redding
(July 6, 2001), available at http://feinsteii.senate.gov/releasesOI/r-redding.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (asking Attorney General for DEA office "[t]o combat the
serious methamiphetamine problem in Northern California").
239. See CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Nov. 13, 1998, at 34-37 (author's notes)
(testimony of Chuck Wexler, Exec.utive Director, Police Executive Research Forum)
(noting how U.S. Attorney must play critical role in focusing attention of federal agencies
on local problems); Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government Work? The Tension
Between Uniformity and Differing Regional Values in Administering the Federal Death
Penalty, 14 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 7, 9 (2001) (finding it unsurprising that "U.S. Attorneys
within states that do not permit the death penalty do not prosecute capital cases as often,
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junction between prosecutorial and agency priorities will be particularly
great when the benefits of pursuing a case or class of cases will be felt only
nationally and not locally. Tax prosecutions-or at least those brought to
deter tax cheating-present just the most obvious example of this problem of the commons, 240 and, not surprisingly, are often hard to sell to
24 1
U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
Recognizing that all agendas are political (although one hopes not
partisan), the question becomes: Whose politics determine the outcome?
If one wants national priorities to dominate (or at least not to be given
short shrift), one needs to avoid giving prosecutors, who already control
the charging process, too many, tools to impose their agendas on
agents.

242

The third element has less to do with the politics of agenda setting
and more to do with comparable knowledge and capacity. Decisions to
pursue a defendant and the force with which he should be pursued are
not just legal or even moral judgments, but inevitably involve a vision of
how common the conduct is, how socially harmful it is, and how one
offender stacks up against another. Even if prosecutors were able to gain
full access to the information an agency has on a case it wants to pursue,
they would still lack a systematic sense of all the other possible cases. Of
course, federal agency knowledge may be spotty as well, outside of particular "beats," but it is supplemented by local enforcers (who thereby gain
some hold over agencies that can undercut their centralization) and, at
worst, it is still better than prosecutors' knowledge. Prosecutors regularly
or recommend them, as do U.S. Attorneys in states that vigorously pursue the death
penalty"); Rabin, supra note 12, at 1043 ("On the whole, the agencies keep much tighter
rein on field personnel than does the Justice Department on U.S. Attorneys."). This is not
to say that prosecutors have no interest in national priorities. See generally Andrew B.
-Whitford, Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness:
The Case of the United States Attorneys, 12 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 3 (2002)
(exploring how U.S. Attorneys respond to national political control).
240. The dimensions of this "commons" (i.e., what level of tax prosecutions are
needed overall) continue to elude quantification. See Memorandum from Pamela J.
Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit, U.S. Treasury Dep't, to Chief, Criminal
Investigation, Criminal Investigation Can Improve Its Performance Measures to Better
Account for Its Results Uan. 28, 2002), available at http://www.tigta.gov/2002repors/
200210009fr.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
241. See Mark E. Matthews, Through the Looking Glass: Reconciling the Mission of
the Tax Division with the Goals of the United States Attorneys' Offices in Tax Prosecutions,
U.S. Attorneys' Bull., Apr. 1998, at 7, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia.readingroom/usab4603.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
242. See generally Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure,
and Bureaucratic Politics, 30 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 379 (1986) (discussing effects of
organizational structure on organizational agenda). For an empirical study showing the
extent of local variation even within the highly centralized corps of procureurs in France,
see generally Jacqueline Hodgson, Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French
Criminal Justice: Some Empirical Observations, 29 J.L. & Soc'y 227 (2002) (discussing
hierarchy, bureaucracy, and ideology as constraints on French procureur in criminal
investigations).
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have to make the grossest "apples" vs. "oranges" sorts of comparisonse.g., one complicated tax case vs. three easy gun cases-and because of
their gatekeeping position and relative neutrality, they are better placed
than agencies for such judgments. And, as Elizabeth Glazer has demonstrated,2 43 prosecutors may be well placed to alert one agency to the synergies of sharing information with another agency. 2",1 But when it comes
to discriminating among the matters within their respective jurisdictions,
the agencies reign supreme (or at least they should). Moreover, prosecutors' asserted competence to rise above agency turf concerns and look at
"the totality of threats" within their districts is a claim that rests more on
the blinders with which agencies see the world than on the keenness of
prosecutorial vision.
A second challenge to the hierarchical model does not dispute any
of its assumptions about the value of prosecutorial decisionmaking but
rather argues that prosecutorial contributions can best be made from a
perspective somewhat removed from the investigative context, and would
even be threatened if injected into that context.245 The problem finds
parallels in the debate over the advantages of inside, as opposed to
outside, counsel when it comes to promoting legal compliance by private
firms. Inside counsel, according to their champions, "can use the information, organizational power, and trust they obtain from being part of
the client organization to participate in corporate planning, anticipating
legal problems and maintaining legal compliance."2 4 1 However, as Ronald Gilson has written, "the risk is real that inside counsel may not share
outside counsel's preference for acting as a gatekeeper" and will turn to
"members of corporate management rather than other lawyers" as a "reference group." ' 47 The risk will be more pronounced if inside lawyers are
243. See Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can
Reduce Violent Crime, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 573 (1999); Elizabeth Glazer, Harnessing
Information in a Prosecutor's Office, Nat'l Inst. Jist. J., Oct. 2000, at 2.
244. See also CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Dec. 2, 1998, pt. I, at 148 (author's
notes) (testimony of Mark Calloway, U.S. Attorney, W.D.N.C.) (noting that U.S. Attorney's
Office is "unique" in being able to see cases of eveiy agency and being able to tell where
there is an "overlap or where there's a need For cooperation").
245. See, e.g., New Zealand Law Commission, Rep. No. 66: Criminal ProsectItion 3
(2000), available at http://www.lalwcom.govt.iz/dociIments/pIl)ications/R66cpr.pclf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Prosecution should be separated from investigation.
Separation of these two key functions ensures that there are checks and balances
incorporated into the system to protect the individuial. It also promotes impartiality and
ultimately respect for the criminal jtstice system and the rule of law."); Landes, Comments,
supra note 66, at 227 ("[W]hen investigation and prosecution are combined we might
expect a greater use of settlements ... that avoid the acknowledgement of error when it
appears that the evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant in a trial."); Craig
Whitlock & April Witt, Pr. George's Prosecutor, Police Spar, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 2001, at
BI (explaining his reftisal to assign prosecutors to work in teams with police officers, state's
attorney cites "rules against prosectItors becoming directly involved in a police
investigation").
246. Rosen, supra note 152, at 487.
247. Gilson, supra note 14, at 9 i 5.
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scattered within an organization, working alongside the people they
counsel. As Chayes & Chayes noted,
The more decentralized the lawyers are ....
the more likely it is
that the preventive program will be fully integrated with general
corporate operations. Lawyers who have daily contact with
product, manufacturing, marketing, and sales personnel know
the routines and practices and can correct them. Decentralization, however, means
less expertise, and a risk of less profes248
sional objectivity.
The analogy between prosecutors and corporate counsel has its limits, 2 4 9 but the tension between engagement and informational access on
the one hand, and professional judgment on the other, is equally present
in the range of relationships that prosecutors can have with criminal investigations. Knowledge itself can influence perspective. The prosecutor
who, while taking no part in the conduct of investigations, regularly
learns from agents about their false starts and tactical gambles may find
himself more sympathetic to agency travails than would a more removed
official accustomed to hearing seamless narratives. This is not necessarily
so, but the readiness of criminal justice officials to become inured to the
inadequacies of police officers is a sad but familiar phenomenon and
helps explain the allure for defendants of the more naive decisionmaking
25
that juries offer. 11
The risks to prosecutorial judgment are even greater when prosecutors become extensively involved in investigative decisionmaking. Just as
corporate lawyers "cease to objectively evaluate transactions that are often
their own creations, '25 1 prosecutors who have helped call the shots in an
investigation will be hard pressed to retain their magisterial perspective
not just about the tactics used in the investigation, but about whether
charges should be pursued thereafter.2 52 This response is in part quite
rational and appropriate, since they will have already passedjudgment on
the nature and extent of the resource commitments. But the response
248. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 289 (1985).
249. Even the broadest notions of corporate counsel's ethical responsibility and
independence, see, e.g., William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers'
Ethics (1998), pale beside the rhetoric and reality of prosecutorial discretion.
250. See David N. Dorfiman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J.
Crim. L. 455, 476-77 (1999); see also United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.
2002) (rejecting claim that prospective jurors should have been voir dired about attitudes
toward police, and noting that 'juries in New York City show a healthy skepticism of
prosecution cases built entirely on the credibility of police officers").
251. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507, 545 (1994) [hereinafter Painter, Interdependence].
252. See Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's O1C and the
Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 645 (1999) ("Procedures for checking
over-zealousness should include assigning someone in the office, preferably the lead
prosecutor himself, the role of skeptic-the lawyer who picks apart the case, puts the case
for the defendant, demands to be told why it is worth prosecuting.").

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:749

can go beyond what is merely rational. A prosecutor may be loath to pull
the plug on an investigation in which she has invested time and professional prestige. 253 She may be cognitively limited as well-too quick to
find that any new information merely confirms her original impressions
of a case or a target. 254 And, unfortunately, these challenges to objectivity will be greatest in the "big case," where the prosecutor's professional
commitment is the largest, where her immersion in the investigation is
the longest, and where her close-knit relationships with the case agents
can come at the expense of her ties to the rest of her office.2 5 5 These
factors may be offset by the higher level of supervisory oversight (which
the line assistants are likely to see as "meddling"2 56) these cases are likely
to receive. But supervision of fact-intensive judgment calls is bound to be
difficult.
While one risk of too much prosecutorial involvement in investigative decisionmaking is that prosecutors' ability to monitor agent conduct
is reduced, another risk is that such involvement will threaten the esprit
and effectiveness of investigative agencies. Even as we celebrate the giant
strides made in the professionalism of police agencies over the past century and recognize the particular triumphs of federal units in this regard, 25 7 we ought not forget that professionalism cannot be fostered with253. Painter, Interdependence, supra note 251, at 545 (stating that one reason for
loss of objectivity is that "lawyers invest their time and professional prestige in transactions
they want to see completed").
254. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 100-01 (1993) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Lawyers' Responsibility] (Because "[t]he processing of new information and
the search of memory to aid in inference are biased, sometimes heavily, toward the
confirmation of existing schema," even without "motivational factors, a lawyer is likely to
dismiss as unimportant or aberrational the first few negative bits of information that she
receives regarding a client or situation.").
255. Striking aspects of the recent El Rukn debacle in Chicago (where members of
the prosecution team turned a blind eye to drug use and sexual misconduct by
incarcerated cooperating witnesses) and the revelations about the FBI's relationship with
"Whitey" Bulger (a Boston gangster who used his service as an FBI informant to gain carte
blanche for his own racketeering activities) are the degree of closeness between the
prosecutor and the agents in each case and the degree of separation between these teams
and the rest of the U.S. Attorney's Office. Cf. United States v. Griffin, 856 F. Stipp. 1293,
1300 (N.D. Ill.
1994); United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (N.D. Ill.
1993),
aff'd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995); Lehr & O'Neill, supra note 82, at 210-13; Jeffrey
Toobin, Capone's Revenge, New Yorker, May 23, 1994, at 46 (discussing alleged
misconduct by prosecutor and agents in El Rukn cases). "War rooms"-where agents and
prosecutors cluster-are, of course, relatively common in very large cases, and they bring
important benefits in efficiency and esprit. But they have their risks as well.
256. Cf. Langevoort, Lawyers' Responsibility, supra note 254, at 114 ("Each of these
bureaucratic interventions [by a law firm to protect its reputation against cognitive pitfalls
on part of its partners] comes at considerable cost ... in terms of time and effort as well as
the more subtle interference with individual partner autonomy that otherwise
characterizes many highly successful firms.").
257. See Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of
Professionalism 159-66 (1977) (exploring role of FBI in fostering police professionalism);
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out autonomy. And professional autonomy "involves the feeling that the
practitioner ought to be able to make his own decisions without external
pressures from clients, those who are not members of his profession, or
from his employing organization. 295 Of course, concern for agency esprit can occur even within the framework of a hierarchical relationship.
"[A] boss frequently finds herself choosing not to overturn a
subordinate's bad decision because doing so would reduce the
subordinate's effort and enthusiasm in the future." 259 But, given their
likely career paths, many assistants might not take this long-term view.
Finally, even with the experience gained through regular investigative involvement, prosecutors just may not be very good at making investigative calls that require the "street smarts" or industry knowledge that
agents pride themselves on developing. To be sure, an agent's claims of
"street smarts" can conceal a sub-optimal attitude toward the legal niceties that (one hopes) loom larger in a prosecutor's calculus. But for tactical decisions that turn on predictions of human behavior, informed by
previous tactical experiences (for instance, how a target will respond or
the appropriate level of pressure to place on a recalcitrant witness), second-guessing by prosecutors may be counterproductive.
The alternative normative model that emerges from these concerns
does not exalt agents over prosecutors, but it counsels against exalting
prosecutors over agents. Rejecting hierarchy, it would promote measures
defining and distinguishing between the separate ambits of each group.
As Fama and Jensen have explained, organizations "in which important
decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of
their decisions" can survive in part because the organizations have structures that "separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions. '2 6 1 It does not take a large
leap in terminology to apply this model to law enforcement bureaucracies and to see it as supporting a system that keeps agents and prosecutors
at arm's length.
As we have seen, coordinate separation has costs. Therein lies the
attraction of the hierarchical model. But coordinate entities can check
one another, particularly when institutional structures and cultural differDavid A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1216-17 (1999) (noting FBI's
role in growth of police professionalism).
258. Richard H. Hall, Professionalization and Bureaucratization, 33 Am. Soc. Rev. 92,
93 (1968).
259. George Baker et al., Informal Authority in Organizations, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org.
56, 57 (1999); see Paul A. Sabatier et al., Hierarchical Controls, Professional Norms, Local
Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An Analysis of U.S. Forest Service Planning
Decisions, 39 Am.J. Pol. Sci. 204, 207 (1995) ("[T]op officials have less control over 'streetlevel bureaucrats' than the Progressives envisioned, particularly when field officials are
professionals whose job commitment is contingent upon their ability to exercise substantial
discretion." (citations omitted)).
260. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & Econ. 301, 301-02 (1983).
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ences deter co-optation. The question thus becomes whether this really is
a zero-sum game. Perhaps there is a third way.
C. Toward a Theory of Working Groups and Mutual Monitoring
Even beyond our shores, the debate over the appropriate allocation
of power within enforcement bureaucracies often seems to present a
stark choice between integrated hierarchy and coordinate separation.
Such was the dichotomy presented at a recent Council of Europe conference. While noting the similarities between his nation's criminal justice
system and Sweden's, the Prosecutor General of Finland noted that "Finland did not wish to make the prosecutor head of the pre-trial investigation as is the case in Sweden. In Finland every effort was made to emphasize in particular a prosecutor's objective neutrality."2"'1 But the
Prosecutor General of Sweden explained:
It has sometimes been argued that early assumption of responsibility dilutes the prosecutor's functions of supervision and control. To that I would reply that it must be an advantage if the
supervisory and controlling functions come into play at an early
stage of the investigation, above all where serious crimes are
concerned. And there are guarantees of legal security built into
the system which offset the risks associated with early participation by the prosecutor .... 262
The threat that integration poses to prosecutorial independence has
been noted in Austrialia as well. There, when a proposal was made to
give the Director of Public Prosecutions the power to intervene in investigations, one legislator condemned the "dangerous" idea as "absolutely
opposed to common law principles." He scathingly referred to the proposal as "the Hawaii Five-O amendment," calling it an "attempt to turn
'2
(the DPP) into a Los Angeles type district attorney's office. 11 63
But do we really need to choose between integrated hierarchy and
coordinate separation?
The short answer is that we couldn't even if we wanted to. In thinking about how the federal enforcement bureaucracy should be organized,
one can no more choose between hierarchy and integration than one can
choose between crime control and due process in structuring a criminal
justice system. 2 6 4 As was true with Herbert Packer's models, each of these
261. M. Matti Kuusimiki, Independence of Prosecutors in Relation to the Executive
Power, the Courts and the Police, in What Public Prosecution in Europe in the 21st
Century 103, 106 (Council of Eur. ed., 2000) [hereinafter European Conference]
(proceedings of Pan-European Conference, Strasbourg, May 22-24, 2000).
262. Klas Bergenstrand, Role and Status of the Public Prosecution Crime Policy, in
European Conference, supra note 261, at 89, 92.
263. Rod Harvey, The Independence of the Prosecutor: A Police Perspective 7
(1996), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/prosecuting/harvey.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (paper given at Australian Institute of Criminology)
(quoting the Hon. B.H. Vaughn).
264. Packer, supra note 228, at 239.
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is not a goal that one strives for to the exclusion of the other. They are
simply poles between which we must navigate. The question remains,
though: In which direction should we be steering?
If one uses a broad enough brush, one can paint outlines of a normatively appealing system (operating in a second-best world in which
Congress has left the enforcement bureaucracy as a whole with extraordinary discretion): We want investigative agencies to use their expertise
and information sources in service of some legitimate agenda that structures decisionmaking about the selection of targets and the intensity with
which such targets are pursued. How and where that agenda gets set will
vary, and should vary, from agency to agency and from locality to locality.
Perhaps there is some appropriate balance between headquarters, field
office, group, and individual agent decisionmaking; some optimal balance between national priorities, local needs, and personal initiative.
Though I can easily think of some inappropriate agendas, I know of no
way to capture what the range of appropriate agendas ought to be.
Setting an enforcement strategy is peculiarly challenging for federal
agencies since it requires the identification of the (or an) optimal allocation of responsibility between federal, state, and local authorities. 2 65 No
unified theory provides the answer(s), and even if it did, any solution
would be transitory. National needs, whether actual or perceived,
change. And every new priority has institutional consequences that in
turn shape the setting of priorities. It is noteworthy that the debate about
the FBI's role in combating terrorism is now being played out primarily
in terms of the locus of decisionmaking, with champions of centralization
pointing to the nature of the mission-which requires a high degree of
coordination with other agencies, both foreign and domestic, and puts a
2 66
premium on centralized intelligence collection and dissemination

265. See Frase, Decision, supra note 52, at 280-90 (noting challenges of coming up
with an optimal federal prosecution strategy).
266. See Oversight Hearing on FBI Reorganization: Hearing Before the Subcomn.
on Commerce, Justice, State & the Judiciary of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General), available at
http://vv.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100102walker.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Testimony of David Walker] (discussing centralization of FBI
counterterrorist efforts); Dan Eggen, FBI Director to Propose "Super Squad" for Terror,
Wash. Post, May 15, 2002, at Al (reporting that move to create "'super squad,'
headquartered in Washington," to "lead all major terrorism investigations worldwide,"
"underscores the extent to which Mueller intends to remake the FBI and consolidate
power in the Washington headquarters, whose administrators have traditionally allowed
field agents and their bosses to maintain control over their own investigations"); Eric
Lichtblau, F.B.I. Officials Say Some Agents Lack a Focus on Terror, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
2002, at Al; see also Richard A. Best, Jr., Congressional Research Service, Report for
Congress: Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the
U.S. (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf (on file with the
Colutmbia Law Review).
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and its sensitivity, 267 while champions of field office authority complain
'268
of a "lack of investigative zeal at headquarters.
From prosecutors as well, we want independentjudgments, based on
similarly diverse and mutable professional and political calculations
about what charges are worth pursuing and with what intensity. The important point (for our purposes) is not how agencies and prosecutors
develop their respective priorities, but how, assuming some organic basis
for their respective priorities, these bureaucrats and their bureaucracies
will interact. 26 1 The problem ought not be seen as one of subordinating
one group's agendas to those of the other, but rather of productively
embracing the political tensions between the two. As Graham Allison observed in his classic study of bureaucratic politics, "[T]he context of
shared power but separate judgments about important choices means
that politics is the mechanism of choice. Each player pulls and hauls with
the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception
of national, organizational, group, and personal interests.'2 7
For help in conceptualizing the ideal interaction between prosecutors and agents, we need not look far. There are features of the dynamic
that are unique to the law enforcement context. But, at heart, the productive institutional collaboration we seek is just a variant of the team-

267. Some political considerations, necessarily within the purview of the headquarters
in Washington, would be jeopardized by increased discretion at the field office level:
One longtime FBI agent.., recently questioned the new rules that have been
established for agents in field offices to initiate counterterrorism investigations
without first obtaining approval from headquarters. 'I'm worried about six or
seven years from now when there are five or six Arab-American members of
Congress and they call me before some committee to grill me on my actions
against their people," the agent said.
Walter Pincus, Congress to Postpone Revamping of FBI, CIA, Wash. Post, July 2, 2002, at
Al; Testimony of David Walker, supra note 266, at 17 (noting organizational benefits of
"[n]ew provisions that provide more authority to FBI field offices to initiate and continue
investigations").
268. Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Johnston, Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I.
Stumbles in Terror War, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2002, at Al.
269. See John P. Heinz & Peter M. Manikas, Networks Among Elites in a Local
Criminal Justice System, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 831, 832-33 (1992) ("A lack of system
integration may, of course, produce coordination problems, unpredictable outcomes,
inconsistent decisions, rule violations, or other pathologies.... But loose coupling may
also be functional."); id. ("The relative separation of the elements or subsystems permits
each to maintain a measure of independence, which may make the system more flexible
and less resistant to innovation." (citation omitted)).
270. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 171
(1971).
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work of diverse professionals championed both in an emerging body2 of
72
theoretical literature 2 7' and in a growing number of applied contexts.
Part of the allure of collaborative teamwork between diverse professionals stems from the contribution that their interaction can make to the
decisionmaking process itself. The risk of "polarization" that pushes a
group to choose an extreme option is increased, Cass Sunstein has observed, when the group has "a degree of solidarity. '273 And solidarity can
be a function of organizational structure. As Mark Seidenfeld has noted,
"polarization is likely to occur when groups are 'attitudinally homogeneous,' which, in turn, is more likely to be the case when members share
similar professional and work backgrounds than when they pursue differ2 74
ent disciplines and come from different offices within the agency.
In many organizational settings, the most effective way to promote
healthy deliberation and moderation is to locate decisionmaking in
"teams," each defined as a
set of individuals (1) whose agencies' contributions are thought
to be mutually complementary in their productive capacities
and (2) whose individual characteristics-including such matters as their knowledge and skills, their access to resources and
to status within their home agencies, their aspirations and beliefs, their personal strengths and weaknesses-are taken into
members themselves, who
account by those, including the team
275
organize their respective activities.
The point is not simply one about fruitful discussions informed by
diverse perspectives, however. The allure of team production, and the
attention that it has received in the corporate and organizational theory
literature, 276 come from its promise in addressing the classic agency problem that arises when there is no principal (employer) able to monitor the
271. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 96, at 354 ("Experimentalist regulatory
agencies recall the design and problem-solving teams of learning-by-monitoring
institutions in the way they pool various kinds of expertise in the evaluation of different
situations."); Juliet Kaarbo & Deborah Gruenfeld, The Social Psychology of Inter- and
Intragroup Conflict in Governmental Politics, 42 Mershon Int'l Stud. Rev. 226, 232 (1998)
(discussing how boundary spanning can lead to more thoughtful processing of
information).
272. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubeck, Context and Collaboration: Family Law Innovation
and Professional Autonomy, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2533 (1999) (exploring multiprofessional collaboration in family law practice).
273. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale
L.J. 71, 92 (2000).
274. Seidenfeld, supra note 34, at 544.
275. Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory
of Managerial Craftsmanship 117 (1998).
276. See Eric Talley, Taking the '" out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the
Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24J. Corp. L. 1001, 1002 (1999); see also, e.g., Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247
(1999); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982); Irene
Valsecchi, Policing Team Production Through Job Design, 12 J.L. Econ. & Org. 361, 371
(1996).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:749

contributions of its various employees. If properly structured, a team production process "can transcend the built-in limitations of hierarchical
'277
control by developing norms of reciprocated cooperation and effort.
This paradigm can easily be transferred to the federal enforcement
context. Here, there is no "mediating hierarch" 278 able to monitor the
respective outputs of agents and prosecutors. There is not even a "hierarch" willing and able to monitor their joint output. The breadth of its
substantive legislation and the merely sporadic attention it gives to enforcement decisionmaking suggest Congress lacks the inclination. To be
fair, though, the informational barriers to monitoring may explain why
legislators have not invested much in this area. After all, how does one
assess the quantity, let alone the quality, of "output" that can be measured
only by looking at the cases and tactics not pursued and a universe of
potential cases vaguely defined? And courts lack the tools (as well as the
information), since their own potential points of intervention (already
scant, given the discretionary power enforcers have been legally granted)
27
are usually bargained away by defendants. )
To be sure, some may see it as perverse (or worse) to find virtue in a
system where the only real control on the behavior of one executive
agency comes from another executive agency. But in the second (or
third) best world in which we find ourselves, we must find virtue where we
can. In any event, necessity is not the only justification. By using the
organizational literature to help reconcile ourselves to the doctrinal oddity of thinking in separation of powers terms within the executive branch,
we can begin to see how the structured interaction of enforcers drawn
from two relatively distinct cultures can promote depolarization and
more thoughtful decisionmaking, even in the absence of legislative or
2
judicial oversight. 811
Moreover, this model of professional interaction between lawyer and
non-lawyer may work better here than in the corporate setting, where
institutional and market pressures can lead the inside (or even the
277. Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy
216-17 (1992).
278. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 421 (2001) (noting that team
members can "solve the team production contracting problem and discourage mutual
rent-seeking by agreeing to subject themselves to a mediating hierarch who will monitor
their efforts and decide how to divide the spoils").
279. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
280. See Sir lain Glidewell, The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service Cm. 3960, at
94 (presented to Parliament by the Attorney General June 1998) ("The professional
independence of lawyers in the [Crown Prosecution] Service is the light which should
illuminate all their work, but independence of mind does not require total separation from
others."); cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 462-63 (2001) (offering regulatory approach in which
"normative elaboration occurs through a fluid, interactive relationship between problem
solving and problem definition within specific workplaces and in multiple other arenas,"
not just courts).
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outside) counsel to subordinate his professional instincts or values to
more entrepreneurial goals. At least in the federal context, the distinctive institutional homes for prosecutors and agents, and the distinctive
aftermarkets they face, provide the best guarantee that the blurring of the
line between investigatory and adjudicatory decisionmaking will not
break down the diversity of their perspectives. 28 1 The value of experience
and specialized knowledge may limit the extent to which prosecutors and
agents can be rotated from unit to unit, or from investigation to investigation. But so long as care is taken that an agent's primary orientation is to
his agency, and an assistant's primary orientation is to his office, and for
both cultural and materialist reasons, to his profession, 2 2 the benefits of
deliberation 28 3 can best be captured in the context of teams, not arm's2 84
length interagency negotiations.
Having adopted the mutual monitoring/working group model not
as the solution to all issues of enforcement discretion but as a vision of
beneficial interaction, we next should determine whether we need to do
anything to promote it. Maybe the model just captures current realities,
and we live in the best of all possible worlds. I suspect not.
But can one prove that all is not right? It is tempting to bracket
difficult empirical questions and to rely on horizontal equity. Given that
prosecutors play a larger role in the development of white collar cases
than they do in, say, most drug cases, one might be troubled by the fact
that white collar defendants receive special insulation from aggressive enforcement. One might therefore support measures that bring the moderating influence of prosecutors to bear on other sorts of investigations.
There are some problems with this critique, though. To begin, it is not
285
clear that it is the agents who need moderation in white collar cases.
281. See Seidenfeld, supra note 34, at 541. Seidenfeld notes that "groupthink" is
especially likely to occur when a group's members
are homogeneous in terms of social background and ideology,, when the group
leader and decisionmaking norms and processes tend to direct the group toward
a preselected outcome, and when the group believes that it faces a crisis situation
in which there is high stress and little opportunity for a decision that will improve
the status quo
Id.
282. See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy 18 (3d ed. 1984)
(discussing how professional units can be "dominated by individuals whose primary
commitment is to the skill they practice rather than to the institution by which they are
employed"). Situating prosecutors in the continuum that ranges from the classic
Weberian bureaucrat to the collegial professional is a conundrum that sociological
theorists might profitably pursue. See Clifford I. Nass, Bureaucracy, Technical Expertise,
and Professionals: A Weberian Approach, 4 Soc. Theory 61 (1986). See generally
Malcolm Waters, Collegiality, Bureaucratization, and Professionalization: A Weberian
Analysis, 94 Am. J. Soc. 945 (1989).
283. See Sunstein, supra note 273, at 105-06.
284. See, e.g., Glidewell, supra note 280, at 128 (suggesting use of integrated
"Criminal justice Units" composed of police and Crown Prosecution Service personnel).
285. See Webster Report, supra note 99, at 16, 33 (describing efforts of U.S.
Attorneys' Offices to bring CID agents in to handle complex financial cases); Burnham,
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Agencies may articulate white collar enforcement agendas, but on the
personnel side, it is the prosecutors, not the agents, who are most likely to
be gung-ho in white collar cases, where aggressive investigative and trial
tactics are most likely to be rewarded by the aftermarket. Moreover, even
were one to conclude that the nature of the prosecutor-agent interaction
in white collar cases somehow led to more "moderation," one might still
be untroubled by the comparison to narcotics cases. Perhaps white collar
enforcement, by its very nature and because of the extraordinary breadth
of statutes directed at white collar offenses, threatens to chill valuable
economic and political activity in a way that narcotics enforcement does
not. Perhaps white-collar criminal statutes are more "incomplete" (to use
the term of Pistor and Xu), being particularly open-ended and ambiguous as to what legislators really consider harmful. 2 6 Certainly the Wall
28 7
Street Journal's editorial page would so argue.
In the absence of clear (or even semi-clear) empirical evidence that
we live in a suboptimal world when it comes to the degree of coordination between prosecutors and agents, we come to an expository crossroad. We can sit tight and await better evidence. Or we can plunge
ahead.
There are a number of arguments for plunging ahead. First, one
can easily shift the burden of proof and find just as little evidence that
teamwork between prosecutors and agents has flourished where it is most
needed. Second, one can be agnostic and see the project not as calling
for wholesale change but as devising a toolkit of measures that could promote the teamwork model. Finally, even were one to believe that the
invisible hand was working overtime to ensure the appropriate equilibria
across cases, agencies, and districts, one would still regularly have to confront decisional junctures, whether of legal rule or institutional design,
when one's choice inevitably affects the prosecutor-agent dynamic.
Where a choice (made for reasons having nothing to do with coordination) makes coordination harder, it would be helpful to know how to
compensate.

supra note 100, at 15 (noting FBI's "apparent lack of zeal in pursuing corporate and whitecollar crime").
286. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law-A Conceptual and
Analytical Framework-and Its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market
Regulation 4 (Columbia Center for Law & Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 204,
2002), available at http://ssrn.coin/abstractid=310588 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
287. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1050, 1050 (1990) (decrying prosecutorial overreaching and
suggesting that "[n]o one can know whether" "Wall Street traders, bankers, analysts,
accountants and others" "may inadvertently some day become defendants under the vague
RICO predicates of mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud").
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III. PROMOTING TAmvwoK

AND MUTUAL MONITORING

The goal, then, is to promote teamwork between prosecutors and
agents. So long as each player orients to his distinct institution and professional culture, interaction presents less a risk of capture than an opportunity for both productive collaboration and mutual monitoring.
What measures might advance this model? Given that nearly every legal
or institutional move one makes (or forgoes) can affect agent-prosecutor
relations, the possibilities are endless. In part to show the breadth and
variety of potential measures, and in part because they have particular
salience to the agent-prosecutor dynamic, the focus here will be on three
different areas: (A) information flow to prosecutors; (B) rules or institutions deterring agent-prosecutor interactions and/or facilitating the circumvention of these interactions by one side or the other; and (C) unilateral institutional measures.
A. Information Flow
Prosecutors are ill-equipped to second guess agency choices about
tactics and targets when they lack sufficient information about the cases
agencies decide to pursue and the universe of potential cases. Indeed,
they labor under an informational disadvantage even in those systems
where they formally have hierarchical power over police forces. 288 Yet
even within our coordinate system, much could be done to increase the
flow of investigative information to prosecutors.
288. See M. Marc Robert, The Role and Status of Public Prosecution Services in
Europe: Major Problems and the Council of Europe Draft Recommendation in European
Conference, supra note 261, at 21, 35-36 (In those systems that "acknowledge the right of
public prosecution services to supervise police forces or their activity," there is often "a
wide gap between the legal powers attributed to these services and the real-life, day-to-day
exercise of these powers"; "the crucial issue ... is that public prosecution services and also,
in fact, judges are heavily dependent on police priorities in bringing offenders before the
criminal justice system.").
Professor de Doelder writes that in the Netherlands, where "[t]he police function
tinder the command of the public prosecution service,"
a prosecutor finds himself in a highly police-dependent position because he has
to rely heavily on information gathered by the police. Just as a judge is tinder
negative control of the prosecutor service, a prosecutor is tinder negative control
of the police. If the police do not start an investigation or do not share certain
information, a prosecutor is left empty-handed.
Hans de Doelder, The Public Prosecution Service in the Netherlands, 8 Euir. J. Crime.
Crim. L. & Crim.Just. 187, 187, 191 (2000) (footnote omitted); see also Fionda, Discretion,
supra note 142, at 66, 81 (noting that in Scotland, where "police remain in law subordinate
to the prosecutor [procurator fiscals] in the investigation of crime," insiders say "reports
are known to be stereotyped and often short of useful information, which tends to hinder
well-informed decision-making at the prosecution stage"); Busch & Funk, supra note 169,
at 55, 66 ("[E]ven in targeted crime investigations for which public prosecutors are
definitely responsible, they often remain at a disadvantage. . . . By accepting the police
argument that they have to protect their information sources and undercover operations,
public prosecutors allow themselves to be transformed into the 'dancing bears' of the
police.").
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1. Administrative NotVI cations. - If one wanted simply to give prosecutors a bigger role in investigative decisionmaking, one could expand
the range of situations in which a prosecutor's (or a court's) approval
were required. If, however, one wanted to promote collaborative decisionmaking without shifting the balance of power too far in the prosecutors' direction, a softer alternative would be to impose notification requirements on agencies. This, at the very least, would give prosecutors an
opportunity to start a conversation, even though the power they could
deploy in such a conversation would derive from other sources.
The Attorney General's recently released investigative guidelines for
the FBI offer a good example of how such administrative notification requirements can be used. 28 When an FBI supervisor opens a preliminary
inquiry in a "sensitive criminal matter"-defined as one involving political corruption, "the activities of a foreign government, the activities of a
religious organization or a primarily political organization or the related
activities of any individual prominent in such an organization, or the activities of the news media"-he must notify the relevant U.S. Attorney "or
an appropriate Department Of Justice official . . . as soon as practicable

...and the fact of notification shall be recorded in writing. '2' t The FBI
must also "notify the appropriate federal prosecutor of the termination of
29 1
[a sensitive] investigation within 30 days of such termination. '
Views on whether these are the right cases for prosecutorial notification or the efficacy of such notification for anything other than bureaucratic self-defense will vary. The relevant point here is simply that this
sort of administrative measure will, at least on the margin, increase the
degree of collaborative decisionmaking.
2. Mandated Consultations. - Notification measures provide a conversational opening, but more forceful administrative mechanisms for ensuring collaboration can easily be devised. One place where such a regime already exists, at least for certain cases, is in The Attorney General's
Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations.29 2 Any
FBI field office seeking to engage in an "undercover operation" 2- 3 "in289. Office of l.egal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Attorney General's Guidelines
on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations
(2002), available at http://www.usclj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Reviw).
290. Id. at 8-9.
291. Id. at 11.
292. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Attorney General's Guidelines
on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (2002), available at http://
ww'.usdo.gov/olp/t)it:ndlercover.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
FBI U/C Guidelines].

293. The Guidelines define "Undercover Operation" as "any investigative activity
involving a series of related undercover activities over a period of time by an undercover
employee" and define "Undercover Employee" as
any employee of the FBI, or employee of a Federal, state, or local law
enforcenent agency working under the direction and control of the FBI in a
particular investigation, whose relationship with the FBI is concealed fiom third
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volving any sensitive circumstance ' 294 must first apply to FBI headquarters for approval. The application must contain a "letter from the appropriate Federal prosecutor indicating that he or she has reviewed the
proposed operation, including the sensitive circumstances reasonably expected to occur, agrees with the proposal and its legality, and will prosecute any meritorious case that has developed. ' 29 5 If favorably recommended by FBI headquarters, the proposal then goes to an "Undercover
Review Committee," comprised of FBI personnel designated by the Director and prosecutors designated by the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division. Prosecutors from the relevant U.S. Attorney's Office and FBI agents from the field can attend the committee's
meeting 29 6 and, in practice, line assistants are "encouraged" to discuss
the proposal with committee members before the meeting.2 9 7 Decisions
within this committee are to be by consensus. If one of the prosecutors
declines to join a favorable recommendation "because of legal, ethical,
prosecutive, or departmental policy considerations," the Assistant Attorney General is consulted, and absent his approval or the approval of either the department's top two officials-the Deputy Attorney General or
2'9 8
Attorney General-the operation will not proceed.
The most salient operational feature of this administrative regime is
the number of checkpoints it creates both at the local level and in Washington to ensure that as broad a variety of perspectives as the enforcement bureaucracy has to offer (which for some may not seem very broad)
are brought to bear on those operations most likely to spark allegations
of government overreaching and targeting. 299 An important by-product,
however, is the collaboration it promotes at the field level, as prosecutors
and agents become co-presenters of a joint proposal that each must sell
parties in the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a cover
or alias identity.
Id. at 1. The investigative use of non-employees is addressed in Office of Legal Policy, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, The Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential
Informants (2002), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/olp/dojguidelines.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). For a discussion of the history of the Attorney General's
Guidelines, see AmandaJ. Schreiber, Note, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the
FBI's Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 Colum.J.L. & Soc. Probs.
301, 308-19 (2001).
294. Among those circumstances that the guidelines define as "sensitive" are criminal
investigations of any public official or political candidate at all levels of government or of
"any foreign official or government, religious organization, political organization, or the
news media." FBI U/C Guidelines, supra note 292, at 6.
295. Id. at 10.
296. Id. at 9.
297. Joshua R. Hochberg, The FBI Criminal Undercover Operations Review
Committee, U.S. Attorneys' Bull., Mar. 2002, at 2, available at http://www.tisdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia-reading-room /usab5002.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
298. FBI U/C Guidelines, supra note 292, at 8.
299. Katherine Goldwasser, After ABSCAM: An Examination of Congressional
Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 Emory
L.J. 75, 81 (1987).
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up through his respective Washington hierarchy. Such administrative
measures will thus drive prosecutors and agents toward the team relationships we are trying to foster.
3. Brady Doctrine and Other Disclosure Rules. - Administrative rules
and internal directives have their limits, however, both in the range of
circumstances they cover and in the readiness of enforcers to comply with
them. Recent debacles like the Whitey Bulger case in Boston (where FBI
agents kept prosecutors in the dark about the nature of their relationship
with top-echelon informants),3o() and the Timothy McVeigh case (where
the Oklahoma City bombing prosecutors were blindsided by the belated
appearance of FBI field office files they had previously promised to disclose to defense counsel and that the FBI Director had himself ordered
be given to prosecutors),"'" though each unique and distinguishable in
its own right, still suggest that we might not rely solely on administrative
means of promoting the flow of information from agents to
302
prosecutors.
The inadequacy of administrative measures can be addressed-and
to some extent has already been addressed-by constitutional or statutory
rules that require prosecutors to disclose to defense counsel certain raw
investigative data, like initial witness interview reports, documentary and
physical evidence that points in directions other than that pursued by
investigators, and so forth. These rules may not seem particularly helpful
to prosecutors after they have obtained a conviction, or who find themselves the subject of stinging judicial criticism.""' Indeed, they regularly
oppose reversal where evidence has emerged post-conviction that alleg300. See United States v. Flemmi, 195 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (D. Mass. 2001); Lehr &
O'Neill, supra note 82, at 282-86; see also Orena v. United States, 956 F. Supp. 1071, 1086
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing relationship between FBI agent and mobster in New York);
'Jeff Donn, Uncovering FBI Informant Underworld, Wash. Times, Mar. 16, 2003, at A5
(reporting, based on interviews with nine former agents, that "[f]or decades, in cities from
coast to coast, FBI agents recruited killers and crime bosses as informants, and then looked
the other way as they continued to commit violent crimes"). The problem is certainly not
confined to the FBI. See, e.g., Cheryl W. Thompson, DEA Shielded Tainted Informant:
Agency Paid Source for 16 Years Despite Arrests, Peiljury, Wash. Post, July 19, 2001, at Al.
301. See Inspector General, Dep't of Justice, An Investigation of the Belated
Production of Documents in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case 37-42 (2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/Oklahoma/index.htm/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also Lois Romano & Dan Eggen, FBI Kept Files from McVeigh's Lawyers,
Wash. Post, May It, 2001, at Al.
302. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379, 1414 (2000)
[hereinafter Fisher, Lessons] (comparing United States with England, which has a
"comprehensive regulatory framework for police record-keeping and revelation of case
information to the prosecutor").
303. See United States v. Diabate, 90 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143-44 (D. Mass. 2000)
(discussing dismissal of indictment based on U.S. Attorney's Office's violation of local rule
requiring it to instruct agencies, in this case U.S. Secret Service and Fall River police, to
preserve notes that could have been used to impeach law enforcement witnesses). For a
discussion of this local rule, available at http://www.bostonbar.org/dd/crimrules/
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edly casts doubt on the validity of the government's theory at trial. Even
ex ante, the rabid or lazy prosecutor who just wants to convict the nearest
available suspect will not have a brief for a broad discovery regime. -0 4 Yet
institutionally, prosecutors can profit from such rules in their dealings
with agencies, particularly when the rules impose an indefeasible duty on
prosecutors to disclose information from agency files, regardless of their
own personal knowledge. °5- Prosecutors are able to tell agents not just,
"Please give me all the reports detailing your agency's relationship with
the informant so that I can assess how good a witness he'll be," but also,
"If you don't turn everything over to me, defense counsel and the judge
will really stick it to us, and particularly me, if anything turns up postconviction." By ostensibly ignoring the gulf between prosecutorial and
agency knowledge""' and putting what at first blush seems an "unrealis3t °8
tic" 30 7 burden on prosecutors, the rules may actually reduce that gulf.
Moreover, although in any one case the odds of a prosecutor's finding
out about evidence an agent should have told her about but did not are
low, the iterated interaction between prosecutors and agents over a range
of cases, and the consequences that discerned agent misbehavior will
have on prosecutorial trust, will tend to promote agent compliance.
report.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review), see Fisher, Lessons, supra note 302, at
1437.
304. Prosecutorial discomfort with broad disclosure regimes may also reflect distrust
of ajury's ability to assess the information appropriately. See Daniel Richman, Expanding
the Evidentiary Frame for Cooperating Witnesses, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 893, 897 (2002).
305. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d
1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 578 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that AUSA cannot
rely on agency to search personnel files for Brady material); Lis Wiehl, Keeping Files on the
File Keepers: When Prosecutors Are Forced to Turn over the Personnel Files of Federal
Agents to Defense Lawyers, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 103 (1997); see also Kevin McMunigal,
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957, 1002-04 (1989)
(exploring how a mandatory disclosure regime affects police willingness to share
exculpatory information with prosecutors).
306. Fisher, Lessons, supra note 302, at 1382 ("The Kyles court failed to acknowledge
the distinction between holding prosecutors strictly responsible for the conduct of other
prosecutors (in the same office), and for the conduct of the police, who are not normally
employed by or directly accountable to the prosecutor.").
307. Id. at 1383.
308. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale
of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 643, 659 (2002) ("Perhaps Brady's most
important pre-trial function is that it stresses the prosecutor's responsibility for and the
need to be aware of all evidence within the government's possession."). For limits, and a
sense of the policymaking involved in the articulation of the Brady right, see United States
v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[K]nowledge on the part of persons
employed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the
imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor .... "); see also United States v. Locascio, 6
F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We will not infer the prosecutor's knowledge simply because
some other government agents knew about [a particular piece of evidence]."). For an
exploration of the special problems raised by the involvement of intelligence agencies in a
criminal investigation, see Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement,
and the Prosecution Team, 16 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 331, 335-39 (1998).
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The lesson here is that we need not always choose between promoting legality and moderation through institutional mechanisms and promoting them through the creation of judicially enforceable rights. By
giving defendants a right of access to information in the hands of investigative agencies, doctrines like that articulated in Brady and its progeny t 't
also help ensure that prosecutors have the tools to scrutinize agency decisionmaking effectively."") An expansion of the Brady and non-constitutional : '' pre-trial disclosure regime (in terms of the information covered,
the timing of disclosure,3 1 2 and enforcement) would serve both purposes.3 1 And if we want to promote our working group model, efforts to
3 14
limit those regimes should be resisted.
309. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that failure of prosecutor,
upon request, to disclose evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process,
itrespective of good or bad faith); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
(creating single standard of materiality, regardless of whether defense request was made);
see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 97 (1976) (concluding that prosecution's due
process obligation to disclose material evidence is extended to cases where defendant
made no request).
310. As one organized crime prosecutor explained in a panel discussion on criminal
discoverv:
Federal agents love to bring the bow tie case to an Assistant United States
Attorney. When I say bow tie, I mean they are presenting to you an accordion file
and they are saying this is everything that you need to know to go forward with
this case. And the Assistant United States Attorney that goes forward on that basis
is not doing their job. They're not doing it trom the constitutional standpoint.
Because everything that's been said here about our responsibilities to thoroughly
investigate what are in police files, FBI files, and those dozens of file cabinets
tucked away in some dark corner someplace is absolutely correct.
Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 781, 805-06 (1999)
[hereinafter Criminal Discovery in Practice] (comments of Art Leach, chief of Organized
Crime Strike Force in the Northern District of Georgia and AUSA).
He later noted:
[The] FBI loves to tell Assistant U.S. Attorneys, you can't see it. Well, I can
dismiss this case. And it takes a tough individual to tell the agents that. And any
AUSA who tells a lawyer that the agent won't let me do what is just and right in
the case ought to be fired.
Id. at 808.
311. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000) (requiring disclosure of prior statements of
testifying witnesses); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (setting forth pre-trial discovery r-ules).
312. See Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that, under
Brady and progeny, "disclosure prior to trial is not mandated").
313. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2457 (2002) (finding government
Under no constitutional obligation to provide impeachment information prior to
defendant's entry of gtilty plea); see also John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and
Criminal Discovery, 68 Fordhani L. Rev. 2097, 2133-50 (2000) (critiquing limited nature
of discovery regime for federal criminal cases).
314. One caveat here: The more agents see prosecutors as acting on behalf of
defendants, the deeper the cuIltural gulf between prosecutors and agents becomes.
"[L] egalistic mechanisms" like-expanded Brady rights can thus "backfire" by increasing the
"sense of distance and differentness" between organizational groups. Sim B. Sitkin &
Darryl Stickel, The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust in an Era of Quality, in Kramer
& Tyler, supra note 185, at 196, 198. To the extent that investigators respond by
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4. Hearsay in the GrandJury. - If the goal is to ensure that prosecutorial gatekeeping reflects the true quality of investigative data and does not
rely on burnished agency reports, we might want to go beyond requiring
that prosecutors acquire such data, and force them to actually sift
through it: interview first-hand witnesses, handle physical evidence, and
speak with the relevant government experts. By the time a prosecutor
comes onto the scene, the universe of potential evidence will inevitably
reflect agency selection decisions and may also be tainted by agency handling. But the more contact the prosecutor has with the evidence at an
1 5early stage, the more informed her screening decisions will be.
If every case went to trial, the hearsay rule and the demands of advocacy would force prosecutors to do all this. The combination of professional self-interest and easy monitoring (because poor trial preparation
shows) would be potent. But diminishingly few cases go to trial. Moreover, even for cases going to trial, prosecutors will not have a strong incentive to scrutinize first-hand witness accounts until the eve of trial, after
plea negotiations have broken down. To do so would be inefficient in a
plea-driven system. 3 16 This means that scrutiny often will not occur until
after indictment, when the prosecutor is subject to the bias flowing from
such a public commitment." 17 While institutionally prosecutors might
benefit from a more careful scrutiny of witnesses at an early stage, they
thus are under pressure to rely on agency reports.
One way to counteract these pressures would be to reconsider the
well-established rule that lets federal prosecutors rely (exclusively if they
choose) on hearsay presentations in the grand jury.-""' Federal prosecutors may (for a variety of tactical reasons) call first-hand witnesses, but
they frequently do not because they lack any incentive to do so. 3 1 9 The
standard critique of the prosecutorial license to introduce hearsay in the
grand jury is that the practice diminishes the grand jury's ability to perwithholding information from both prosecutors and defense counsel (either by leaving
facts out of reports or not turning over certain reports), the gains from an expanded Brady
regime would be limited.
315. Ron Wright and Marc Miller make a similar point, in the course of arguing for
more rigorous prosecutorial screening as a way to minimize plea bargaining. Wright &
Miller, supra note 118, at 104-05.
316. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
317. See Langevoort, supra note 254, at 103 ("[O] nce commitment has occurred, and
especially if it is publicly expressed and repeated, what might be an obvious red flag to a
disinterested observer may not appear such to the actor."); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in Behavioral Law & Economics 144, 151 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000) ("Once a person voluntarily commits to an idea or course of action,
there is a strong motivation to resist evidence that it was ill-chosen.").
318. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
319. See McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart,J, dissenting

from denial of certiorari) (noting that "multiple hearsay" is "common" in grand jumy
investigations); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 260, 267 (1995) (discussing hearsay in grandjury).
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form its screening role.3 2 1 Yet, in a world where (for better or worse)
prosecutors are de facto judges and jurors, the primary effect of the license and its use may be on the care with which prosecutors perform
their gatekeeping function.
It may be that things are just right, and that federal investigators do
not require the monitoring that many of their state counterparts get.
Perhaps state systems, like New York's, that do bar hearsay presentations
in the grand jury, 32 1 need a rule forcing prosecutors to deal with all significant fact witnesses at an early stage because their police forces are less
careful, or because a great many state cases involve eyewitness or accomplice claims about single-transaction crimes. In the absence of such features, the argument might go, it makes sense for the federal system to
leave agencies responsible for dealing with witnesses pre-indictment.
But there is no such neat dichotomy. Federal cases often arejust not
that different from state cases. Given the well-known pitfalls of eyewitness.42 2 and accomplice 3 23- testimony, the increasing involvement of the
federal government in the single-transaction street crimes that used to
fall in the exclusive bailiwick of state authorities, and the increasing (and
consequent) reliance of federal agencies on the work of state and local
police officers, 32 4 the effects of federal grand jury doctrine may not be so
benign. And its reversal could be a significant (albeit expensive) component of any program aimed at giving federal prosecutors the raw investigative material that, together with their charging powers, would promote
320. See United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 405 F.2d
691 (2d Cir. 1968); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand jury and the State
Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 463,
541 (1980).
321. See Sara Sun Beale et al., Grand jury Law and Practice § 4:20, at 4-109 to 4-116
(2d ed. Supp. 2002); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand jury: Is There Room for
Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 22-23 (2002).
322. See Nat'l Inst. of justice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial 24
(1996) (noting critical role played by eyewitness testimony in wrongful convictions
studied). See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1996) (examining how
psychological factors affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony).
323. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 202, at 962 (discussing "the extent to which the role
of cooperators and the cooperation process under the Sentencing Guidelines have created
or exacerbated problems regarding the reliability of cooperator testimony").
324. See Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 59, at 93-96. A magistrate
judge in Atlanta recently noted:
It used to be in the old days, when I first started as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, that
virtually all of the law enforcement agents who were making the cases and
presenting them . . . were federal agents. Now that seems to be the exception
rather than the rule. And most of the drug cases, the violent crime cases that we
see in federal court are actually made, at least in the Northern District of Georgia,
•.. by state and local agents or state and local agents who are participating in task
forces with federal agents.
Criminal Discovery in Practice, supra note 310, at 794 (quoting Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn
G. Brill).
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greater dialogue with investigative agencies about tactics as well as
25
targets.'
B. Mechanisms That Directly Promote or Deter Mutual Gatekeeping
If the goal is collaborative dialogue, we should also scrutinize any
measure or structural arrangement that deters agency-prosecutor interaction or allows one side to circumvent the other.
1. Application of the No-Contact Rule. - One area where recent legislation has threatened to undermine prosecutorial involvement in investigative decisionmaking involves pre-indictment contacts with represented
targets. In the absence of any general constitutional or statutory bar on
such contacts, those seeking to restrain enforcers turned to the legal ethics rules, which, in one form or another, prohibit an attorney from communicating "with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter" absent that lawyer's permission.32 6 Their victory came in the McDade Amendment,3 27 which mandated that federal prosecutors face the
same ethical restrictions as do their private counterparts. Justice Department regulations have since made clear that prosecutors "shall not direct
an investigative agent acting under the attorney's supervision to engage
in conduct under circumstances that would violate the attorney's obligations" under the provision.3 28 But a significant regulatory gap has now
325. Cf. April Witt & Paul Schwartzman, Pr. George's Prosecutor Targets
Questioning: Police Must Provide Interrogation Notes, Wash. Post, June 7, 2001, at BI
(documenting that, in wake of newspaper articles about false murder confessions, State's
Attorney announced that "he no longer will prosecute confession-based homicide cases
unless county detectives provide him with detailed written accounts of the time suspects
spend [sic] under interrogation").
326. Model Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 7-104(A) (1) (1986). The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct contain a similar provision. Model Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 4.2
(1999). The literature on this resort to ethical regulation is considerable. See, e.g., Bruce
A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications with Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24
Crim. L. Bull. 283 (1988) (discussing "six questions involving the application of [DR 7104(A)(1)] to prosecutors"); Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal
Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 670,
700-03 (1992) (discussing arguments that courts should read "no-contact rule" into the
Constitution); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. LJ. 69, 146-48 (1995)
[hereinafter Richman, Cooperating Clients] (discussing "salutary role that the disciplinary
rules can play"); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137,
1179 (1987) ("[Hlowever ingrained it may be in civil matters, [DR 7-104(A)(1)] should
not be transferred to criminal cases."); Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling Professional
Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1635
(1994) (assessing Justice Department regulations implementing "no-contact rule"); Note,
Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 2080 (2000) (evaluating "McDade Amendment's impact on federal prosecutors").
327. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, Ethical
Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000); see also Ryan E. Mick,
Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1251,
1255 (2001) (criticizing McDade Amendment as "unsatisfactory").
328. Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77.4(f) (2002).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:749

been created between prosecutors and agents, as agents, not bound by
the ethics rules, remain free to contact represented targets overtly and
3 29
covertly, so long as they do not involve prosecutors in such endeavors.
The gap may even get bigger, now that at least one state court has held
that prosecutors are also precluded from engaging in deceit or dishonesty of the sort necessary in undercover and "sting" operations.3'' To the
extent one's goal is to ensure prosecutorial involvement in investigative
decisionmaking,3: ' the McDade Amendment and the unreflective application of ethical rules governing investigations to prosecutors generally
are thus large steps in the wrong direction (and unlikely to prove effective in restraining investigative contacts with represented parties).
3: 32
2. FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act. - The recent Wen Ho Lee case
provides another example (albeit a limited and provocative one) of a leg329. See Caroline Heck Miller, Knowing the Dancer from the Dance: When the
Prosecutor is Punished for the Government's Conduct, 29 Stetson L. Rev. 69, 83-84 (1999)
(noting that agents are free to use investigative tactics barred under legal ethics rules, but
not by Constitution "until the moment they consulted a government attorney for legal
counsel; having done so, they may be directed to desist"); see also The Effect of State
Ethics Rules on Federal Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 63 (1999) (statement of
AUSA Richard L. Delonis, president of Nat'l Ass'n of AUSAs) ("Knowing that their closer
relation to the prosecutor serves to circumscribe their investigative efforts, agents may well
be motivated to separate themselves from prosecutorial oversight and act more
independently.").
330. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000); see also DOJ Sues Oregon Bar over Dishonesty
Rule, Asserts Need for "Prosecutorial Exception," 69 Crim. L. Rep. 438 (2001) (discussing
possible ramifications of Gatti). But see Utah Panel Says Government Lawyers May
Participate in Lawful Covert Operations, 71 Crim. L. Rep. 135 (2002) (discussing the Utah
State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., No. 02-05 (Mar. 18, 2002), which states that
government lawyers do not act unethically merely by taking part in or supervising lawful
covert operations that involve use of deceit).
331. Increasing prosecutorial control was one of the rationales the Department of
Justice cited when it tried unsuccessfully (so far) to make repeal of the McDade
Amendment part of its anti-terrorism program. See Beverley Lumpkin, You Know What
They Say About Sausage: Halls ofJustice: A Weekly Look Inside the Justice Department,
Oct. 5, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tis/Hallsotjustice/hallsojustice96.htil
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (measure hailed by Criminal Division official who
"said [that] for the bureau to fight bin Laden and his like effectively, it needs confidential
informants to infiltrate, and prosecutors need to oversee their use and to counsel the
agents"). The measure passed the Senate, but did not make it into the final USA
PATRIOT Act. Broad Anti-Terrorism Package Passed by Congress, Signed by President, 70
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 93, 96 (2001).
One answer, of course, to the prosecutorial control argument for repeal would be to
amend the disciplinary rule to make prosecutors responsible for agency behavior, whether
or not they authorized it. See Sebrina A. Mason, Policing the Police: How Far Must a
Prosecutor Go to Keep Officers Quiet?, 26 S. 11. U. L:J. 317 (2002) (discussing recently
adopted Illinois disciplinary rule requiring prosecutors to "exercise reasonable case" in
preventing police officers from making extrajudicial statements that they, as prosecutors,
could not make themselves).
332. For background on the case, see generally the Washington Post's archive at http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ nation/speciaIs/nationalsecurity/chineseespionage/
(last visited Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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islative provision that effectively deterred agents from collaborating with
prosecutors at an early stage. Prior to its amendment by a provision of
the USA PATRIOT Act,33 3 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) was understood to establish a regime under which the government could conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches under
terms more permissive than those governing criminal investigations only
so long as "the primary purpose" of those searches was to obtain foreign
intelligence information.3 34 As Eleanor Hill recently explained in the
Joint Intelligence Committee hearings on the intelligence community's
response to the September 11 attacks: "In order to avoid courts ruling
that FISA surveillances were illegal because foreign intelligence was not
their 'primary purpose,' DOJ lawyers began to limit contacts between FBI
personnel involved in these activities and FBI and DOJ personnel in33 5
volved in criminal investigations."
According to the Justice Department's inquiry into the government's
handling of the Wen Ho Lee investigation, the FBI's failure to consult
with prosecutors, because of the Bureau's fear that doing so would
threaten its ability to proceed under FISA, "not only jeopardized the potential for a successful prosecution; it jeopardized the potential for any
prosecution. 1,3 6 Precisely what the prosecutors could have done had
they not been excluded is not entirely clear from the report, perhaps
because important parts of it remain classified. But the report found
that, had prosecutors been consulted earlier, they could have given
agents critical advice on access to Lee's computer, how to conduct Lee's
interviews, and the importance of establishing motive. Noting that, at the
time, the FBI's Director and General Counsel were both former prosecutors, the report went on to observe: "The issue is not one of expertise....
The issue is that it is the Criminal Division that is charged with the primary responsibility for asserting the Department's prosecutive equities.
While it should not be the only party at the table, when such equities are
3 47
at stake, it should certainly be at least one of them.
333. See infra note 338.
334. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000); Attorney General's
Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, U.S.
Dep't of justice, Final Report 709 n.2 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/bellows.htm (declassified version, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Bellows report] (citing cases); see also In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 301 F.3d
717 (Foreign Intell. Surveill. Ct. Rev. 2002) (finding common understanding of FISA's
provision to lack basis in statutory language).
335. The Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorist Attacks Against the
United States from February 1993 to September 2001: Hearing Before the Joint Comm.
on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, joint
Intelligence Inquiry Staff), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/021Ohrg/021008/
hill.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
336. Bellows Report, supra note 334, at 704. The report's primary author was an
AUSA, Randy L. Bellows.
337. Id. at 744.
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Whether the Wen Ho Lee investigation would have ended differently
had it been better coordinated is hard to determine. The government's
decision to let Mr. Lee plead guilty to a single count of mishandling classified information is certainly consistent with Mr. Lee's claims that he was
a victim of an unjustified witch hunt. Yet it could also reflect the government's recognition that it had bungled the case beyond repair. The important point for our purposes is the way in which the investigation's miscues highlight the sometimes perverse relationship between institutional
dynamics and legal doctrine. Although some complain that the USA
PATRIOT Act's relaxation of the FISA barriers between intelligence activity and criminal investigations-requiring only that intelligence gathering be "a significant purpose" and not necessarily the only or even chief
purpose of FISA searches and interceptions3 3 8-threatens civil liberties,
there may be countervailing benefits from relaxation of strictures (selfimposed or otherwise) against early prosecutorial involvement.3: : A
large part of the Wen Ho Lee investigation story is about the costs of
institutional separation.
Obviously, each of the legal regimes discussed here has advantages
or disadvantages that have nothing to do with the balance of power between prosecutors and agents. Disclosure rules serve the goal of adversarial fairness and may even promote more accurate factfinding. Eliminating the use of hearsay in grand jury presentations might lead to more
rigorous screening by grand jurors who would gain a better understanding of the witnesses relied upon by the government. Reliance on ethical
rules to regulate prosecutorial contacts with represented targets may be
necessary because suppression is a poor deterrent3 4o and administrative
controls are insufficient to deter prosecutors who can escape administrative sanctions by resigning, and who upon resigning might find their aggressiveness rewarded by the private market.3 4 1 The risk of government
abuses in the intelligence-gathering area may exceed the gains from increased prosecutorial involvement. One can imagine many other arguments. The point here is not to fully assess the costs and benefits of any
of these measures, but rather to show how, even within the essentially
coordinate structure of the federal enforcement bureaucracy, one could
338. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218,
115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) (7) (B), 1823(a) (7) (B)); see In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743 (upholding constitutionality of relevant USA PATRIOT
provisions, and finding there never to have been any legal requirement of a "wall" between
intelligence and law enforcement information gathering).
339. For a history of coordination difficulties between 1995 and the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-01-780, Report to the Ranking
Minority Member, Senate Government Affairs Committee, FBI Intelligence Investigations:
Coordination Within justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited (2001).
340. See Richman, Cooperating Clients, supra note 326, at 144-48.
341. But see Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L.
Rev. 721, 725 (2001) (noting how rarely prosecutors face sanctions in disciplinary process).

2003]

PROSECUTORS AND AGENTS

productively tinker with the system if one's goal were to increase the qual342
ity of the interaction between prosecutors and enforcement agencies.
3. U.S. Attorney's Office Investigative Units. - Removing actual or perceived barriers to agent-prosecutor collaboration may not be enough, absent a commitment to productive interaction. Should we be concerned
about that commitment, we might also target procedural or institutional
mechanisms that allow one side to circumvent or mitigate the influence
of the other.
One such target might be investigative units within U.S. Attorneys'
Offices. There are only a few such units, 3 43 but they still raise important
questions about whether we want to give prosecutors the capability to
pursue cases on their own.3 4 4 From a prosecutor's perspective, control of
an investigative unit would be a godsend.3- 45 In cases involving corruption or criminal conduct within an enforcement agency, 346 an office
might worry about conflicts of interest. It might also want the capability
quickly to address shortfalls between the evidence a prosecutor wants for
trial and the evidence an agency is willing to provide. 3 47 If we want both
to check prosecutors and to ensure that they maintain a distinct perspective on investigative decisionmaking, however, we might see the loss of
these capabilities as a price worth paying and look askance at the idea of a
U.S. Attorney's Office handling some of its most sensitive cases on its
own.
342. See also Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care,
78 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 558-59 (1990) (noting that among the changes along French lines that
might promote "a more integrated, efficient, and responsible police function" are:
"requiring the police to notify the prosecutor at an early stage of the investigation and,
whenever possible, prior to arrest; giving the prosecutor ... explicit authority to direct or
order specific police investigatory acts"; and giving the chief prosecutor "some police
administrative or disciplinary powers").
343. See CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Apr. 13, 1999, at 8-9 (author's notes)
(investigator from Eastern District of New York U.S. Attorney's office, serving as president
of Federal Criminal Investigators Association, notes that only three districts have their own
investigative units).
344. Id. at 29 (noting that a separate investigative unit allows a U.S. Attorney to "get
thing[s] done" "if there's a problem between the U.S. Attorney and a SAC [special agent in
charge] of a particular agency"). But see id., Nov. 12, 1998, at 136 (former deputy director
of FBI, Floyd Clark, complaining that some U.S. Attorney's offices have created "their own
investigative bodies that go out and conduct investigations many times not even being
coordinated with the agencies that have direct responsibility").
345. On a personal note, I have to say that the USAO investigators I dealt with when I
was an assistant were some of the most capable, decent, and savvy professionals I've ever
met.
346. See CAFLE Hearings, supra note 44, Apr. 13, 1999, at 14 (author's notes) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (testimony of J. Michael Daly, president of Federal
Criminal Investigators Association) (noting use of investigators in political corruption
cases).
347. 'While the evidentiary shortfall may not be worth addressing over the long term,
see supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text, it still can be cause for concern in
particular cases.
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By comparison, the price seems unacceptably high in local systemsor in a federal context analogous to local systems. 348 An interesting case
study can be found in the request in 2000 made by the Justice Department for funding for 43 investigators within the District of Columbia U.S.
Attorney's Office. Explaining the request, a departmental spokesperson
noted:
The concept of assigning investigators to a prosecutor's office is
not unique. According to the National Association of Investigators and Adjusters (NAIA), a majority of local prosecutors' offices have in-house investigators. For example, the Manhattan,
New York District Attorney's office has more than 100 investigators and the District Attorneys' offices in Dallas, Texas and
Miami, Florida have their own investigative staffs. These offices
are comparable to the District of Columbia United States Attorney's office in their primary mission of prosecution of violent
crimes in their communities.
Unlike most federal cases, where defendants are arrested after a
thorough investigation, a case in the District of Columbia Superior Court
Division usually begins with a preliminary investigation, followed by an
arrest by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). An arrest by the
MPD is based on probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime. It thus signals the beginning, rather than the culmination,
of an in-depth investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
crime. Hence, the MPD presents the prosecutor with felony cases that
require a substantial amount of investigative effort in order to secure an
4indictment by the Grand Jury and a conviction thereafter. '
For our purposes, if we accept the department's claim of need as
valid and presume that it would make similar requests if prosecutors
faced similar evidentiary gaps elsewhere in the federal system, we can ask
some interesting questions: Is there something about violent crime that
leads police forces to focus on the apprehension of perpetrators and not
to recognize a duty to stay with cases until conviction, or to be derelict in
348. See Martin H. Belsky, On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1485, 1512 (1984) ("Increasingly, prosecutors use their own detectives to investigate
offenses."); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Survey of
Prosecutors: State Court Prosecutors in Large Districts, 2001, at 2 tbl.1 (2001), available at
http://wVw.ojp.Llsdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scpld01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting that staff investigators comprise 9.9% of total personnel in prosecutors'
offices in large districts (defined as those serving populations of 500,000 or more)).
349. FY2001 Appropriations for Drug Enforcement: Hearing Before the House
Appropriations Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, State &Judiciaiy, Federal
News Service, Mar. 23, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All
(prepared testimony of Mary H. Murguia, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, Dep't of
Justice). The Justice Department's position may reflect its assessment of the D.C. police
force in particular. See supra note 136 (discussing use of grand jury subpoenas and
prosecutor's complaints of "shoddy" police work in District). But given the general trend
in large metropolitan District Attorneys' Offices to have in-house investigative units, I am
inclined to take its explanation at face value.
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that duty? If so, what is that something? Is it the simple press of business
that leaves police forces with a readily monitorable responsibility (something that federal agencies generally lack) and insufficient resources both
to keep the peace and prepare for trial? Are the career incentives in
police forces so different from those in federal agencies?3 5° Moreover, is
there even a "problem" here? Are local systems actually working extremely well, with police forces allocating their resources most efficiently,
and the evidentiary gap between arrest and conviction so small that a
relative handful of investigators can bridge it? Or is there some sort of
obstacle to efficient allocation, arising out of the fact that prosecutors
and police officers generally do not share the same political chain of
5
command?Exploration of these issues would advance our understanding of the
prosecutor-agent or prosecutor-police dynamic. In the absence of reason
to believe that federal prosecutors face systematic evidentiary gaps
outside of Washington, D.C., however, we ought to view investigative units
as question-raising sources of prosecutorial power, rather than as compensatory measures.
4. Presentation of Information to SentencingJudges. - While the foregoing discussion presented investigative agencies as moderating influences
on prosecutors, agency monitoring can also promote prosecutorial zeal.
One way this could be done is through the rules and practices relating to
the presentation of sentencing information to judges.
Sentencing information has always been a significant determinant of
sentences, but never more so than under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which set presumptive sentences according to such factors as the
quantity of drugs involved in a conspiracy and the size of the monetary
loss inflicted or intended by economic crimes. In a system of negotiated
dispositions, the government's sentencing presentation is as much a prosecutorial tool as its charging discretion.3 52 A prosecutor's willingness to
characterize a drug conspiracy as "really" involving only five kilograms of
cocaine (as opposed to the thirty kilograms suggested by an alternate interpretation of the evidence), or a fraud as involving only $100,000 (instead of $1 million), will be a considerable boon to a defendant, making a
53
guilty plea far more likely.350. See William F. McDonald, Prosecutors, Courts, and Police: Some Constraints on
the Police Chief Executive, in Police Leadership in America 203, 207-08 (William A. Geller
ed., 1985) (noting how police reward structure is not linked to an officer's ability to get
convictions).
351. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-01-187, D.C. Criminal Justice System:
Better Coordination Needed Among Participating Agencies 13 (2000).
352. See Standen, supra note 3, at 1475-76.
353. For reports of prosecutorial manipulation of sentencing facts, see David Yellen,
Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What They See, 8 Fed.
Sentencing Rep. 339, 339 (1996) ("[A]pproximately forty percent of probation officers
believe that guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements in a majority of cases are
not 'supported by offense facts that accurately and completely reflect all aspects of the
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In his valuable study of U.S. Attorneys' Offices, written before the
advent of the Guidelines, James Eisenstein noted:
[F]ederal investigative agents handle fewer cases and more
often become personally involved in the outcome of their cases
than do local police. As a result, they possess both the incentive
and information needed to monitor plea bargaining practices.
It is not clear how successful agency attempts to shape bargains
are . . . .But prosecutor anticipations of agency reactions to
overly lenient bargains
undoubtedly contribute to existing strin5 4
gent practices.
Since then, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have given agents a
better-marked avenue for their contributions. As Stith and Cabranes
have noted, the "independent" investigation that probation officers are
required to do under the Guidelines "provides an opportunity for the
police or law-enforcement agents to assert their version of what happened, and their views on an appropriate sentence, directly to the court,
by-passing the prosecutor's censorship," and consequently undermining
355
prosecutors' ability to make commitments during plea negotiations.
How often this actually happens is unclear. But if it is happening,
what are we to make of agency efforts to present an ostensibly more complete picture of a defendant's culpability to sentencingjudges? The question is hard even at a descriptive level. Do agents see this as an opportunity to shift authority away from prosecutors whom they perceive as too
prone to compromise strong cases in order to further career goals or to
avoid the hard work of trials? Are these agency contacts fostered by prosecutors who, having had little to do with the investigation of a case that
soon ended in a guilty plea, are forced to rely on the agents who know
the facts? Or by prosecutors who, having obtained a conviction, care little
about how much time the defendant actually serves? Or, more nefariously, by prosecutors happy to play both sides, getting a plea by a phantom concession and then encouraging agents to nullify the defendant's
gain?
At the normative level, however, we should embrace agency contributions as a monitoring tool, or at least a spur to closer collaboration
between agents and prosecutors. Measures that encourage agency input
would likely be institutionalized in greater prosecutorial consultation
with agents about plea dispositions and apparent unanimity within the
government camp at sentencing. And if this did not happen, agency contributions would at least provide a helpful check on undue prosecutorial
leniency (though one can imagine situations in which agency information would mitigate sentences).
case.'") (citation omitted); Joseph S. Hall, Rule I (e) (1) (C) and the Sentencing
Guidelines: Bargaining Outside the Heartland?, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 587, 608-09 (2002).
354. Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 181.
355. Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 87 (1998) (quoting Gerard Lynch).

2003]

PROSECUTORS AM) AGENTS

What of the defendant, whose guilty plea was based on an understanding with the prosecution about an appropriate guideline sentencing
range? If an agency submission leads the court to impose a harsher sentence, the defendant can fairly complain that he was blindsided.3 56 But
the solution here ought to be rules ensuring that he can withdraw his
plea, not ones that silence agencies. 357 This would protect a defendant's
legitimate expectation interests, while promoting agent-prosecutor collaboration. Increased agency contributions would also promote the sentencing goals of horizontal equity, by making judges better equipped to
determine whether offenses that prosecutors have presented as factually
similar really are. 358 Moreover, while, as we have seen, prosecutorial discretion might be fatally undermined were agencies able to grant defendants immunity without prosecutorial participation, 3 59 the cost to prosecutorial power here would be more limited, going only to the magnitude of
sentencing concessions-a cost justified by the gains in collaboration, judicial authority, and transparency.
Giving the defendant the ability to claim breach and withdraw his

plea is a spur to agent-prosecutor collaboration, in addition to a matter of
simple fairness. When, as in a number of states, 360 defendants are given
no relief when police departments effectively undercut prosecutorial sentencing concessions, prosecutors have less reason to reach a consensus
with the police up front. A few savvy defendants might decline to enter
plea agreements under these conditions, or demand police participation,
but the more likely result in this regime is blindsided defendants and
apathetic prosecutors. Those states that treat police and prosecutors as
independent actors in the plea agreement context would do well to reconsider a framework that seems blind to the virtues of coordination
within the enforcement bureaucracy. Here again, as we saw in the Brady
356. A defendant may lack such a claim where the plea agreement leaves the
government free to add to the record "at all times concerning the facts and circumstances
of [a defendant's] offenses," as was the case in United States v. Pollard. 959 F.2d 1011,
1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding plea agreement not violated when prosecutors gave probation department
FBI reports of defendant's post-plea agreement criminal conduct).
357. Ordinarily, the selection of a remedy (rescission or specific performance) for a
breached plea agreement is left to judicial discretion. See United States v. Carmichael, 216
F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 47 (3d Cir. 1992).
358. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 915-24.
359. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
360. Compare State v. Sanchez, 46 P.3d 774, 780 (Wash. 2002) (holding that
independent statement by investigating officer at sentencing hearing did not violate
prosecution's commitment not to recommend a sentence because officer deemed not a
party to plea agreement), State v. Rogel, 568 P.2d 421, 423 (Ariz. 1977) (suggesting that
law enforcement officers are not agents of the state and thus not bound by a plea
agreement), and State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(finding police department not bound by plea bargain), with Lee v. State, 501 So. 2d 591,
593 (Fla. 1987) (concluding that prosecutor's plea bargain binds all state agents, including
state law enforcement officers).
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context, treating the "government" as a single unit when it comes to defendants' rights makes it more likely that enforcers will productively
collaborate.
C. Unilateral OrganizationalMeasures
Not all measures promoting the mutual monitoring model would
have to be implemented across agency boundaries, or by legislative or
judicial action. Were there concern that prosecutors were lacking the
information, incentive, or professional perspective needed for effective
monitoring, a U.S. Attorney's Office could unilaterally consider a variety
of organizational measures.
One area for consideration is the degree to which an office is organized vertically (leaving assistants responsible for cases from start to finish)
or horizontally (assigning assistants to just one stage of case development). The goal of promoting the involvement of prosecutors in investigative decisionmaking would of course be furthered by any measures that
put prosecutors in the thick of investigative calls. Having a different set
of prosecutors do gatekeeping at the charging stage would preserve some
magisterial perspective. But if the goals are to ensure that a gatekeeping
prosecutor's priorities are considered as evidence is developed, that she
has a textured understanding of the evidence when making her gatekeeping decision, and that her office can fully leverage its gatekeeping power
over charging into the investigative stage, then vertical organization will
be preferable, at least where nonroutine cases dominate an office's or a
unit's caseload.' '
Another unilateral measure could be to pay more attention to the
extent to which individual prosecutors work with a particular group of
agents or kind of case. Perhaps there is some optimal period of service,
sufficient for the prosecutor to develop the specialized knowledge and
agent trust that would facilitate productive exchanges, but not so long as
to foster a subculture divorced from the professional mainstream of the
office. '62
One might also target hiring and retention patterns for assistants.
But though this would surely have significant effects, what those effects
would be is hard to determine. As Jerry Lynch recently noted: "We have
little real notion of what mix of backgrounds, credentials, advancement
patterns, skills, and temperaments works well to produce effective prosecutors under the traditional adversarial model, and still less whether the
same blend functions as well where the prosecutor increasingly serves a
quasi-judicial role."'"' How, for example, does prior criminal work on
361. See generally H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of
Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695 (2000) (suggesting that this
investigative oversight and gatekeeping would best be done by mature prosecutors able to
summon0n uL) a degree of dispassion).
362. See supra note 255.
363. Lynch, Our Administrative System, stIpra note 6, at 2150.
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the defense side affect prosecutorial behavior? One might theorize that,
having had this experience, a prosecutor is more likely to maintain an
arm's-length relationship with agents, having been trained to focus on
their excesses and weaknesses. Moreover, just as "greater investment in
occupation-specific," as opposed to "firm-specific" human capital, will
make a lawyer more committed to the profession as a whole, 364 so might
a career path that orients to the adjudicative process generally, not a particular side of it. On the other hand, defense lawyers trying to reconcile
their duties to court and client understandably tend to develop just the
agnostic deference to the adversary system that could promote a laissezfaire attitude toward investigative processes. 3 65 As for retention policies:
Limitations on assistant tenure could foster greater orientation to the
outside legal community and promote a professional solidarity in contradistinction to agency culture. But shorter tenures could also limit prosecutorial experience, leading assistants to rely more upon agents' enforcement expertise, and therefore to become more deferential. These
avenues for inquiry ought to be pursued.
CONCLUSION

This is very much a work in progress. Part of the challenge comes
from the very nature of the model of decisionmaking this article embraces. The "Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model" of decisionmaking described by Graham Allison in his masterful study of the
Cuban Missile Crisis seems particularly apt for understanding the federal
enforcement bureaucracy because of its studied refusal to see policy as
the product of a unitary actor.3 66 But this model can make one too open
to nuance. As Allison noted, it "tells a fascinating story, but it is enormously complex. The information requirements are often overwhelm' 36 7
ing, and many of the details of the bargaining may be superfluous.
Another part of the challenge comes with the period of flux in which
this Article has been written. It is too soon to say how much enforcement
agencies have changed their priorities since September 11, but they have
364. Jean E. Wallace, Organizational and Professional Commitment in Professional
and Nonprofessional Organizations, 40 Admin. Sci. Q. 228, 239 (1995) ("Lawyers who have
more experience outside the current workplace and who have attended an elite law school
have invested more in their legal career and should therefore be more committed to the
profession.").
365. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175, 182
(1983-1984); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on
Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 925, 954 (2000) ("It is the
prosecutor's responsibility to anticipate and counter defense strategies-even those that
play into juror prejudice. If they fail to do so, why blame the defense?"). The allure of this
"epistemological demurrer" can be felt by lawyers outside the criminal defense bar as well.
See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 618
(1985).
366. Allison, supra note 270, at 144.
367. Id. at 274.
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changed. If investigative agencies focus more on prevention,3 6 8 and presumably less on pursuing cases in court, agency dependence on prosecutors will be reduced.
So let us conclude by following Heraclitus of Ephesus3 69 as well as
Graham Allison. All is indeed in flux within the federal enforcement bu-

reaucracy, but it hag always been so, with the balance between agents and
prosecutors a changing function of exogenous enforcement priorities, institutional structures, and procedural rules. In the large space of indeterminacy created by substantive and constitutional law, however, this balance-and not that between citizen and the state-needs far more
attention. For in our second-best world, it may be the citizen's primary
source of protection.
368. See Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1 (2002)
(statement of Robert S. Mueller, Ill, Director, FBI), available at http://www.senate.gov/
7jtidiciary/testimony.cfm?id=279&witjid=608 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Dan
Eggen, Ashcroft Plans to Reorganize justice, Curtail Programs, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 2001, at
A17 (reporting that Attorney General Ashcroft declared "that the primary mission of
federal prosecutors, FBI agents and immigration officers must become thwarting future
terrorist strikes"); Allan Lengel, FBI Leaving Some Cases Untouched, Wash. Post, Mar. 3,
2003, at B] ("The FBI's emphasis on terrorism has prompted the agency to scale back
investigations of other once high-priority crimes throughout the Washington region,
including white-collar offenses, housing fraud, drug trafficking and street violence,
according to local and federal law enforcement officials and investigators."); Lichtblau,
supra note 266; Abraham McLaughlin, Secret Service Dons New Roles for a New Era,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 6, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/
0206/p02s02-uspo.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that "since Sept. 11,
demand for the service of this gold-standard in global security has exploded").
The calls for prevention-oriented strategies are certainly louder since September 11,
but the strategies themselves may not be that new. See David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams,
FBI Restructuring to Emphasize Crime Prevention, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1999, at A2.
369. See Anthony Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason: A History of Western Philosophy
from the Greeks to the Renaissance 44 (2000) (discussing idea of Heraclitus (c. 540-c. 480
BC) "that beneath the apparent harmony and stability of things, everything is in a state of
flux, a battleground of conflicting opposites").

